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György Szabados
Membership in Civic Association in Central and Eastern Europe: a Longitudinal Analysis

MĂLINA VOICU
Department of Sociology, University of Bucharest

Abstract:
This paper focuses on the trends in civic participation in ten post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe, trying to see which mechanism led to changes in the pattern of civic participation during the post-communist period – intra-cohort change or cohort replacement. The analyses are based on the three successive waves of European Values Survey, collected in 1990, 1999 and 2008. Using the cohort decomposition analysis, the social change is partitioned in changes due to the replacement of the older cohort socialized in an environment less favourable to civic participation and to the changes produced by the transformation in the social context and by individual aging. During the last two decades, the rate of civic participation has decreased in all the countries included in the analysis, with the exception of Slovenia. This negative evolution is due to the intra-cohorts changes and it is quite likely the outcome of the economic crises occurred during the transition to the market economy and of the inappropriate functioning of the democratic institutions. The cohort replacement exerts a significant positive effect on most countries, but its contribution to the total social change is weaker than the effect of the intra-cohort change.

Keywords: Civic Participation; Central and Eastern Europe; Longitudinal Analysis; Cohort Decomposition.

Introduction

The civic participation in Central and Eastern Europe is below the level recorded during the older democracy in Western Europe and North America. Post-communist societies from the former soviet bloc are known for being civically and politically passive for various reasons: distrust in institutions and people (Wallace, Pichler & Haerpfer, 2012), lack of communication with their fellow citizens (Mondak & Gearing, 1998) or economic hardships (Lane, 2005). On the other hand, the political and the civic participation are very important for the consolidation of democracy in the region (Badescu & Radu, 2010) and this lack of involvement is detrimental to the consolidation of the democracy.

The dynamics of the civic participation in the Western democracies were already investigated and the results pointed out a stable pattern in Western Europe (Wallace, Pichler & Haerpfer, 2012; van Ingen, 2008) and a decrease regarding the civic activism in the case of the United States (Wallace, Pichler & Haerpfer, 2012), as predicted by Putnam (2000). The evolution of the civic participation was less investigated in the post-communist countries, due to the lack of comparative data. Howards (2003) investigated the dynamics of the civic society in Russia and in East Germany finding a decrease of the civic activism in Russia between 1995 and 1999, while Wallace, Pichler and Haerpfer (2012) compared four countries from Central and Eastern Europe with the ones from the Commonwealth of Independent States and with the trend registered in
Western Europe. The current work fills in this gap of lack of information about the dynamics of the civic society in Central Europe, by analysing the trends in the membership in civic associations in 10 countries from Central Europe, that are currently members of the European Union. While Wallace, Pichler and Haerpfer (2012) analyse the trend only in four countries in the region: Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, the current paper extends the comparison by including other six countries, not investigated by Wallace, Pichler and Haerpfer (2012) namely: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic. Moreover, while the previous work only described the trends, the current analysis goes further and decomposes the social change to its components and investigates the mechanisms producing the changes in the civic participation during the post-communist period.

The social change in attitude and behaviour occurs due to three different mechanisms: the replacement of the older cohort by the younger ones that have a different attitude and behaviour, changes occurring because of the transformation of the political, economic and social context and changes due to the individual transition from one life cycle to another. During the last 20 years, the countries from Central and Eastern Europe have experienced a significant transformation of their politics and society, with a stronger impact on the civic society evolution. The freedom of speech and the association process provide a favourable background for the civic participation, while the increasing number of NGOs provides more opportunities regarding the involvement. Therefore, the post-communist cohorts were socialized in a more favourable climate concerning the civic participation. On the other hand, the economic hardships and the democratic deficit, in some post-communist countries, affected negatively the willingness to participate.

This paper analyses the dynamics of membership in the civic association between 1990 and 2008, paying special attention to the mechanisms of social change in ten post-communist countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). The paper is based on data from three successive waves of European Values Survey (1990, 1999, 2008) and employs the linear cohort decomposition (Firebaugh, 1992), a technique allowing the separation of the effects produced by the cohort replacement of those caused by the intra-cohort change, namely by the contextual transformations and the individual life cycles.

This paper is organized in four sections. The first section includes the theoretical framework, while the second describes the data used in the analyses, the method employed and the main indicators. The third section presents the results of the empirical analyses and the last section contains the main conclusions and the implication for further researches.

**Cohorts’ replacement, contextual changes and life cycles effects**

According to the theories of social change, the transformations in attitude and behaviour are the result of three different mechanisms: the cohorts’ replacement, the contextual changes and the life cycles effects.

The contribution of the cohorts’ replacement to social change is based on the assumption that attitudes and behaviours are learnt early in life and remain stable afterwards. The primary formative experiences have an enduring influence on the behaviours and the attitudes of every generation (Mannheim, 1952; Ryder, 1965). The attitudes and the behaviours of each cohort significantly differ from the others, depending on the type of social, economic and political context during their formative period. Therefore, the differences among the generations ‘reflect a historically specific set of conditions’ (Alwin, 1990, p. 348). The social change is the outcome of cohort replacement, older cohorts being replaced by younger ones socialized in a different environment.

According to the sociological literature, civic skills are acquired early in life and the participation during the formative years and youth increases the probability to participate in civic activities during adulthood (Kirlin, 2002). Few institutions and life experiences are particularly important
for learning the skills required for civic participation: family, school and involvement in extra-curricular activities. Parents are usually models for their offspring and their participation will lead to a similar behaviour among the young generation (Niemi & Sobieszek, 1977; Langton, 1984; Janoski & Wilson, 1995; Khane & Sporte, 2008). A similar effect was reported in the case of neighbourhood (Khane & Sporte, 2008). Moreover, the family climate seems to be important as well, Almond and Verba (1963) reporting higher political competencies and civic skills among the children raised in families that involved them in decision making since early in their life.

The school may boost civic participation through various channels that contribute to the acquisition of fundamental civic skills. Therefore, curricular, as well as extra-curricular, activities seem very important in creating civic skills, such as teaching classes of civic education (Niemi & Sobieszek, 1977; Torney-Purta, 2002; Khane & Sporte, 2008), students’ involvement in community service programs and clubs (Khane & Sporte, 2008; Claes, Hooghe & Stolle, 2009). Moreover, what happened in the classroom exerts an important role on pupils’ civic competences, like discussing problems encountered by the local community and possible ways to overcome them, providing students with an open climate and with the opportunity to openly discuss controversial issues, encouraging them to participate in school councils or exposing them to civic role models (Langton, 1984; Torney-Purta, 2002; Khane & Sporte, 2008). All mentioned activities help children to develop a civic identity and to acquire and practice civic skills (Kirlin, 2002; Kelly, 2008). Hooghe and Wilkenfeld (2008) show that by the age of 14, the teenagers have already acquired the ‘fundamental attitudes associated with citizenship’ (p. 166).

Contextual effects. Changes in attitudes and behaviour might occur as the outcome of social, economic and political events experienced during the adulthood. The unusual events, such as the Great Depression, World War II or the French Revolution create new relevant issues in life and may cause certain transformation in the early orientations (Sears & Valentino, 1997). However, not only significant events such as wars and revolutions, but also transformations in the political and economic landscape can induce transformation in what regards people’s willingness to participate. Such transformation are: changes with respect to the access to basic democratic right, like freedom of speech and association, a period of economic hardships (Wallace & Pichler, 2008) or poor quality output of the public institutions, which undermine legitimacy. In the case of the United States and Western Europe, Putnam (2000) shows that the contextual changes, like secularization and consumerism, may decrease the civic engagement.

Aging and the life cycle effects. While there is no consensus regarding how aging affects civic engagement, previous researches found a significant effect of aging on civic activism. Howard (2003) shows that older people are more likely to take part in the civic activism. This is because they have already collected experiences of participation and they have acquired the skills needed for the civic participation. Jennings and Stoker (2004) find that civic involvement increases during middle-age and decreases afterwards. Participation is also connected with individual resources, those having more resources being more probable to participate, because they have resource to share (Wilson, 2000; Pearce, 1993). Therefore, older people who have many resources in terms of time, wealth and skills are more likely to participate. On the other hand, Rotolo (2000) points out the existence of significant differences in participation depending on marital status and parenthood, while van Ingen (2008) shows that having children may induce a positive effect regarding the civic participation. All in all, the movement from one life cycle to another exerts an effect on civic participation.

The contextual effect, aging and the life cycle effects represent the intra-cohort part of the social change. Therefore, social change may occur due to changes in attitudes and behaviours of the successive birth cohorts and is the result of the replacement of the older population cohort with the new cohorts. The second mechanism leading to social change may be represented by the intra-cohort change, transformations produced within the cohort during its adult life and due to either growing old or to the transformation of the social and economic context.
Civic participation in post-communist countries

Post-communist transition brought many significant changes regarding the civil society and the civic participation in Central and Eastern Europe. The establishment of the new democratic rights and institutions created the framework for the development of the civil society. Moreover, many international NGOs became active in the post-communist countries. However, the level of civic participation remains very low, as already documented by previous researches (Wallace, Pichler & Haerpfer, 2012; Valkov, 2009a). Looking from a longitudinal perspective, there are some factors that have stimulated the development of civic society in Central and Eastern Europe, while others have obstructed it.

The change of political regime, from totalitarian to a democratic one, provided the post-communist citizens with a large range of political rights and civil liberties, like freedom of speech and freedom of association which are central for civic participation (Wallace, Pichler & Haerpfer, 2012). The younger generations are now socialized in a democratic context and are more likely to share pro-democratic values and attitudes as well (Voicu, 2010). The educational curriculum in schools includes civic education and a closer contact with the Western culture, makes the younger generations more inclined to assume participatory behaviours and to be more active in the civic associations. In addition, in all post-communist countries, the number of NGOs has increased a lot, providing people with more participation opportunities (Howard, 2003; Lane, 2005).

Previous researches analysing values and behaviours of the younger cohorts in post-communist societies point out to a significant effect of socialization during the transition period. The younger people are more inclined to support democracy (Mishler & Rose, 2007) or to participate in protest activities (Nikolayenko, 2007, 2008). I expect to find a similar effect of the early socialization during democracy on civic participation, because younger cohorts can acquire civic skills in school, they can learn about civic participation from mass-media and from direct contact with the Western culture and they have the opportunity to get involved, due to the increased number of organizations existing in the new democracies from Central and Eastern Europe.

Several macro-level factors were employed to explain the persistence of the lower implication of post-communist citizens in the civil society: the economic development, the level of democratization and the pre-existing institutional framework of civic participation.

Generally speaking, economic prosperity influences the propensity towards civic participation. People living in prosperous societies are more likely to get involved in civic associations (Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006; Acik-Toprak, 2009). Wealthier societies have enough resources to support associations and their citizens are more educated and have more leisure time to spend outside the formal labour market (Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). A lower level of economic development could partially explain the weakness of civic societies in post-communist countries; most of them scored low on this dimension as compared to the Western countries (Lane, 2005). Moreover, studies have shown that Slovenia, which is the most prosperous post-communist country, has the highest score regarding the civic participation in the region (Acik-Toprak, 2009; Wallace, Pichler & Haerpfer, 2012). On the other hand, all post-communist countries have experienced an economic crisis during the first decade of the post-communist transformation that has produced disappointment with the new political and economic system and made many people avoid the public sphere (Lane, 2005). Moreover, the economic hardships make people more concerned by their own survival and less interested in the public life (Wallace & Latcheva, 2006).

The country level of democratization exerts a significant impact on the level of civic participation (Acik-Toprak, 2009). A minimal access to civil liberties and political rights is required in order to establish and run some civic organizations. Moreover, democracy fosters a participatory political culture that is needed for the development of civic associations (Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). Although many countries from Central and Eastern Europe reached a certain level of
democratization, some inadequate democratic forms, such as corrupt elections and deficient party formation, occurred in many of these societies and led to political apathy (Lane, 2005).

According to Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001), the institutionalized cultural frames affect the level and the character of the associational activity across nations (p. 810). These frames are rooted in the political, religious and economic history of those countries. Basically, the establishment of the new civic associations in post-communist countries has to fit these specific frames in order to be successful. Although the level of the civic activism was never very high, civic associations existed before the establishment of the communist regime (Valkov, 2009b) and even during the communist period. Lane (2005) points out that during the communist period a fragmented civic society developed, but it had different shape as compared to the Western one.

The communist state had established certain associations, like women’s associations and labour unions, which provided some basic welfare services, but the membership was rather compulsory. The legacy of the compulsory membership resides in the mistrust in the formal organization and civic passivity (Howard, 2003). On the other hand some associations were established outside the state bureaucracy, like writers associations, professional associations or philatelic clubs (Lane, 2005). The membership was not compulsory, but the activity was strictly monitored by the state. Moreover, due to the economy shortage, the communist citizens have developed private social networks, that helped them get access to goods and services (Howard, 2005). These networks continued to exist during the post-communist transition and obstructed the development of the formal civic associations.

According to Lane (2005) the pre-existing framework did not fit the Western model of civic involvement and made the external help provided by the Western countries non-attractive and non-effective for the development of the civic society. Moreover, this external help represented rather a ‘top-down’ approach, than a membership based one, because the external donors came with their own agenda which did not always correspond to the local one. This generated even more distrust in formal institutions (Wallace, Picher & Haerpfer, 2012).

Therefore, the economic crisis, the ineffective democratic system and the lack of compatibility between the local institutional structure of the civic society and the model of the Western civic society exerted a negative effect on the development of the civic sector. I expect these factors to exert a similar negative impact on all the cohorts and to have an impact on the level of the civic participation via the intra-cohort mechanism.

Previous researches focused on the dynamics of the political participation in Central and Eastern Europe pointed out a negative evaluation during the first year of transition due to the ‘honey moon’ effect (Weil, 1989). In the beginning of the transition the general expectations were very high and the new democracy was highly praised. Therefore, people were very willing to support democracy and to get involved in political activities. However, due to the economic crises and to the failure of the new regime to provide the expected output, the population was disappointed and the political participation decreased everywhere (Kostadinova, 2003). I expect to find a similar evolution in the case of the civic participation as well.

Based on the theoretical framework exposed here, I formulated the following hypotheses:

(H1) The level of the civic participation decreased in the countries from Central and Eastern Europe during the last two decades.

(H2) The intra-cohort change exerts a negative impact and represents the main mechanism of change of the civic participation in post-communist countries during the investigated period.

(H3) The cohort replacement exerts a positive effect on the civic participation, the cohort socialized during the post-communist period being more inclined to participate in the civic life.
Data and methods

The analysis is based on the data set resulting from the three successive waves of European Values Survey (EVS), carried out in 1990, 1999 and 2008 in countries from all the European regions. The questionnaire provides information regarding the orientation of the attitudes, the values and the behaviours with respect to a broad range of life domains, including civic participation. Other information regarding the social background variables is available, too. My analyses deal with the following ten countries belonging to the former communist bloc: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. All the national samples are probability samples. The database provides information regarding each country from three points in time, 1990, 1999 and 2008. The data comes from the Integrated Dataset EVS 2008 (GESIS, 2010).

The linear cohort decomposition method, adapted for logistic models, was used to test the hypotheses. The method, proposed by Firebaugh (1989) allows the decomposition of the social change in two orthogonal components, the intra-cohort change and the cohort replacement. The first step is to pool the cross-sectional data and to regress the target variable of the survey year and the cohort (respondent's birth year). The intra-cohort change can be estimated according to the slope of the year weighted by the length of the time interval \( t - t_1 \) (the difference between the year of the last investigation and the year of the first one) (p. 253). The cohort replacement is estimated by the slope for the birth year weighted by the rate of the cohort turnover (the difference between the average of birth year at the time of the last survey and the same average at the time of the first survey). Because my target variable is a dichotomous one, I have adapted the linear decomposition model to the logistic regression, following the method used by Brooks (2000) and Brooks and Manza (1997).

Although the linear decomposition does not solve the confounding effects of aging, period and cohort, it has the advantage of employing the most information to estimate the cohort replacement effect, because it uses both non-spanning and spanning cohorts. However, it just partitions the social change in two orthogonal components – those produced by the modification of the population composition and those due to the change within the cohort (Alwin, 1996).

Although some authors recommend not using the control variables in the cohort decomposition models because other variables might mask the pure cohort replacement effect (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988), Alwin (1990) shows that cohorts differ with respect to education, and education has a significant effect on values and behaviour. Therefore, Alwin recommends the education monitoring when decomposing the social change in order to separate the effect of early socialization from the effect of schooling. Consequently, I have chosen to run two different sets of models for each country, one set without any control variable, which presents the pure effect of the cohort replacement and a second set including education as control variable that accounts for inter-cohort differences. No other control variable was used as it might induce errors in estimating and interpreting the cohort replacement effect (see Firebaugh & Davis, 1988). In all the models described I used listwise deletion of missing values. A table including a number of cases, by country and the percent of deleted cases after listwise deletion is provided in the Appendix (see Table A1).

The dependent variable is represented by the membership in voluntary organizations. The variable indicates whether the respondent belongs (coded 1) or not (coded 0) to any of the following voluntary organizations and activities: social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people, religious organizations, educational, artistic, musical or cultural activities; third world development or human rights, conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights, professional associations, youth work, sports or recreation, women’s groups, peace movements, voluntary organizations concerned with health and other groups. The alternative model was tested, using an index without trade unions membership as dependent variable, but the final results were very similar.

\(^2\) For more information about European Values Study see the website: \(\text{http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu}\).

\(^3\) From the original list of
organization included in the EVS questionnaire membership in political parties and in labour union was skipped when editing the index. I have excluded the political parties as the political participation is different from the civic participation and I have also excluded labour unions because the membership in labour unions was compulsory during the communist period and it used to be higher in the beginning of the post-communist period, as a heritage from the communist time without a clear connection to the real civic participation.

The participation in the civic organization is not a one-dimensional concept, the authors distinguishing between old and new social movements (Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001) or between instrumental and expressive associations (Glanville, 2004). However, I have followed Ruiter and de Graaf (2006), who consider it as a single dimension concept and built one indicator that included all types of associations. My choice was determined by the relative limited level of the civic participation in the countries investigated, which reduced the number of the cases used in the analysis. Therefore, a multidimensional approach would produce more insightful results, but due to reasons of reliability I have decided to include the participation in all the types of associations as a single indicator.

The analysis employed only one control variable: education, measured in age when completed.

**Results**

The countries in Central and Eastern Europe differ in respect to the speed of transition and to approaching the social and economic reforms. Some countries have experienced a milder transition with a less harmful economic crisis than others. The figures in the Table A2, in the appendix, show that while some countries went through a period of economic depression, not only in the beginning of the 90’s, but also in the beginning of 2000, other countries recovered faster or had a smoother transition. These differences might leave their mark on the level of civic participation and could explain, at least in part, the different trends experienced by some countries.

Although in seven of the ten countries analysed in the current paper, the trends in civic participation were very similar, there are some notable differences. The data in Figure 1 indicate a decline in civic participation in the seven countries, during the transition period, which was more abrupt during the first decade, while the pace of change was reduced during the second decade. In the beginning of the post-communist transition, more than 50% of population from Estonia, Latvia, Czech Republic and Lithuania declared that they belonged to civic associations, while in 1999 this percent drastically decreased in all of these countries. Romania and Bulgaria had the lowest participation rate in 1990 and the decreasing trend reduced the civic involvement even more. Once should mention that Bulgaria and Romania were the poorest countries in 1990 among the ten investigated, and had a lower GDP in 2000 than in 1990. Moreover, they have the lower GDP during the entire period and in the same time, among the lowest level of civic involvement.

Slovakia and the Czech Republic followed a different pattern. The pace of change was very slow in the Czech Republic during the first decade under investigation, while during the second decade, the civic participation decreased with 15%. In Slovakia the civic association membership increased first and then drastically decreased during the second decade. Both countries had a higher level of economic development and in 2000 the GDP was almost the same with the one in 1990, which indicated that the countries overcame the difficult transition period by the end of the first decade of the post-communist transition. This might partially explain the relative stability of the association membership over the first decade of transformation. Afterwards, the trend became a descending one in what concerned the civic participation, which can probably be explained by another mechanism, like the gap between the frame provided by Western tradition of civic participation and the pre-existing tradition of civic participation in these countries.
The evolutionary process in the case of Slovenia was completely different. In the beginning of the transition the civic participation level was very low, similar to the Bulgarian one. However, the membership rate increased during both decades, although the pace of change was slower during the second period. This result is corroborated by other researches that have also pointed out a revival of the civic society in Slovenia and associated this evolution with the high level of the economic development in Slovenia, as compared to other countries in the region and with the particularities of the Slovenian history (Acik-Toprak, 2009).
The results in Table 1 indicate a similar evolution. Basically, social change of the civic participation between 1990 and 2008 is negative and significant in all the countries under investigation with the exception of Slovenia. Latvia and Lithuania registered the highest gap, regarding the social participation, between the two points in time, while in Romania the social change was the lowest. All in all, the data validated the first hypothesis, showing a negative trend with respect to the civic participation in the post-communist countries.

The second hypothesis of the current research refers to the intra-cohort changes. According to the results in Table 1, intra-cohort changes are very important in all the countries included in the current analysis. In all these countries the intra-cohort changes are highly significant and negative, with the exception of Slovenia, where they are positive and significant. Therefore, the civic participation decreased in Central and Eastern Europe during post-communist period mainly due to the changes occurred in the social and economic context, and also due to the changes in the individual life cycles. Latvia and Lithuania displayed the highest intra-cohort changes over the investigated period. Therefore, the data validated the second hypothesis, pointing out the significant negative intra-cohort effects everywhere in the region. Due to significant positive effect of the intra-cohort change, Slovenia is again an exception.

The third hypothesis is supported by the empirical data, too. The data in Figure 2 presents the civic participation by generation at an aggregate level, in all countries together. The results show that the civic participation differs according to cohort. The older cohort is less civically active in all three points in time, while the youngest is more civically active. According to this data the oldest generation, born before 1994, has the lowest membership level of for all three points in time 1990, 1999 and 2008. This is a common country trend that can be noticed by the country analyses shown in Table 2. The other two generations, born and socialized during communist period (1945-1964 and 1965-1981) and the one born after 1981 have high levels of membership as compared to the older generation, but the differences between generations are smaller regarding the 2008 data. This might be the effect of collapsing all the countries together in Figure 2.
The cohort decomposition models present stronger proofs in support of the inter-cohort significant differences. In the model without controls, cohort replacement is positive and statistically significant in all countries, showing a positive effect of the early socialization on younger cohorts as compared to the older ones. However, in the models with education control, the cohort replacement is positive and significant in some countries, but not in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In these countries, the difference between birth cohorts is due to the effect of a different level of education, while in case of the other countries the higher level of civic
participation registered among the younger cohorts is due to the socialization in an environment more favourable to civic participation. The strongest positive effect of early socialization occurs in Latvia and Lithuania, followed by Slovenia and Romania. All in all, the results of the decomposition support the idea that younger generations have a higher membership level than the older ones and that cohort replacement is a significant mechanism of social change leading to the increase of the civic activism in central and Eastern Europe, although their effects are smaller than those of intra-cohorts changes.

Conclusions

This paper focuses on the trends in civic participation in ten post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe, trying to see which mechanism led to changes in pattern of civic participation during the post-communist period – intra-cohort change or cohort replacement. The analyses are based on the successive waves of the European Values Survey, collected in 1990, 1999 and 2008. Using the cohort decomposition analyses, the social change is partitioned in changes due to the replacement of the older cohort socialized in an environment less favourable to civic participation and to the changes triggered by the transformation of the social context and by individual aging.

The results support all three hypotheses. During the last two decades, civic participation has decreased in all the countries included in analysis, with the exception of Slovenia. These countries have entered the post-communist transition with a low level of civic participation as compared to the Western countries and during the last decades this level has decreased significantly. Moreover, this negative evolution is due to the intra-cohorts changes and it is quite likely that the outcome of the economic crises occurred during the transition to the market economy and of the inappropriate functioning of the democratic institutions. The cohort replacement exerts a significant positive effect on most of the countries, but its contribution to the whole social change is weak compared to the effect of the intra-cohort change.

After twenty year of post-communist transformation, the civic society seems to be weaker than in the beginning of the transition and weaker than the one in the Western countries. The general economic and political context strongly discourage civic participation, while the incompatibility between the Western type of volunteering and the civic tradition in post-communist countries obstructed the involvement in civic activities. However, there are positive prospects regarding the future development of the civic society in Central and Eastern Europe. In all countries included in this study, the new generation seems to be more civically active as compared to the older ones. This means that post-communist societies socialize their younger citizens in a more participatory culture and, in the long run, a more vivid civic society will develop due to cohort replacement mechanism.

Although civic participation is a multidimensional concept, this paper considers it as a one-dimensional concept and taps it by a single indicator, due to constrains related to the data availability. Therefore, the measurement of civic participation using a single indicator might slightly bias the results, because membership regarding all types of civic associations is included in the same indicator. This represents a limitation of this study and further researches might investigate the dynamics of the civic participation using separate indicators for new versus old social movements or intrinsic versus expressive associations. A larger sample can be useful and may lead to a better understanding of the processes that take place in the civic society in post-communist countries.

Further researches should investigate the way the civic society will evolve in the long run in post-communist societies and whether the consolidation of democracy in these countries produces more civically active citizens. Basically, this study is restricted only to countries which
are now members of the European Union, having a more consolidated democracy than the post-communist countries that are not part of European Union. Therefore, further researches should compare the dynamics of the civic society in the post-communist EU and non-EU members and to investigate whether and how the EU accession impacts the civic activism.

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Appendix

Table A1: Total number of cases by country and percent of deleted cases after the listwise deletion of missing values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of deleted cases</th>
<th>N after listwise deletion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A2: The Gross Domestic Product between 1990 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7.527</td>
<td>7.213</td>
<td>11.991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>16.320</td>
<td>16.886</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>10.087</td>
<td>10.937</td>
<td>18.773</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>12.282</td>
<td>13.583</td>
<td>18.004</td>
</tr>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>10.078</td>
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<td>15.593</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>11.780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>12.718</td>
<td>20.515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>16.405</td>
<td>19.722</td>
<td>27.197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nation Development Program

Acknowledgments: This work was supported by the strategic grant POSDRU/89/1.5/S/62259, Project ‘Applied social, human and political sciences. Post-doctoral training and post-doctoral fellowships in social, human and political sciences’ co-financed by the European Social Fund within the Sectorial Operational Program Human Resources Development 2007–2013.
Rent-Seeking as Social Policy: A UK Case Study

NICK JOHNS
Cardiff University, UK

ADRIAN BARTON
Plymouth University, UK

MARK HYDE
Plymouth University, UK

Abstract

Rent-seeking has been an important concept in economics since the 1950s but has not been sufficiently mined in the field of social policy. This paper aims to address this by employing a UK case study to illustrate the relevance of rent-seeking in this context. In doing so it attempts to set out a means of identifying where rents are sought, by whom and the levers they use to extract them. In the UK rent-seeking and welfare is often implicitly linked to 'welfare scrounging'. Here we show that this is not necessarily the case and that rent-seeking has much greater explanatory power in relation to social policy processes and transfers. By also introducing a contextual dimension we demonstrate that market and bureaucratic forms of rent-seeking can operate simultaneously. More work remains to be done to fully articulate these processes, however this constitutes one starting point for this work to develop.

Keywords: Social Policy; Justice; Market Rent-Seeking; Political Rent-Seeking; Bureaucratic Rent-Seeking; UK Policing.

Introduction

For some time now there has been recognition of an inverse care law relating to the allocation of welfare resources (Hart, 1971), that those in greatest need often receive the least in terms of services and resources. This can operate through the greater awareness of processes and resources by the ‘middle classes’, through the systems of welfare, but also through taxation policy. We would argue that there is another dimension to this issue, which is that private institutions are also consuming public resources to a large extent in ways that are opaque and unexpected.

While there were concerns about the privatisation agenda of New Labour, there have also been much more specific themes in public debate. For example, the sponsorship of police patrol cars by private sector organisations has led to anxiety about the impact this might have on policing. Will sponsors be treated preferentially? Even where they do not have these incentives, it can be argued that property receives more police attention than the community more widely (Barton & James, 2003).
This paper overlaps with these matters but we extend the analysis to include the ways in which private organisations already consume more than their fair share of public resources. In order to do so we employ an economic concept, rent-seeking, that has been available since the 1950s, but which has not really been sufficiently mined in the social policy literature. On the borderline between economics and social policy authors like van Parijs (1995) have used rent-seeking to show its applicability in individual cases but little has been made of its organisational relevance.

We start out by discussing the principal concept of rent-seeking, explaining its usage in the current paper, outlining its history and its various applications before explaining its adaptation here. Finally we evaluate its relevance by first talking about the ways in which rent-seeking by private organisations occurs, and second by producing a UK case study of policing drawn from previous work by one of the authors.

Rent-seeking: context, concept and history

Although there were discussions in economic circles as early as the 1950s that skirted around the idea of rent-seeking, the actual term was not coined until the mid-1970s. Its first formal appearance came in an article entitled ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’ by Anne Kruger, published in 1974 in the *American Economic Review*. However, the individual scholar generally credited with the initial generation of the concept was the public choice economist Gordon Tullock in a series of important publications during the 1960s and 70s (Rowley, 2005).

Consistent with the foundations of such debates, the basis for our discussion is distributive justice, that ideal of justice which concerns itself with the fair and just distribution of social rewards, *benefits* and goods (Miller, 1999). Determining who should get what in accordance with distributive justice is conventionally based on different conceptual grounds, which includes criteria like need and desert. In this paper our focus is on desert, in other words what proportion of available resources do people *deserve*? The idea of an *unjustified* transfer in this context refers to the surplus value people obtain over and above their productive achievements, the unearned, unmerited *benefits* accrued. Rent-seeking occurs where participants in the distributional game pursue income or other tangible rewards by manipulating an aspect of the economic environment so that it is biased in their favour, rather than by adding value to production. If successful, rent-seeking results in the extraction of economic rents, which are represented by the *difference* between the value of an agent’s actual productive achievement and the value of their realised remuneration.

Of course there are *different* perspectives on the source and causes of rent-seeking behaviour and these are informed by competing political philosophies. Due to limited space we can only really construct broad-brush approximations of very complex political perspectives as we intend to address this aspect of rent-seeking more fully elsewhere. Nevertheless, that a heuristic device is simple does not reduce its potential usefulness (Hellawell, 2006). Rent-seeking is seen to be the preserve of *different* actors depending on the political perspective adopted. For those on the right of the political spectrum, individuals we might refer to as ‘neo-Liberals’, rent-seeking is generally a political activity. According to one prominent classical liberal philosopher, rent-seeking should be *defined* as “...a special feature of politics, where individuals and groups lobby political leaders to help them [...] appropriate rents that properly belong to others” (Barry, 1998, p.51). For another, the “...term ‘rent-seeking’ *defines* the process of expending resources in order to obtain favours from the government” (Macey, 1998, p.376). This we will refer to as ‘political rent-seeking’.

Alternatively, classical Marxists have focused on the private power that is conferred by the ownership of productive assets, which permits the extraction of a surplus from the labour of employees. In their view, the possibility of labour exploitation is created by the concentration of *capital ownership*, which means that the circumstances in which contracts between employees and their employers are established are neither equal nor fair. Deprived of access to the means
of production, workers have no choice but to sell their labour power if they are to subsist. This
dependence on employment means that owners of capital, or those who represent their interests,
are able to pay wages that are less than the productive contribution of their employees. The
economic rent is ‘surplus value’, as indicated by subtracting the worker’s wage from the value of
his or her productive achievement. Labour exploitation today is perhaps best illustrated by the
distributional consequences of the global decentralisation of production, reflecting the growing
prominence of trans-national corporations in networks of production and distribution. While
workers in developing countries are paid in terms of their local hourly wage rates, the commodities
they produce are sold at retail prices in the developed world, generating profits that substantially
exceed the costs of production (Bakan, 2004).

Having sketched out two opposing positions on rent-seeking we need to consider one final
point, that there is another element that moves an unearned transfer into the realm of ‘rents’,
that it is not justified by the public interest. Theoretically, it is conceivable that the allocation of
an unearned benefit might conform to the distributive ideal of promoting the public good. For
example, a certain transfer could be required as a right of citizenship, particularly in the distribution
of welfare resources, that the market cannot provide those resources through voluntary exchange,
and that the only recourse is for the state to step in and take some form of public action. The
public interest test is common to both philosophical traditions outlined above, although the
components obviously differ. The core feature of citizenship will be liberty for the neo-Liberal
(Nozick, 1974; Machan, 2008) and equality for the neo-Marxist. These considerations are
especially important for the dissection of the case material provided in our discussion section.

In sum, rent-seeking is an economic concept that denotes the acquisition of rewards, benefits
or goods over and above what might be considered just according to the productive achievements
of the recipient or recipients. There are different perspectives on the subject of rent-seeking that
blame either political actors for offering rewards to target voters for electoral purposes, or, ruling
elites who use their influence with political actors to obtain a greater share of resources than
they would ordinarily be entitled to. While rent-seeking is generally considered to be unjust in
terms of distributive justice, there may be instances where the ‘rent’ is justifiable by virtue of
the public interest, and this test is common to all philosophical traditions though with different
core components. Having set the conceptual framework, we now turn to the question of its
application.

Applying the concept of rent-seeking

Drawing on the previous work of one of the authors (Hyde & Dixon, 2009) we maintain that in
order to make sense of rent-seeking as a real world activity there are five basic components that
need to be factored in, as set out in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site or context</th>
<th>Rents sought</th>
<th>Rent-seeking agent</th>
<th>Leverage asset</th>
<th>Exploited agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The first thing to consider is the site or location in which rent-seeking activities occur. From
the broad political perspectives we outlined earlier the context is not vastly important as the
relations that spawn rent-seeking are pretty much defined by the economic and political system,
as long as a system can be defined as democratic on the one hand and capitalistic on the other, the
specific context may not always be singularly important. However, drawing on the social research
literature, particularly Pawson & Tilley (1997), we consider that the actual context in which rent-
seeking occurs is important.
The second component is the rent-seeking agent. This can be a very complex dimension to unravel. For example, taking our broad-brush approach we might see either political or ruling elites as the ultimate rent-seekers, but it could be more complicated than that? Arguably, looking at specific contexts allows a much more accurate attribution to be made about who is seeking rent and in what capacity they seek it. Further, it may also allow us to unpick the complicated interactions and inter-relationships that serve to obscure who really benefits from undeserved allocations.

Thirdly, there is the rent that is sought. This will vary according to the context, but will generally be resource-driven. Fourthly, we need to ask how those who seek rents actually manage to obtain them. Without some form of leverage they would not be able to achieve more than their fair share. Again from certain perspectives it might be that political elites use their power to distort the market via electoral processes; democracy is the leverage asset that they employ to allocate rents and to receive them. From another perspective it could simply be that ruling elites manipulate their economic power to accrue more than they merit, supplementing this with their influence over political elites. Taking a localised view of rent-seeking behaviour though might allow us to identify with greater accuracy what leverage assets rent-seekers employ to gain more than their just deserts.

The final component is the exploited agent. Who is it that loses out when a rent is attained? Just as with the task of identifying rent-seeking agents this can be complex, as individuals or groups might appear to fit in multiple categories. However, one means of assigning agency is to clarify the dominant category in relation to the specific rent. So, for the sake of clarity, an individual might well be a tax payer (a category that equates to the exploited agent) while also being a local councillor (hypothetically defined as a rent-seeker), in this situation the latter would be their definitive status. Having outlined the way in which rent-seeking can be applied, we next set out the illustrative case study.

Run to the sun: a case study

The empirical work involved a case study of a festival held annually in Cornwall known as ‘Run to the Sun’ conducted in 2002. In essence it was designed to explore the management of the event by public police and to consider its impact on ‘communities of interest’ (Giarchi, 1984). The principal communities were the police, the residents of Newquay (the nearest town) and the local businesses coupled with the event organisers. The research, as is common with case studies, was predominantly qualitative in nature and involved interviews with various actors, a documentary trawl through the local media and unstructured, non-participative observation (Silverman, 1993).

The festival is described as: ‘a weekend of cars, music, sea, surf and water pistols’ (SurfGuide, 2002). If there is a central philosophy it is about hedonism, “RTTS [Run to the Sun] has always adopted an anything goes approach” (RTTS, 2002). One of the key features of the event is that it does not remain on the host campsite but spills over into the main town centre. This has traditionally caused problems because of the increased traffic, as festival-goers display their cars, there are extensive water fights and additional pressure is placed on certain areas in the night-time economy.

Many residents do not enjoy the festival and see it as contrary to the general tourist culture central to the economy of the town. However, local businesses regard challenging this culture as potentially damaging:

The police may want to try and stop the use of water pistols, but the bad publicity fallout could seriously damage Newquay’s image of a fun town. Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, became a
dull backward area after the police started harassing the Spring Break visitors. This proved bad for business. Let’s hope Newquay won’t lose its appeal to young people that way (SurfGuide, 2002).

In fact, businesses exacerbated some of the problems; by refusing to stagger closing times, by selling water pistols and by promoting anti-social behaviour in advertising strategies.

During the observation there were several examples of anti-social behaviour and public order offences, and yet police officers in attendance elected to ignore them. Outside one pub:

Glasses were being broken, car roofs thumped, cars were prevented from leaving the pub car park... door staff ejected people from the pub grounds but they only moved across the road where their behaviour continued. All of this was witnessed by police officers stationed each side of the main crowd. **Those police officers made no move to address the situation during the period of observation (Barton & James, 2003, p.14).**

This behaviour chimed with interview data provided by a senior police officer who said “I don’t care if it takes six hours to drive around the town. My concern is that emergency vehicles can get through... the water pistols are a pain but not a priority. My priority is 2 a.m. closing and hot-hatch boy racers” (Barton & James, 2003, p.11). Residents writing to the local press seemed surprised at the levels of police tolerance for behaviour which might be classed as anti-social (Parish, 2002), as did a councillor during the interviews.

Although acknowledging the exceptions in both cases (annoyed business people and happy residents) the paper concluded that in managing the interests of competing communities, the police were supporting the entrepreneurial risk takers (businesses/organisers) at the expense of the wider community (Giddens, 1998). But we can now take this analysis further by employing our adapted concept of rent-seeking, because it is clear that not only are the interests of residents being over-ridden, they are actually paying for the ‘privilege’. Local businesses and organisers are receiving public resources to make the event possible. While we cannot say how much in total the event would have cost the public purse, we do know what the policing costs were. **The operation cost the local police service £70,000 with no contribution, despite repeated requests (Whitney, 2002), from local businesses or the event organisers. As a Bank Holiday weekend the costs would be elevated in any case, but not by this amount. Whatever the difference between the usual police budget and the RTTS policing could be considered a direct rent. In essence then, private organisations are receiving public welfare support for their activities over and above their contributions.** When we factor in other agencies, such as the coastguard and the National Health Service, the potential scale of the rent-seeking becomes more significant.

**Winners and losers**

Having set out the case material, we now need to apply our framework to identify the individual components of the rent-seeking process. However, as we shall see the traditional distinction between political and market rent-seeking does not always hold, nor do these fully cover the rent-seeking behaviour suggested in our case. Taking the most obvious instance first, we need to consider each component of the process. Newquay in Cornwall and its surrounding area constitutes the site or location of the rent-seeking behaviour, and this is the most straightforward element to classify. The rent sought would seem to be apparent but is actually a little more
complicated. Additional police resources offered to the festival organisers and local businesses are the most obvious rent, though there could well be other drains on public resources that are not factored in; for instance, extra work for the coastguard or the NHS as a result of more accidents and emergencies as postulated above.

The next part of our rent-seeking equation is the identity of the rent-seeking agents. Clearly, the organisers of the festival are achieving unpaid-for public support for their private activities, but, as we have seen, local businesses were offered protection for their property, and again this did not reflect their actual contributions. It was not paid for via direct payments, although this was possible as the police can be ‘hired’ for private events. Williams (2008) has shown the scale of this activity, which was referred to as ‘additional policing’ in the nineteenth century but is now identified as ‘special police services’. Nor was the extra police provision covered by hypothecated taxation or rates and so local businesses too must be regarded as rent-seeking agents. These might include outright owners of the capital assets or passive owners as shareholders.

There are also managers responsible for organisational assets (Wright, 1985). The claim that organisation assets can provide a distinctive basis of rent-seeking is equivalent to saying that agents can use their disproportionate control of organisation assets to generate remuneration that exceeds the value of their performances at work. The possibility of this form of rent-seeking in the private sector has allegedly been accentuated by the rise of the Anglo-American corporation, which gives managers and bureaucrats effective authority regarding the organisation of production. The separation of ownership and control, and thus the diminution of opportunities for the direct supervision of employees by owners, creates considerable scope for managers to use their authority to pursue their own ends. Although Marxists have drawn our attention to the possibility of labour exploitation, it is “...just as important to point to the possibility of management exploiting owners: they may capture quasi-rents, earned legitimately in business operations, through excessive pay rises, unjustifiable perks, and other examples of opportunism” (Barry, 1998, p.50). Thus rent-seeking in some contexts might be contrary to the will of owners of capital assets.

How do these different agents manage to extract the rent associated with unpaid for police resources? There would appear to be a range of different leverage assets. On the one hand, simply controlling capital assets or controlling organisational assets can create the circumstances where significant influence over public agencies like the police service can be exercised, which is exacerbated where organisations like the Chamber of Commerce represent their collective interests. On the other, these interests, including the festival organisers are able to cite local policy objectives to support their rent-seeking behaviours. One of the key industries in Cornwall is tourism. It accounts for 10% of employment in some of the most deprived communities such as Camborne and Redruth, compared to a national average of 8.2%. Tourism is also considered to be a growth industry as it accounts for £115 million per annum and is the UK’s fifth biggest industry. It employs 2.6 million people with another 2.9 million jobs predicted to appear by 2020 (Chorley, 2010). Thus RTS organisers can claim to be supporting local policy objectives by promoting tourism and boosting the local economy. Taken together these would be powerful leverage assets to secure rents in the form of unpaid-for police support.

Finally we come to the exploited agents. In our case this would appear to be local residents. On top of the specific rent there is the inconvenience involved in holding the festival, the noise, the public disorder and the traffic jams that bring the town to a virtual standstill. But the rent is more serious because what it means is that for the period of the festival they are not receiving the services they have paid for. What this in turn means is that the public services provided at other times are suspended, and this might have serious ramifications for public safety and protection. Furthermore, as it is historically recognised police policy to ‘borrow’ resources within and between service areas where demonstrations, festivals or other public events are concerned (Wallington, 1988) this means that residents in the surrounding area might find themselves with inadequate police cover. Consequently we can trace the entire rent-seeking process in this instance, and this
seems to be an example of market rent-seeking. This can be illustrated in the following table.

**Table 2: Economic rent-seeking process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site/context</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Rent-seeking agent</th>
<th>Leverage asset</th>
<th>Exploited agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newquay</td>
<td></td>
<td>Festival organisers</td>
<td>Reference to local policy objectives</td>
<td>Local residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capital owners</td>
<td>Capital ownership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(passive and active)</td>
<td>Collective representation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Controllers of organisational assets</td>
<td>(Chamber of commerce etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reference to local policy objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control of organisational assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective representation (Chamber of Commerce etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reference to local policy objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We said above that to ultimately qualify as an unjustified rent a particular transfer would have to fail the public interest test. Interestingly, this case fails the test from both a neo-Liberal and neo-Marxist perspective. In terms of the former, there is no reason that the additional police resources could not be paid for directly, and therefore no reason that public action is required (Williams, 2008). Negative liberty is not maximised by this transfer of resources to benefit festival organisers and owners of capital and the controllers of organisational assets. From the neo-Marxist perspective the equation is broadly similar except that the transfer fails to further any notion of equality. So, we can say that the use of additional police resources to benefit a few specific individuals is a rent and not simply a straightforward unjustifiable transfer. Earlier we said that the distinction between market and political rent-seeking is hard to make in reality, and this case study with its contextual emphasis illustrates this.

**Muddying the waters: bureaucratic rent-seeking**

The conceptual framework took into account market rent-seeking and political rent-seeking as distinct entities. In our case it seems that both can operate simultaneously. The piece of the puzzle that needs further explanation is the motive of the police service. They may be the providers of the rent but there appears to be more to their role than that. While it is probable that the police could be pressured into allocating additional resources through capital ownership and the control of organisational assets, certainly expressed through collective representation this would be limited and could be resisted. Nor would reference to local policy objectives necessarily be sufficient to encourage the allocation of such a rent. Therefore, we suggest that the police in this case are rent-seekers and that they are bureaucratic rent-seekers.

To underline this we need to use the same equation we applied above. The site is obviously the same, but the rent is slightly different. One defining feature of public sector agencies is the desire to expand and to secure more resources (Horn, 1995; Osborne & Plastrik, 1997). This is even
more evident in the current climate of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition’s ‘Big Society’ agenda. The rent sought by the police in this case would be extra resources from the Home Office to cover any deficit created by the festival.

The leverage asset is also different in this case. There might be some reference to local policy objectives but this would not necessarily secure resources from the centre. What the police have at their disposal is their professional identity. According to Wright (1985), skill credential assets—the possession of marketable skills and qualifications—enable individuals to generate remuneration that exceeds the value of their work performances. This is easiest to illustrate with reference to those who achieve the highest rewards for credentialed work. According to one set of arguments, professional workers in the market are, like other employees, rewarded in accordance with their marginal product, which means that their remuneration can never be excessive. Professional credentials indicate the possession of skills that are relevant to the execution of specific performances in work settings, and their role is simply to convey information about the suitability of individuals for employment. As far as remuneration is concerned, it is the performances that count, not the credentials, although it may sometimes look like this. While these specialist skills are not always persuasive, they do carry significant weight with policy-makers (Waddington & Hamilton, 1997).

According to one authoritative response (Wright, 1985), the primary role of credentials is to restrict entry to labour markets, giving employees leverage to achieve excessive remuneration. If this analysis is accepted, skilled workers have a direct interest in maintaining a system of credentials, not only for its role in facilitating the selection of appropriate personnel, but also because it artificially reduces the supply of labour, generating the possibility of excessive remuneration. One thing worth noting is the variance from traditional expectations where skills credential assets are generally understood to restrict access to professional ranks, here they are employed to expand resource acquisition.

Finally the identity of the exploited agents is more expansive. The local residents are the primary exploited agents as they are paying for services they are not receiving, but in seeking centrally allocated funds to help cover events like this, national tax payers are drawn into the equation. If resources are redirected to cover the original rent then this has the effect of creating new exploited agents. This can be illustrated in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site/context</th>
<th>Rent-seeking agent</th>
<th>Leverage asset</th>
<th>Exploited agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newquay</td>
<td>Local police service</td>
<td>Skills credential assets</td>
<td>Local residents (extended)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National tax payers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to categorise this as rent-seeking we ultimately need to apply the public interest test and bureaucratic rent-seeking also fails. Neither equality nor negative liberty is furthered. Wilding’s (1982) analysis invites us to consider the possibility that the performances of professionals at work can have harmful consequences both for their clients and for society as a whole. This is reflected in the failure of professionals to discharge their responsibilities in ways that meet the needs of their clients. In recent decades, it is clear that “professional have come in for considerable criticism from researchers, government, the media and popular opinion for a range of [...] failures of professional responsibility” (Wilding, 1982, p.93). This analysis of the professions invites us to consider the possibility that their performances at work can diminish economic and social welfare, which means that their value to society is open to debate.

The police might argue that they are pursuing the interests of their local population by
attempting to secure additional resources to benefit them. This is not convincing. On the one hand, if we were to accept it at face value, it merely shifts the emphasis between the primary and secondary exploited agents; national tax payers become the primary exploited agents and local residents secondary. On the other hand, as local residents have been neglected by the police in order to secure additional resources, there is no guarantee that new resources would be used to benefit them. By adopting a contextual focus we can see the complexity of rent-seeking, that political and market rent-seeking can occur simultaneously and that the level of exploitation can expand as a result.

**Conclusion**

The concept of rent-seeking has been insufficiently mined in the social policy literature and arguably it has great potential for identifying resource flows that cannot otherwise be readily conceptualised. In order to illustrate this we drew upon research previously conducted by one of the authors in the South West of England. The focus was therefore on the allocation of police resources a festival known as Run to the Sun in the local area, however, our framework could be applied to different social policy contexts.

By breaking things down into key components – site, rent-seeking agents, specific rents, leverage assets and exploited agents – it is possible to identify the process fairly clearly and underline its winners and losers. Some elements may never be fully accounted for, such as the influence of personal relationships or the potential for corruption, but it does at least give us a device with which to identify unjustified transfers and begin to unravel some of the complex motivations for rent-seeking behaviour.

In addition to the evaluative possibilities this article presents, there are also some important points that perhaps need further exploration. First, the role of private institutions and interests as consumers of public welfare and in particular the propensity for market rent-seeking that routinely occurs. Rent-seeking in the UK is often defined as an activity exclusively undertaken as ‘welfare scrounging’. On the contrary, we can see that public resources are also unjustifiably allocated to private sector organisations. Second, that rent-seeking is divided into either market or bureaucratic forms depending on the political perspective favoured by individual authors. Partly by factoring in a contextual dimension the inadequacy of this view becomes evident. In fact it would appear that market and bureaucratic rent-seeking operate side by side.

This work stands as an early attempt to apply the concept of rent-seeking in a social policy context, and it provides a potential tool for identifying who obtains more than they should, what they seek to obtain and what they use in order to do so. Ultimately, whichever political perspective we embrace the notion of rent-seeking should be weeded out wherever it is found. It is simply a matter of justice.

**References**


External Validity for One-Dimensional Cumulative Scaling on Supranational Political Decision-Making

LLUÍS COROMINA
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Girona, Spain

WILLEM E. SARIS
Research and Expertise Centre for Survey Methodology, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain

Abstract

This paper examines citizens’ preferences for a supranational decision-making in 21 European countries based on the data collected from the European Social Survey (ESS). The goal of this study is twofold. The first intention is to create a one-dimensional cumulative scale of political preferences at supranational level. Mokken scaling, a non-parametric item response approach is used for this purpose. We haven’t found any single unified European scale and clusters of countries based on citizens’ preferences regarding decision-making were carried out. Notably different levels of support emerged for supranational decision-making in different clusters. On that basis, individual scores for the level of supranational decision-making were developed. The second goal is to study the external validity of supranationalism in order to understand empirically which are the main factors responsible for determining the previously created level of supranationalism. Results show that most relevant variable is “trust in the European P” which has a strong positive effect on support for supranational decision-making, while trust in the national parliament has a negative effect on the same variable. The pattern of significant variables is similar across clusters but the ranking of most influential variables on supranationalism varies.

Keywords: Supranationalism; Political Preferences; Political Decision-Making, Mokken Scaling, Cross-Cultural Comparison; Political Trust.

Introduction

Strøm (2000) describes the chain of delegation of decision-making power in the European Union as follows: Elections determine the delegation of power from the voters to the national candidates. National parliaments have delegated part of their decision-making power to the European institutions. Such a structure could be perceived as multilevel governance (Jordan, 2000). Strøm (2000) considers the extent to which the European Commission and the different governments are responsible for different policies according to EU legislation. Responsibility is subject to the principle of subsidiarity, which, according to EU legislation determines the type of policies to be decided at each level (regional, national or supranational). Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to study the opinions of citizens living in different European countries about the connection between the level of political decision and several relevant policies.
The principle of subsidiarity was first ideated in 1992 during the Treaty of Maastricht and rewritten in the 1997 as part of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The principle of subsidiarity was updated on 13 December 2007 by the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007). The principle of subsidiarity indicates that policy decisions should be made at a level as close to the citizen as possible, ensuring the lowest effective level of governance (Dekker et al., 2007; Ederveen, Gelauff & Pelkmans, 2006; Føllesdal, 1998; Pelkmans, 2006). Consequently, the application of this principle may cause decentralization and shifting of power away from supranational entities. Countries may use this principle to enhance the power of their own territories and prevent high levels of supranational intervention. Taylor (2006, 2009) studied how the principle of subsidiarity is applied between the federal and national governments in Germany. Ederveen, Gelauff & Pelkmans (2006) and Dekker et al. (2007) compared centralization and decentralization for different policies.

The first part of the article is dedicated to the study of the subsidiarity preferences by European citizens; such level of subsidiarity is measured by the citizens’ preferences on the level of political decision-making for relevant policies. Preferences regarding policy levels are determined by the following question: “Which policies should be regulated by the EU and which ones by the national governments?” eight different policies (detailed later) being evaluated.

EU regulated policies are not expected to be evenly preferred by citizens living in different countries. Previous studies pointed out that, for instance, it makes more sense for the EU to govern energy or transport for policy integration. However, the limits to what can be achieved at the European level are not clear (Jordan & Jeppesen, 2000). Hence, these policies could be visualized as a scale of subsidiarity-related preferences (from highest to lowest).

**Research hypotheses**

The level of preferences for supranational policies can be considerably affected by the legitimacy or trust in political entities, such as national and European Parliament (Scott, 2009; Scharpf, 2001); therefore the substantial part of the article is based on the effect of political trust on supranationalism level. Thus, legitimacy (Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997) of these institutions may be important factors in determining whether supranational decision-making for some policies will be preferred by the citizens (Thomassen & Schmitt, 2004).

A number of studies, mostly focusing on social capital framework, use trust on political institutions as the explanatory variable and focus on determining which variables affect trust in governments (Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009; Hardin, 1999; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Maloney & Rossteutscher, 2007; Newton, 2001, 2007). For this reason, a substantial part of the article will be devoted to investigate which variables are predictors of citizens’ political preferences levels in different countries.

It seems likely that the trust in the these institutions may have opposing effects: people who mainly trust their national parliament might not be in favour of supranational decision-making, while people who trust the European Parliament might be more open to a supranational level of political decision-making.

This distinction brings us to the formulation of the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: “People who have higher levels of trust in the European Parliament will have higher preference for supranational political decision-making” and

Hypothesis 2: “People who have higher levels of trust in the national parliament will have lower preference for supranational political decision-making”.

Given these hypotheses, which will be empirically evaluated, the next section is devoted to study citizens’ opinion about the level of political preferences in different European countries. In this part, the paper deals with several innovative aspects. It does not merely rank policy preferences, but it takes a step further in testing whether the policy preferences form an homogenous scale and if such scale can be considered as a cumulative scale in Europe.
The second part of the article is devoted to the study of substantive significant relationships between trust in institutions and the level of supranational preferences. Thus, the reason for which citizens’ opinions on an adequate level of supranational political decision-making vary will be investigated using predictors of supranationalism preferences as “trust in parliament” (Scott, 2009; Scharpf, 2001), “interest in politics” (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001), “level of education” and “establishment in the area” (Berg & Hjerm, 2008; Gabel, 1998). The outcoming hypotheses will be studied and interpreted. The article ends with an analysis of the results and conclusions.

**European citizens' preference(s) for policy areas**

Several studies have examined European citizens’ opinions regarding the level of political decision-making. Dekker & Ederveen (2006) showed that in 2005, Scandinavian countries were the least in favour of further European integration, whereas new state members preferred the highest level of integration of European policies. Berg & Hjerm (2008) found that countries that have spent a longer period of time in the EU are more positive about European-level decision-making. These authors paid special attention to Scandinavian countries with Denmark as the most favourable towards European-level decision-making. These results do not differ from those obtained by Thomassen & Schmitt (2004) who studied the level of governance EU citizens prefer by using the European Election Study. Thomassen & Schmitt identified two levels of policies, specifically, the European level (which includes international conflicts, the environment, drugs and migration) and the national level (taxation, education and health care). These researchers suggested that citizens prefer the most important issues to be the responsibility of national governments. Hooghe & Marks (2001) studied the trend of citizen’s opinion on supranationalism in a long-term study carried out between 1950 and 2000 for 28 policies. These authors there has been a shift in the perception of authority from national level towards the European level.

The Eurobarometer (EB58 wave 2002) indicates the proportion of European citizens who prefer policies to be decided at the European level. A summary of the 28 policies can be aggregated into global policies related to international terrorism (84%), humanitarian aid (70%), the fight against organized crime (70%), and the fight against drugs (69%), which are the policies that most citizens preferred to be decided at supranational level. In contrast, for issues that are more closely related to everyday lives, such as questions related to the police (31%), education (33%), health and social welfare (33%), and the role of the press (35%), citizens preferred lower-level decision-making.

Different levels of preferences found in the results from Thomassen & Schmitt (2004) and Eurobarometer might suggest that these different policies could be ordered forming a scale from the most to least preferred policies to decide at supranational levels. In order to study this situation a cumulative scale will be tested for eight policies from European Social Survey (ESS) data.

**Data and method**

The data for this study were obtained from the European Social Survey (2002 wave), collected in 21 countries. There is no later ESS data set on this topic. In each country, a representative sample of the population was drawn. Special attention was paid to the comparability of the samples (Lynn & Häder, 2007) and the comparability of the translations of the questions into different languages (Harkness, 2007).

The specific issues probed in the ESS were derived from the EB58 by ESS experts. Eight items were chosen from the longer EB58 list of 28 policies, which had clearly inspired differing ideas about governance levels. The question, exactly as formulated in the European Social Survey, is as follows:

“Policies can be decided at different levels. At which level do you think the following policies should mainly be decided?”
Response categories for each policy were regional or local, national, European and international levels. The main interest of the article is to study the effect of relevant variables on supranational political preferences, and for this reason data were dichotomized so that 1 represents the supranational level (European and international level) and 0 represents lower levels (regional or local and national).

In order to measure citizen’s support for supranational political decision-making a score for each individual must be established. Such score could simply be determined by counting the total number of policies that each person prefers to be decided at the supranational level. However, the disadvantage of using a counting score is that one cannot know which issues each person stipulated as appropriate for supranational control because all combinations are possible.

This problem can be solved if the analyzed items form a single dimensional cumulative scale (Guttman, 1950). In this case, a cumulative scale would indicate that, if the issues are ordered for all citizens from high support to low support, people who support an issue with lower support will also support all issues with greater support. For instance, a sum score of 3 would indicate that such person supported the 3 policies with the most general support and that a person with a score of 5 felt the same way about 5 policies.

In the situation where the order of items is essential, in this case preferences on policy level, a cumulative scale is more adequate than, for instance, Factor Analysis (FA). FA can be used for the creation of a latent factor of interest using observable indicators but this technique cannot detect the level of preferences of individuals, which is of primary interest for this article.

However, perfect is seldom found, a parametric version called Rasch scale which has strict conditions (Rasch, 1960; van Schuur, 2003). In order to avoid these strict conditions a non-parametric scaling approach called Mokken scaling (Mokken, 1971, 1997; Molenaar & Sijtsma, 1984; Sijtsma & Molenaar, 2002) is used. The Mokken scale procedure is a probabilistic model that it is used for scaling items and scoring respondents on an ordinal scale. Basically, the idea of Mokken scaling and others scaling techniques is that the probability of a positive response to an item can be seen as a function of the subject latent trait score and the item’s properties. The probability that subjects possessing different amount of latent trait (supranationalism) give answers to each item can be represented by an Item Response Function (IRF).

Mokken scaling is based on two requirements. The first one is known as the Monotone Homogeneity (MH) requirement, and it tests whether a set of items form a single latent trait (this part of the procedure is similar to the use of categorical FA). The second criterion is called the Invariant Item Ordering, (IIO) and it tests whether the order of the items, in the single latent trait, is the same for different groups of subjects (Mokken, 1971; Sijtsma & Molenaar, 2002).

In order to fulfill the MH requirement, the binary items must follow some assumptions: a) Responses by the same subject are locally stochastically independent; b) Item Response Functions for different items must be monotonically non-decreasing; and c) Unidimensionality of the latent trait where all items measure a single latent trait (Mokken, 1997; Paas, 1998; van der Ark, Croon & Sijtsma, 2008).

Monotone homogeneity is not sufficient and a stricter requirement, the Invariant Item Ordering (IIO), is also necessary. If the IIO requirement fits the data, then the order of items will be the same for each group (Mokken, 1971; Molenaar & Sijtsma, 1984; Sijtsma & Molenaar, 2002). This means that a one-dimensional cumulative scale can be used to rank
items (policies). The detailed explanation of the technique and its procedure is out of the scope for this article, for more detail see references above.

**Supranationalism Cumulative Scale**

In this section, the supranationalism of the citizens in 21 European countries is determined. Table 1 presents the proportion of citizens who prefer a supranational level of decision-making for different policies. An aggregate for Europe (last row Table 1) and the number of supranational policies for each country (last column Table 1) are also shown.

**Table 1: Proportion of supranational level of governance in 21 countries for each policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aid</th>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Environ</th>
<th>Immigr</th>
<th>Defence</th>
<th>Irates</th>
<th>Agric</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Policies*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.689</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>0.776</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.580</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.685</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.787</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.813</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.578</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>0.732</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.762</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.770</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>0.669</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0.697</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.710</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.698</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.590</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.541</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.513</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.393</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.384</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.254</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Policies* = Number of policies which more than 50% of citizens answered that should be decided at supranational level.

Aid = Aid to developing countries; Crime = Fighting against organised crime; Environ = Protecting the environment; Immigr = Immigration and refugees; Defence=Defence; Irates = Interest rates; Agric = Agriculture; Welfare = Social Welfare

Table 1 is organized in the following way. Policies (columns) are ordered according the total mean for all countries, thus, globally ‘aid to developing countries’ is the most preferred policy at supranational level (21 countries); while social welfare is the least preferred policy at the same level. Countries (rows) are ordered according to the number of total policies that citizens prefer to be decided at supranational level. For a better understanding of scores in Table 1, 79.8% of Belgian respondents (1st row) prefer the policy ‘aid to developing countries’ to be decided at European level; which shows that this policy is mostly supranational according Belgian citizens.
Policies can be ranked according to the proportion of individuals from all countries preferring supranational level of governance. In order to evaluate how supranationalism can be determined a lower bond level is necessary. Authors considered policies to be desired at the supranational level if most of the citizens in a country preferred that option (> .50).

Table 1 shows that the most preferred supranational policies are aid for developing countries, fighting against organized crime and environmental protection. Conversely, welfare, agriculture and interest rates are most likely to be decided at a lower level, especially welfare policy, which has the lowest score in almost all countries.

Subjects clearly considered that the first three policies, specifically, aid to developing countries (all countries), fighting against organized crime (18 countries out of 21) and environment (17 countries out of 21) should be decided at supranational level of governance. Immigration (14 countries) and defence (11 countries) were ranked in the middle of the scale. The lowest levels of preference in supranational governance were for interest rates (5 countries), agriculture (5 countries) and welfare (none of the countries). This pattern in which global policies received more supranational support, and personal policies received more national support, is comparable with the ones present in Eurobarometer - EB58 - and in Thomassen & Schmitt (2004).

The low level of support for agriculture as a matter of supranational policy might be due to the difficulty to fit a centralized policy to such a diverse geography as that of Europe which covers many different climatic zones and forms of agriculture which makes difficult to manage a good policy on this aspect and the consequent disappointment by citizens.

Another remarkable result concerns interest rates; people may not realize that interest rates are determined by the European Central Bank instead of the national banks (or do not want this condition to be the case). It is also noteworthy that the great majority of citizens generally do not prefer welfare issues to be decided at the supranational level. It is also easier for regional or national governments to understand specific domestic difficulties and detect possible needs and advantages in their own national welfare system, with the possible fear that this advantage might be lost in a supranational environment; therefore, this preference is a clear case in which the principle of subsidiarity could be applied.

In spite of these general trends, differences between the different countries do exist. In some countries (Spain, Greece, Great Britain, Poland and Portugal), aid to developing countries is the policy that people would most like to be decided at the supranational level of governance, whereas in others (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) that policy ranked on the first place is fighting against organized crime.

In order to summarize the overall preferences of each country’s citizens regarding supranational governance, Table 1 (last column) counts the number of supranational policies (policies that the majority of respondents in a country would like to see handled at the supranational level). Considerable differences across countries can be seen, some countries are more favourable to supranational governance (Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany and France) than others (Ireland, Great Britain, Finland, and Sweden, among others). Ireland has the lowest score, with only one policy (aid to developing countries) preferred at the supranational level, this somewhat comes as a surprise considering than Ireland is EU member since 1973 while other countries with higher score entered later in the EU.

Whether (i) or not policy preferences form a cumulative scale and whether (ii) or not these are homogenous for all European countries is the subject of the analysis presented in the table below. Up to this point, we have discussed supranationalism at state level. However, a score for each individual with respect to his or her support for supranational decision-making is necessary in order to build the concept of level of “supranationalism”.

Using Mokken scaling procedure we can easily see that a single-dimensional cumulative scale for all 21 countries would be not adequate, because violations of the requirements were found. For a detailed study of Mokken requirements inspection, see Coromina & Saris (2012) since exhaustive testing steps of the method is not the aim of this article.

Results show that four of the analyzed policies (fighting against organized crime, agriculture, aid to developing countries and interest rates) do not fulfill the requirements for cumulative scaling. A direct consequence is that a simple additive index for these 21 countries
is not appropriate for considering preferences on political decision-making at supranational level. In sum, a unique cumulative scale with these eight policy preferences at supranational level (all 21 countries) is inadequate.

A reason for such violations on the Mokken requirements at European level might be that, although political decision trends exist among countries, there are large differences across them. In some countries (Spain, Greece, Great Britain, Poland or Portugal), ‘countries aid’ policy is associated with the highest level of supranationalism; while in others (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Norway or Sweden) ‘fighting against organised crime’ is the highest level for a supranational policy. Despite the lack of homogeneity for a unique cumulative scale for all countries, patterns on supranational level among similar countries seem to exist. In order to inspect where a single cumulative scale exists for similar countries a cluster analysis and posterior Mokken tests for each cluster will be carried out.

Country classification for supranational policy patterns

In order to inspect whether a single cumulative scale exists for similar countries a cluster analysis – the Ward method with squared Euclidean distance - was used.

Cluster analysis was used to sort the countries into homogeneous groups based on information at the country level taking into account all countries in Table 1. From those results of preference similarity, countries were found to be aggregated as follows: Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark); Mediterranean countries (Spain, Slovenia, Greece and Portugal); Euro-sceptic countries (Great Britain, Ireland, Hungary and Poland), in which a geographical cluster structure has not been found; and Central countries (Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, France and Luxemburg). Austria, Italy, Czech Republic and Switzerland were discarded during the cluster analysis procedure because they do not fit any of the groups. These countries have notably different views of which decision-makers should be responsible for these policies, and thus they could not be associated with one of the other groups or with each other.

One characteristic of the Central cluster is that these countries are the same ones that (along with Italy) signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 for the establishment of the European Economic Community. Hence, this group can be considered to be the promoters of the current EU structure or the EU founders. Anderson & Reichert (1995) and Gabel (1998) named this cluster (with Italy) ‘original members’.

Cluster results are shown in Table 2, scores can be interpreted in the same way as for Table 1, with the consideration that percentages are listed for each cluster instead of individual countries.

Table 2: Proportion of supranational level of governance and in brackets the number of countries inside cluster that support supranational level decision-making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td>0.839</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.639</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.350</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(5)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.302</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.751</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.334</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Sceptical</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*policies = Number of policies which more than 50% of citizens answered that should be decided at supranational level.

The main difference between clusters is the number of supranational policies supported (Table 2, last column). The Euro-sceptic group supports only one policy (aid to developing
countries) at that level. Scandinavian and Mediterranean groups support supranational decision-making for three and four policies, respectively; whereas Central countries’ citizens prefer seven policies to be the responsibility for this governance level. This finding indicates which clusters are the least (Euro-sceptical) and the most (Central) pro-supranational.

The number of countries that support supranational decision-making for a policy is shown, between brackets, in Table 2. For instance, in the Mediterranean group, all four countries suggest that country aid, the fight against organized crime, protection for the environment and immigration policies be executed at the supranational level, whereas only Slovenian citizens prefer defence to be decided at the supranational level. The remaining items are viewed as having the lowest level of governance, thus higher levels of subsidiarity. In the most pro-supranational cluster (the Central group), all five countries indicate that policies should be executed at the supranational level, except for welfare policy (and interest rates in the case of Luxemburg).

In general, the Euro-sceptic group (Great Britain, Ireland, Hungary and Poland) has the lowest level of governance followed by Scandinavian and Mediterranean clusters, while the most pro-supranational citizens, according this political decision level, are the ones belonging to the Central cluster.

**Dependent variable**

In this section we analyze whether supranational policy preferences form a cumulative scale for different clusters. Results from the Mokken procedure (Coromina & Saris, 2012) determined an adequate scale with all eight items for Mediterranean and Central clusters. This means that subjects and policies can be ordered according a cumulative scale of preferences.

In the case of Scandinavian and Euro-sceptic an additive index of all eight items for determining supranationalism level would be incorrect due to the fact that these clusters do not fulfil invariant item ordering (IIO) requirements. Additional inspections of these clusters reveal that Mokken scaling for the Euro-sceptic cluster fulfils with seven policies (except for immigration policy). Thus, a counting of these seven policies can be used for this cluster. In the case of the Scandinavian cluster, Mokken requirements were fulfilled for six items (except defence and interest rates, which cannot be used for a cumulative scale). Thus, a counting of these six policies will be used for Scandinavian cluster.

Dependent variable is the level of supranational cumulative one-dimension scale, and one score for each person, based on the ordering of the issues in its cluster, can be computed. Given these results, scores range from 0 (no policies should be decided at the supranational level) to 8 (all policies should be decided at supranational level) for Central and Mediterranean clusters; scores range from 0 to 7 for the Euro-sceptic cluster and from 0 to 6 for the Scandinavian cluster.

Based on the ranking of the items as presented in Table 2, a score of 1 for the Mediterranean group means that only country aid policy (with the highest proportion) is preferred as supranational policy. For the Central group, the same score indicates support for organized crime as a supranational policy. A score of 2 for the Mediterranean group indicates support for aid to developing countries and fight against organized crime as supranational issues; this support for the Central group as well. Scores for other clusters can be interpreted in the same way. Even though the items on which the scores are based may differ, they still indicate levels of support for supranational decision-making.

Distributions of the supranationalism score levels for each cluster, dependent variable, are presented in Figure 1.
Scores obtained for the different groups show relatively strong homogeneity within clusters and heterogeneity between them. The mean score for the policies determined at the supranational level is 5.2 for the Central cluster, 3.9 for the Mediterranean group, 2.8 for the Scandinavian group and 2.7 for the Euro-sceptic group. Figure 1 shows that the Central cluster has a negatively skewed distribution, which indicates that the respondents are notably supra-nationalistic. The Mediterranean cluster has a normal distribution except for the extreme scores, which have high values, showing opposite preferences. The Euro-sceptical cluster, which contains seven items, has a high frequency of zeroes, and only a few people exhibit high scores for supranationalism. The last distribution, the Scandinavian cluster, contains six policies and has a frequency distribution similar to a normal distribution. The trends for the respondents in the different clusters are quite dissimilar and for this reason, supranational policies are viewed differently across clusters.

Once the one-dimensional cumulative Mokken scaling has been found for each cluster, external validity of the model and hypothesis testing are carried out.

**External validity**

To address differences in orientation regarding the question of supranational authority, the effect of political trust in the national and European parliaments on the level of supranationalism is of primary importance.

Multiple regression analysis will be used to study the effect of several predictive variables on the supranationalism scale. However, it is known that measurement error has a considerable influence on the estimated effects, therefore multiple regression corrected for measurement errors using quality coefficients (Saris & Gallhofer, 2007) will be carried out.

Independent variables used in the model were constructed in the following way:

- “Trust in the European Parliament” and “trust in the national parliament” were measured using the following question for each type of political trust: “Please tell me, on a scale of 0-10, how much you personally trust each of the institutions. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust”.
- “Interest in politics” aids the decision-making capabilities primarily of those already more interested about politics (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). The question used
for interest in politics was as follows: “How interested would you say you are in politics?” Response scale ranges from 1 (not at all interested) to 4 (very interested).

- In order to control for confounding factors, we used the following variables:
- “Education”: the question was as asked as follows: “How many years of full-time education have you completed? [To be reported in full-time equivalents, including compulsory/mandatory years of schooling].”
- “Establishment in the area”; the question was: “How long have you lived in this area?” Responses were reported in years. This variable was also used in other studies (Berg & Hjerm, 2008; Gabel, 1998).

Scores for the dependent variable, sum score of the one-dimensional cumulative scale, are not directly comparable between clusters because the ranking of the policies and the total number of policies are different. Therefore, regression effects are estimated separately for each cluster.

Table 3 shows unstandardized regression coefficients and standard error – between brackets –, taking into account measurement error.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors by cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust European parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust country’s parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment in area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance: *p<0.001; **p<0.01; ***p<0.05; ****p<0.10

Adjusted $R^2$ is significant ranging from 10.4% (Scandinavian) to 15.7% (Mediterranean); however it is not very high it has interest for the prediction of the one-dimensional cumulative scale for supranationalism.

Intercept indicates the expected mean value of the preferred level of supranationalism when predictive variables are 0. Table 3 show that the highest expected mean corresponds to the Central cluster (5.150), followed by Mediterranean (3.900), Scandinavian (3.302) or Euro-sceptic clusters (2.701).

Concerning to the main variables of interest, “trust in European Parliament” has a significant positive effect on the supranationalism scale for all clusters; which means legitimacy on European Parliament positively influences the level of supranationalism. In the case of the Central cluster, increasing trust in the European Parliament by 1 standard deviation causes an increase of .415 points, on average, in the supranational cumulative scale.

“Trust in single country’s parliaments” have a significant negative effect on supranationalism, however, the effect for Scandinavian cluster is hardly significant (p-value = 0.096). In this case for the Central cluster, increasing by 1 standard deviation the trust in national parliament causes a decrease of 0.174 points, on average, in the supranational cumulative scale. The remaining clusters can be interpreted in the same manner.

In sum, for all clusters, a 1 standard deviation change in trust in European Parliament produces more of a change in the supranational cumulative scale than a 1 standard deviation change in trust in national parliament.
These results show that hypothesis 1: “People who have higher levels of trust in the European Parliament will have higher preference for global supranational political decision-making” and hypothesis 2: “People who have higher levels of trust in the national parliament will have lower preference for global supranational political decision-making” are supported.

“Interest in politics” has a significant positive effect on supranationalism for all clusters. Citizens with more interest in politics have a higher preference for supranational political decision-making. This would mean that interested citizens following political issues might better understand political mechanisms, which affect their supranational preferences.

Control variables have indeed a different effect on supranationalism. Duration of education is positively related with the level of supranationalism, especially relevant in the Mediterranean cluster which is clearly the most powerful predictive variable for supranationalism scale. People with more years of education have a higher preference for policies to be decided at supranational level than those with lower education. This finding could be explained due to broader and more extensive knowledge that permits a more global view of the matter. Inglehart (1970) highlighted education as a relevant predictor for European mobilization, which is also relating the effect on education on supranational actions or activities.

“Establishment in the area” has a negative effect on supranationalism. People who have spent more years living in the same area are more likely to prefer policies to be more at lower level, such national or regional; thus higher level of subsidiarity. A reason may be that the more permanently settled in the area a person is, the more they know mechanisms in that region and believe that a supranational organization could not take them into account. Establishment in the area is especially relevant for Mediterranean and Euro-sceptic clusters where the effect is the second more predictive one.

Conclusions

Following the principle of subsidiarity as defined by Føllesdal (1998), a solution for supranational political decision-making was elaborated and computed. Characteristics of such concept were that it fulfilled some requirements in order to obtain a one-dimensional cumulative scale for supranationalism. A first research of the countries showed that supranationalism is heterogeneous across European countries, possibly due to the large differences of opinion related to the existing governance. An aggregation of countries with similar level of supranationalism was studied using a cluster classification. It showed four different types of clusters: Central (the founding countries of the EU), Mediterranean, Scandinavian and Euro-sceptical. The euro-sceptic group supports the execution of only one policy at supranational level. Scandinavian and Mediterranean give sustenance to three and four supranational policies, respectively, whereas the Central cluster supports seven policies at the supranational level of governance.

A first remarkable finding of the article is that a homogenous cumulative scale for supranational political decision-making for all countries aggregated is not adequate. A single additive index to evaluate an ordering of supranational political preferences for the 21 countries would be incorrect. However, a cumulative scale for each cluster was found where Central cluster is the most pro-supranational cluster concerning to supranationalism level.

External validity reveals that years of education has a positive effect on supranationalism level. This is especially relevant in Mediterranean cluster, which means that in that higher educated citizens have higher preferences for supranational policies than the lower educated ones. The effect of the establishment in the area has a negative effect on supranationalism, which might also be related with closer environment and fear of not being taken in consideration in the case supranational policy was applied.

In general, clusters seem to have a similar pattern of predictive variables but with different importance on their effect on the level of supranationalism. For instance, the effect of interest in politics on supranationalism in the Mediterranean cluster is low (0.099) compared with the same regression coefficient (0.320) in the Central cluster.

Research hypotheses were both met. First hypothesis is highly significant for all clusters, it is thus important to note that clearly the level of trust in the European parliament positively affects the
level of supranational policy preferences. The Central cluster has the stronger effect. The second hypothesis is also supported; in this case the effect is less strong than the first hypothesis. Citizens with higher levels of trust in the national parliament have lower preference for supranational policies.

In summary, people who trust their own national parliament have less preference for higher levels of political decision-making, while higher levels of trust in the European parliament are associated with support for higher supranational level of political decision-making. In terms of generalization, one also could say that lower levels of political decision-making are preferred by citizens who have higher trust in the national parliament, lower trust in the European parliament, lower interest in politics, lower education level and have spent more time establishing more time in living the same region.

The novel finding of this study is the inverse relationship between the two types of trust, specifically, European and national political trust, and supranationalism, which seems a relevant result as such and can be also important for further research on the topic.

References


European Policy Models of Employment of People with Disabilities

MARCIN GARBAT
University of Zielona Góra, Poland

Abstract

The article presents three different systems of professional activation for people with disabilities and promotion of their employment such as: the quota system, motivating employers and a system based on civil rights. The purpose of the quota system is to force the employers to employ people with disabilities in the open labor market. However, the system is bi-directional. On one hand, the law obliges employers to hire these people in a certain proportion. Then employers are trying to achieve suitable employment rate to avoid paying insurance contribution. On the other hand, employers are encouraged to maintain this index to continuously receive grants from public funds. A system based on civil rights is different in its essence. Its purpose, as in the quota system, is to enable people with disabilities to gain and maintain jobs. It does not, however, oblige employers to hire these people, only enforces the rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The last model is based on motivating employees. It is associated with the flexicurity approach. It is also referred to as the "golden triangle" because it consists of three components: a flexible labor market, social security and active labor market policy. This model operates on a gentlemen’s agreement between the government and the participants in the labor market. Acceptance by all stakeholders is an essential condition of its operation.

Keywords: People with Disabilities; Employment; Labor Market; Employment Policy; Market Instruments.

Introduction

In European countries there are many different systems of professional activation of people with disabilities as well as those supporting their employment – from the most extreme ones, i.e. quota system and system based on different rights – to hybrid solutions that combine elements of both. However, despite legal, formal and substantive differences, as well as those concerning principals of operation and financing, the aim of all currently active systems is basically the same: assistance in the employment, activation and professional rehabilitation of persons with disabilities. The integration (or reintegration) of persons with disabilities on the labor market faces many problems. So far there is little evidence of the fact that the diverse political activities taken in this direction have given satisfactory results.

Employment policy

The legislative approach regarding the promotion of employment of persons with disabilities is probably subject to the most intense discussions in the policy context concerning disability. During the ‘90’s, along with the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation in many countries, this discussion had been even stormier. It seems that there is a significant difference between the approach based on civil rights and the approach that is based on the employment of people with disabilities based on indicators of the amount. The third way is based on incentives for employers to employ persons with disabilities. At the same time recent economic events (the economic crisis of 2009) suggest that a different approach may be less contradictory than it is usually maintained.
Employment policy based on the quota system
The purpose of the quota system is to force the employers to employ people with disabilities in the open labor market. However, the system has a two-way function. On one hand, the law obliges employers to employ such people in a certain proportion. In this way, in the model solution, the main objective of the employer is not to maximize profit, but to create new as well as maintain already existing jobs for people with disabilities.

In most European countries the policy is based on compulsory norms of the employment, determined in a special Act of Employment or Employment Promotion of Persons with Disabilities. In accordance with such provisions, employers are bound to employ a certain percent of employees with disability: in Greece – 8%, in Italy – 7%, in France and in Poland – 6%, in Germany – 5% (see Table 1 in Annex). This norm includes only persons with disabilities, who are registered in special registers and who meet the appropriate criteria (in case of Poland such register is kept by PFRON). In all countries, these norms apply to both state and private sector; however, they are applicable only to employers, who employ a certain number of employees (e.g. 100 employees in Russia, 50 in Spain and Turkey, 15-25 in other countries). Some countries even allow reducing the numbers in case of the employment of persons with disabilities with the significant degree or specific disability groups (NDA, 2013; ILO, 2013).

Employment policy based on civil rights
The system based on civil rights is different in its essence. Its aim, as for the quota system, is to enable persons with disabilities to obtain and maintain jobs. It doesn’t, however, force employers to employ such persons, but it enforces their constitutionally guaranteed rights. It is based on the right to work and the non-discrimination principle. It needs to be recognized by the society, and above all by employers; persons with disabilities have the right to work and to have the same chances on the employment market as fully efficient ones. This system operates mostly in economically rich and highly developed countries, where the economy can easily absorb the labor force of people with disabilities (Garbat, 2005, p. 92).

In Great Britain and Ireland the policy is shaped by anti-discrimination legislation introduced in the mid-90’s twentieth century. These legal acts have special chapters prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities in all aspects of the employment or employment processes. Such legislation requires employers to provide appropriate conditions for employees with disability to perform their duties in the workplace, if they do not entail an excessive effort or expense (Table 2).

Table 2: Employment systems of persons with disabilities based on civil rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Detailed act concerning anti-discrimination</th>
<th>Year of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>The Equal Treatment Act</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Employment Contracts Act</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>The Equal Treatment Act due to a disability or chronic illness</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Equality Act</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lichtenstein</td>
<td>Law on Equal Opportunities for People with Disabilities</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>Administrative Act on the Protection of Human Rights and Social Inclusion</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Federal Law on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Equality Act</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Equal Opportunities Act</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Law on Anti-discrimination in Working Life of People with Disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own study based on legal acts of employment of persons with disabilities in European countries; OECD (2009a), ILO (2013)

In the last few years, several European countries have also introduced more general anti-discrimination acts (e.g. Sweden in 1999, Norway in 2001, and Germany in 2002), however they were only to supplement existing rules, rather than establishing new bases of the policy on the employment of persons with disabilities (Hartman, 2011, p.10). Other countries have introduced a
general anti-discrimination clause in their constitutions (e.g. Austria in 1997, Switzerland in 1999), although the significance of these changes is mainly symbolic. Spain has gone in a different direction – and has adopted anti-discrimination regulations in other legal acts (Idström, Stenroos & Uimonen, 2013, p. 6).

Accounting for the different duties of employers is fundamental. This has a much greater impact than quota systems-based approach to anti-discrimination legislation. Sanctions and other instruments for their implementation were never the main problem. Therefore, it seems that the most effective are systems such as the Swedish one with certain normative acts in a variety of specific obligations of employers towards both current employees and applicants for employment and the relatively strict compliance with these obligations (NDA, 2013).

Employment policy based on the motivation of employers
General legislation on work or the working environment is important especially in Norway and Denmark. This legislation regulates the obligations of the employer, but without going into detail (Table 3). This may include, for example, the exclusion of discrimination in recruitment or include an obligation of adapting the workplace to suit or lead to rehabilitation of workers with disabilities (OECD, 2009a; ILO, 2013). However, there is no indicator of employment, quotas and quota statutory and legal sanctions for the fact that the employer does not employ a certain number of employees with disabilities. Ultimately, this policy is based largely on voluntary activities and information. Apparently, this can be seen in Denmark, where the action can take many forms, from regular awareness campaigns on good practices by employers, along with the stigma of bad practices, to strive towards greater use of incentive instruments (e.g. subsidies to adapt jobs). Denmark has highlighted its trend by introducing two basic principles, which are also a response to the anti-discrimination: the principle of compensation, according to which society must make compensation to persons with disabilities in order to compensate for the lost opportunity of earning a derivative of lower productivity and to enable the use of their abilities, and the principle of sectoral responsibility, which requires every public sector to hold responsibility for its own affairs (Idström, Stenroos & Uimonen, 2013, p. 66).

Table 3: Systems of employment of persons with disabilities based on the motivation of employers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Detailed act</th>
<th>Year of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>The Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>The Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Treatment in the Workplace</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>The Law on Persons with Disabilities</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Act on Issues of People with Disabilities</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>The Law on Persons with Disabilities</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Law on Equal Opportunities for People with Disabilities</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>Law on Social Activities for People with Disabilities</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>The Working Environment Act</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own study; OECD (2009a), ILO (2013)

Political methods based on the voluntary fulfilment of the requirements of the employers are not aimed at imposing obligations. Such a policy must guarantee high funding and technical support to adapt the workplace properly, although support is also useful in combination with other methods of promoting employment.

Instruments supporting employment of persons with disabilities

The instruments of employment policy are generally undertakings shaping this policy, which are established, implemented and controlled by the public authorities. Generally, the instruments at the time of their application in practice are the means of this policy. Many of the instruments used in the context of professional activation policies that exist in European countries can be divided according to the criterion of a supply and a demand. Instruments focused on labor supply, supporting job
seekers are primarily training and professional development and career counselling and partly employment agency. It should be emphasized that the promotion of training and professional development is at the core of employment policy. Their main task is to adjust the training of employees to changes in the economy. Using the training instrumentation it is possible to facilitate professional integration for unemployed persons and graduates of schools with inappropriate qualifications. Among demand oriented instruments one can include all forms of subsidized employment. We can specify the particular instruments such as: measures to maintain and create jobs for people with disabilities, wage subsidies for companies that employ people with disabilities, the direct creation of jobs in the public sector and non-governmental organizations and the promotion for taking up business (European Commission, 2009).

Employers oriented labor market instruments
Political methods based on the quota system may compel the employer to a wider (e.g. Italy and Germany) or more narrow set of obligations (Turkey and to some extent Austria). Special provisions relating to anti-discrimination employment laws intend to impose additional obligations on the employer, which usually involve adapting the workplaces, equipment, facilitating access to devices as well as modification of plans and working hours.

Two crucial elements are needed to determine the real scope of the obligations of the employer: the penalties imposed on employers who do not comply and the statutory obligations and instruments to implement these sanctions. These exact elements guarantee that anti-discrimination measures or compulsory labor standards will force employers to take responsibility and employ persons with disabilities.

The final scope of the employer’s obligations in anti-discrimination legislation depends entirely on the interpretation of the concepts of excessive effort or reasonable adaptation of the working environment - which in turn depends on the size and the economic situation of the company and on a number of penalties and sanctions. Applicable penalties usually include: increased taxes, fines or penalties, but may also include non-financial elements as the adaptation of workplaces or reinstatement. In practice, the main problem results from the fact that in most countries the prosecution of employer or potential employer for discriminatory practices is associated with overcoming major administrative barriers. Even in Great Britain, the number of cases brought to court is relatively low.

When it comes to compulsory employment norms, the implementation of this provision depends on the size of norms and penalties to be imposed on the employer. As for the penalties, it is known from experience that in Spain and Portugal, such sanctions do not actually exist, but in most countries they are small and rely on the deduction of additional payroll tax of about 0.5%. When establishing the contribution rate (“working tax contributions” or penalties for not employing persons with disabilities) legislators take into consideration several important factors. Above all, they try to assess the financial capacity of employers, the impact of the contribution rate to the operation of their employment policy and the policy of hiring those people, with both the task of providing them with equal opportunities on the labor market, and to compensate for increased costs incurred by employers who have achieved the required rate (Garbat, 2005, p. 84). The contribution rate in different countries can be differentiated according to criteria such as the size of the employer or its financial condition. When establishing this rate the legislators try to take into account the fact that the main purpose of collecting contributions should not be to maximize state revenue, but to create the most favorable conditions for creating new workplaces for persons with disabilities by employers themselves. The means collected from employers are usually transferred to a special fund or separate account in the state budget, and are used in many different ways – depending on the social policy objectives conducted in the country. Most of this money is directed to the professional rehabilitation and support of the protected employment. This solution is of special interest for those employers who have met the requirements for the number of employees with disabilities.

The relatively high sanctions are applied only in three countries: Italy, France and Poland. In comparison to other countries, these penalties are several times higher, and even greater for not taking the declaration, although the situation is eased by the rule according to which only the “right candidate” is not to be rejected. The fines in Poland are about four times higher than in other countries with the applicable standard (Garbat & Paszkowicz, 2003, p. 408). Without real enforcement measure, implementing the quota system is an incentive to hire registered people with
disabilities or to maintain the position of those employees who acquire a disability within the company. However, it does not automatically impose any obligations on the employer (NDA, 2013). The contributions paid to the Fund in France can be up to 600 times the working hours at minimum wage for every missing employee with a disability. After three years, if the employer does not take care about the appropriate employment structure, payment to the Fund can be up to 1500 times the hours at minimum wage (Jovilet, 2004).

In general, the amount of contribution for every unemployed person with a disability under the required employment rate is defined by a multiple of minimum or average wage. However, other solutions are also used, e.g. in Slovakia, the contribution is defined by The Ministry of Minister, taking into account the costs needed to create new place of employment for the disabled (NAPSI, 2006, p. 36), and in Hungary the parliament defines the amount range, which determines the size of contribution to the Rehabilitation Fund (NOAS, 2010, pp. 18-24).

Employers receive the money collected by the Fund in a form of grants which help to maintain existing jobs and to create new jobs for people with disabilities, to finance their salaries, to carry out programs, training and professional courses. The money can also be sent directly to persons with disabilities to help them to start a new business, to partially cover transport costs to work, to purchase their own car or for scientific purposes. Grants may also be made directly to institutions and companies involved in career counselling for persons with disabilities, further education and training, or conducting the information campaign among employers and the population.

In some countries, one can find derogation from the principle of directing founds received as a result of the quota system exclusively for professional rehabilitation. Exceptions, however, are rare and happen mainly in countries in which the Fund, apart from collecting contributions, is also supplied from other sources. For example, in Cyprus, among others, the Fund uses of the budget subvention, profit from some charity events, sport and cultural activities as well as income from a special lottery. In Malta, the Fund can conduct business activities. The funds collected in this way are allocated in the first place for the professional rehabilitation, and then also for the social rehabilitation: support for sport and tourism, or elimination of architectural barriers in urban infrastructure (NSRPSI, 2008, pp. 40-42).

**Persons with disabilities oriented labor market instruments**

In order to determine activities and instruments applied in European countries the Opti-Work project results were used. The project is co-ordination of activities financed by the European Commission under the 6th Framework Programme, objective 8.1.B.2.4 – Quality of life and problems of the handicapped and persons with disabilities. A system tool has been used in the Opti-Work project to present the role of legislation, services, benefits, support systems and approaches in the decision-making process of persons with disabilities searching for work and the employers decision concerning recruitment present in 13 legal systems (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Malta, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Great Britain). In order to show a review of current approaches to the issue in question in selected countries, a summary of the important elements from a careers counselling services point of view has been presented (Eurofound, 2006, p. 31).

In the development of profiles of national systems, researchers from the Opti-Work plan cooperated with specialists from each country in order to gather the views of stakeholders on the approach used in the policy to implement the system, the system design and elements focused on promoting the participation of persons with disabilities in the labor market. It should be noted that target group of the Opti-Work project were all persons with disabilities of working age and not just those with work experience, as in the present study. However, the nature of services to a wider group of audience and the target group coincides to a large extent. For this report, particularly important are the views of stakeholders on the effectiveness of the availability of these components, which are significant in terms of career counselling (Eurofound, 2006, p. 23).

When developing a system profile, the respondents were asked to:

- indicate elements existing in their country or region as well as determine the extent to which they consider them effective
- evaluate effectiveness of each elements as a mechanism for introducing the beneficiary on the labor market on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 – very inefficient, 5 – very effective)
- evaluate universal availability components within the legal system on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 – unavailable, 5 – widely available)
- evaluate ease to make use of the elements on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 – very difficult, 5 – very easily).

The review included the following services: assessment of professional skills, matching the right job, career counselling, assistance in obtaining grants, performing for the good of the beneficiary, information and advice provision, case management, specialized professional training, professional rehabilitation, pre-professional training, psychological support and care in the workplace.

Domestic correspondents in most countries pointed to the existence of all the elements in one form or another in their national or regional jurisdiction. The main differences concerned the extent to which elements of the service were available, accessible and perceived as effective in leading the beneficiary to employment. Listing in Table 4 (see Annex) summarizes data collected from different countries.

Although one should not forget about the limitations resulting from the data source of the above analysis, it can be clearly stated that the majority of national systems include service elements that make up the theory of a comprehensive and effective system of the career counselling services. However, in many countries correspondents reported that the accessibility of services is limited and that they are not always effective. There may be problems associated with both the accessibility and coordination/integration of services, which results in reduced efficiency of the services. Comprehensive analysis of services is shown in Table 5 (see Annex).

It is highly probable that evaluations captured in system profiles reflect flattering opinions of the systems and components of services. One would therefore expect to be able to find common features that are considered to be particularly effective in different jurisdictions. One would also expect that in a well-designed system, particularly effective components of it are also readily available and relatively easy to access. However, looking at system profiles, one does not have such impression, since none of the respondents valued the counselling services to be very effective in bringing the beneficiary on the labor market. Moreover, the provision of information services was recognized as very effective only in three countries, but generally achievable only in one of them. Also services associated with performing for the good of the beneficiary were recognized as very effective in one legal system only; however the ease of access in this country was low. Case management was evaluated as very effective by two respondents, but in no case it was easily to access (Eurofound, 2006).

The above mentioned regularities show the need to use more systematic approach to describe services of career guidance and other employment-related services for people with disabilities. It is necessary to remember, that services for people with disabilities in the labor market, especially career counselling, are very important and more usual elements of the functioning of work or employment offices, as well as non-governmental organizations. Their aim is to help unemployed persons with disabilities and those seeking jobs to choose the right profession, to change qualifications as well as examining their interests and professional talents. Career counselling is also associated with the provision of information on various professions, labor market and training opportunities and education. A career advisor can also help the employer to find the appropriate employee, if special professional skills are required (Bondaruk, 2009, p. 55).

Professional trainings, as well as counselling, are quite important instruments. In many cases professional training may result in finding a job. A person who became disabled can be incapable to continue working on the previous position, even soon after the completion of the medical rehabilitation process. The person may require the assessments of needs and possibilities, further advice and professional training, possibly several year of training (e.g. full university curriculum) (Pietrzak, 2010, p. 23). Countries use very different methods to meet these needs, but there are very large variations of the frequency, phase and financial expenditures associated with such interventions. Training services are provided by state authorities, such as specialized rehabilitation centers of professional training in France or special institute of the professional adaptation in Sweden. In other countries such services are offered by competing private rehabilitation units (Netherlands, Luxembourg and Great Britain). Yet another group of countries, including Austria, Germany, Portugal and Spain, uses training services offered by private and public rehabilitation centers. In such countries, the authorities responsible for the labor market services have their own rehabilitation and trainings centers, but when the need arises, they use the outside provided services.
Special conditions of employment of persons with disabilities

When discussing the labor market one must remember the fact that persons with disabilities belong to a specific category of employees. They are subject by labor law to specific legal care and support throughout the process of employment and professional activation. A professional rehabilitation is also included in the whole support process. In case of EU member states the regulation of the European Commission from 12 December 2002 on the application of Art. 87 and 88 European Community Treaty to state aid in the employment is most applicable. It regulates, among others, rules of assistance from public funds for the creation of new jobs for the disabled. According to the EU’s definition the protected employment accounts for the employment of at least 50% of persons with disabilities. The rules determining disability are defined by the law of the country. This regulation is an important instrument of employment policy for persons with disabilities (Eurofound, 2006).

Employment and sickness benefits

Imposition of partial obligation to pay compensation in case of sickness absence on employers is associated with the hope that they will invest in preventive measures. Major responsibilities for the payment of sickness benefits are in the Netherlands (for one year), the UK (for a period of 28 days, the reimbursement in the event of exceptional costs) and Switzerland. It should be noted that employers in these countries insure themselves against such risks. Significant responsibilities in this regard were also imposed in Austria (up to 12 weeks), Germany (up to 6 weeks) and Belgium (one month). In other countries (Scandinavia and Spain), the salary is paid only for a short period of sick leave, covering a period of about two weeks. In other countries, sickness benefit is paid from the sickness insurance from day one.

Employment and disability benefits

The source of income for a large part of people with disability comes from the social security system: social insurance, social assistance and professional activity. Such assistance is designed to meet the necessary needs of people with disabilities and their families, as well as to enable them to live in conditions appropriate for human dignity. The purpose of this system is also providing benefits to ensure the human body sense of social security in many different circumstances in life. In the 90s Twentieth century the new trends in social policy transferring the focus from the social rights of the individual to its obligations appeared. In labor market policy it was reflected in the concept of linking the promotion of readiness to take up employment with increasing of compulsory labor. The following reforms have been carried out in this spirit: Welfare to work in the UK, Work, work, work in the Netherlands and the Active line in Denmark. They included numerous restrictions and cuts in the benefits system for people with disabilities (Oorschot, 2010, p. 38).

In most countries, getting disability benefits is subject to the fulfilment of the essential criteria for the loss of health (above some medical-social level), the degree of independence or age. However, the difference between countries in the acquisition and loss of the right to such benefits is fundamental. One can observe three general schemes for the granting of disability benefits. The first is very liberal and enables to receive and maintain benefits despite taking up employment (the Netherlands, Russia, Ukraine and Switzerland). The second, in which the benefit depends on the size of one’s income from employment (Poland, Germany and Austria). The third scheme is the one in which the benefit is suspended or revoked at the time of employment (Sweden, Finland). In most countries, disability benefits are granted at certain point of life, mostly for people aged 16-65 years. After this period persons with disabilities are included in the group of retirees (Idström, Stenroos & Uimonen, 2013, p. 26).

Currently, it is intended to combat social exclusion of people with disabilities through work, contrasting this approach to combat exclusion by social services. One should remember that support of persons with disabilities requires more and more redistribution of income in their favor, which reduces the competitiveness of the economy. It is clear that in many countries the essential task of the system of social protection for this social group provides income for the period of treatment, rehabilitation and active search for work, as well as creating conditions for the professional activation. The scope of services is also not the motivation for becoming unemployed. It reveals
more and more a close combination of active programs combating unemployment of people with disabilities with the help of money, but conditions the obligation to participate in these programs and active job search. However, this requires a change of approach of the state to the labor market and development of new strategy, which is commonly called the state work philosophy (workfare state).

**Employment and rehabilitation**

In a few countries the involvement of employers in the rehabilitation process is mandatory. In the Netherlands, Sweden, Russia and Ukraine the employer must theoretically present the individual rehabilitation plan to the pension agency/authority. In some other countries, employees with disability are entitled to special rehabilitation or sickness absences (Germany, Poland and Great Britain) (ILO, 2013).

The differences between countries in the field of rehabilitation during employment is significant. In some countries, the request for disability pension is automatically treated as a need of professional rehabilitation. This principle of “rehabilitation before the benefit” is applicable in Austria, Denmark, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. A similar approach is in Germany, Norway and Poland, although the degree of an obligation is a bit milder. Professional rehabilitation is the law in Austria (in relation to employment of persons with disabilities), as well as in France, Germany and Poland, while in Great Britain, Slovenia and Bulgaria it is limited to the right of application (NDA, 2013).

In all countries, eligibility for professional rehabilitation is related to potential benefits to be gained through a rehabilitation program, usually referred to as opportunities to obtain other professions. In compulsory rehabilitation programs, opportunities may be limited to occupations commensurable with the qualifications of the person (as in Austria, Spain and to some extent in Switzerland), or may include other activities (Scandinavia) (OECD, 2009a, OECD, 2009b).

Granting the right to rehabilitation may be limited to authorized persons or potentially eligible for disability benefits (e.g. in Austria) or may include a separate assessment process, independent of the process qualifying for disability grant, and thus may be available to everyone (Denmark, France, Portugal, Switzerland). In some countries, it is assumed that persons with mild to moderate degree of disability do not need professional rehabilitation.

There are three ways of financing the undertaken rehabilitation activities (European Commission, 2009). In many countries, costs of professional rehabilitation are partly covered by social insurance and partly by labor market institutions, in relation to those that are not covered by insurance against incapacity for work (Austria, Germany, Spain and Portugal). In another group of countries, such costs are paid in full to the income state funds. Most countries with quota system have such funds. Some of the funds have legal personality and can create the independent policy in this area, while others which do not have such a personality – constitutes separate fund for some office or agency whose mission is to conduct and finance activities connected with professional rehabilitation and employment of persons with disabilities. The third group includes countries where the sole duty to cover professional rehabilitation rests on the authority issuing pension decisions (local government in Denmark and Switzerland).

**Employment and adjudication the ability to work or disability**

The first important information for person who makes decision about employment is information about work contraindications, i.e. activities which the person with disability cannot do, due to the medical reasons or conditions of working environment. One can call it a negative adjudication. The medical contraindications should be determined by a doctor specializing in medicine of work. Persons with disabilities as a result of damage do not lose all the possibilities. On the contrary – they retain the ability to perform many tasks and some of their surviving skills that are identified and improved can be a foundation for further training, education and employment. These opportunities must be identified, targeted and then tracked in the progress of rehabilitation (Vogler, 2009, p. 53).

In many countries, the employment of person with disability is conditioned on developing crucial professional qualifications and occupations appropriate for the given disease or disability. This regards especially persons, who are incapable to work in a significant degree and who should work in protected conditions. All countries in Europe have a protected market in which persons with specific
Several countries make the integration of persons with disabilities conditional of the degree of disability. For example, in Denmark and Finland, a significant degree of disability (or disability) means prohibition of employment in the open labor market or not-working at all. However, these persons are not left alone. As a compensation for lost earning possibilities, they are supported financially by the system of social rehabilitation or social assistance. In some countries, special jobs in the so-called therapeutic workshops, labs, workrooms or day care centers are organized for people with severe disabilities (Prinz & Tompson, 2009, p. 43).

Conclusions

Many participants in the social and economic life agreed on the fact that in spite of frequent occurrence of contradictions as well as contrasts between achieving economic and social objectives, there is a need to examine and take into account the correlations existing between people. When the lack of compatibility between the performance of the economy and the achievement of social objectives, in terms of obtaining the required level to meet a variety of needs, including those relating to the employment of people with disabilities, inconvenient social issues appear, and if they are not solved in due time they cause problems in situation. Finding common ground for determining the economic and social objectives in terms of socially important needs leads to a harmonious social and economic development. Generally speaking, it is not possible to separate the policy to disability from the policy to world poverty and social, economic, political and cultural inequalities as well as from cultural transformations that are the result of globalization. Particularly important is the recognition that development in these areas is likely to have great importance for all people – whether disabled or fully efficient – irrespective of the country they live in. A characteristic feature of the labor market policy in many European countries is to treat problems of incomplete efficiency in terms of civil rights and to recognize the consequences of their failure due to the presence of social and physical barriers.

The involvement of employers is a fundamental issue for the reintegrating of persons with disabilities. However, there is no consensus on the best way to achieve this. There are different approaches to this matter, ranging from the conviction on the basis of moral and anti-discrimination legislation to mandatory employment quota. The effectiveness of these measures depends primarily on the willingness of employers to assist people with disabilities in keeping the work or taking it in the first place, but also on the ability to evade the rules or to avoid paying fines for not obeying the legal regulations. Establishment of appropriate balance between the employment amount and imposition of excessive penalties on employers is a major challenge in the field of politics, especially because the safety regulations may lead to further discrimination of persons with disabilities in the recruitment process. A strong involvement of non-profit organizations in representing the interests of persons with disabilities is helpful in achieving the success of policy of implementation in some countries. Success in the field of disability policy also depends on many other factors. In particular, the programs in the field of disability must solve the broader problems in the labor market, such as high unemployment and generally low overall demand for employees over 50 years.

It is not decided yet, what will be the evolution of labor market policies, in the face of rising numbers of people with disability, especially because of the unfavourable demographic situation as well as forecast in Europe (ageing of the society and demographic decline). Currently, largely amorphous model of national policies will certainly be subject to essential transformations in the coming years. However, it would be difficult to state today whether these changes will bring permanent social solutions to one of Europe’s leading and the world’s patterns of social policy, or will we have to deal with progressive “hybridization” systems, i.e. borrowing different detailed experience from various, in a sense, competing against one another concepts: continental, Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian or Mediterranean. The latter scenario would resemble the path of development, which was chosen in recent employment policy and the labor market in countries such as the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark.
References


## Annex

### Table 1: Quota based systems of employment of people with disabilities in European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Indicator in the sector</th>
<th>The size of entities covered by the indicator</th>
<th>Amount/form of the payment</th>
<th>Fund – source of funding for rehabilitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4% Above 25 employees</td>
<td>The equivalent of the minimum wage</td>
<td>The National Employment Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4% Above 25 employees</td>
<td>Tax determined annually by the government</td>
<td>Surtax Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2% (Flandria, Brussels)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Tax determined by the local government</td>
<td>Flemish Fund for the Social Integration of Persons with Disabilities (Flandria) Professional Activation Fund (Walonia and Brussels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5% (Walonia)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3% Above 20 employees</td>
<td>Fine determined by Minister of Labor</td>
<td>The state budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 employee (Federation) 5% (Region Brčko)</td>
<td>Insurance contribution determined annually by the government</td>
<td>Found for the Social Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4% Above 50 employees</td>
<td>Insurance contribution determined annually by the government</td>
<td>Agency for Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 employee —</td>
<td>Above 20 employees</td>
<td>Administrative fee</td>
<td>Rehabilitation and Employment Fund for Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 employee Above 50 employees</td>
<td>Insurance contribution determined annually by the government</td>
<td>Professional Training and Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>5%*</td>
<td>All schools</td>
<td>No sanctions</td>
<td>Rehabilitation fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Above 20 employees</td>
<td>Monthly equivalent of 1.5 hour of average daily wage</td>
<td>Employment Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Above 20 employees</td>
<td>The equivalent of 600 times of working hour at the minimum wage</td>
<td>Fund for Professional Integration of Persons with Disabilities in the Public Sector FIPHFP, Professional Integration Fund of Persons with Disabilities AGEFIPH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5% 8%</td>
<td>Above 50 employees</td>
<td>No sanctions</td>
<td>The state budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5% 2%</td>
<td>Above 50 employees</td>
<td>No sanctions</td>
<td>The state budget, budgets of local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3% —</td>
<td>Above 25 employees</td>
<td>No sanctions</td>
<td>The state budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Above 20 employees</td>
<td>Tax determined annually by the government</td>
<td>The state budget, budgets of local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>5% 1 employee 2% 4%</td>
<td>Above 25 employees Above 50 employees Above 300 employees</td>
<td>Half of the lowest monthly salary</td>
<td>Labor Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>Sanctions/补偿</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>All private employers</td>
<td>A fine in the amount of average annual wages</td>
<td>Costs of Unemployment Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Above 20 employees</td>
<td>Tax amount determined by law</td>
<td>45% - Compensation Fund 55% - Social Assistance Funds in the Federal Lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Above 25 employees</td>
<td>40.65% of the average wage</td>
<td>State Fund for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5% 2%</td>
<td>All entities</td>
<td>No sanctions</td>
<td>The state budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3-5% **</td>
<td>Above 100 employees</td>
<td>The equivalent of the average wage of fully efficient persons</td>
<td>Federal trust fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Above 50 employees</td>
<td>A fine equal to 150% of the minimum wage</td>
<td>Employment Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Below 20 employees</td>
<td>The equivalent of three average salaries</td>
<td>The state budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 employee 20-49 employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 employees Above 50 employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 employees Above 100 employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Above 20 employees</td>
<td>The fine in the amount of 0.9% of labor cost based on the average salary</td>
<td>Public Fund for the Financing of Technical Adjustments of Jobs and Protected Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(including 0.2% with the significant degree of disability)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Above 20 employees</td>
<td>A fine equal to 70% of the minimum wage</td>
<td>Fund for Supporting Employment of Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4% 3%</td>
<td>Above 50 employees</td>
<td>The equivalent of full social security contribution paid by the employer and the employee</td>
<td>The state budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 employee 8-25 employees</td>
<td>Half of the average annual salary</td>
<td>Fund for Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Above 25 employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Above 20 employees</td>
<td>A fine determined by Ministerial Order</td>
<td>Fund for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities which is a part of the Labor Market Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1 employee 15-35 employees</td>
<td>The administrative fee determined locally</td>
<td>Budgets of local governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 employees 36-50 employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Above 50 employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own study based on legal acts of employment of persons with disabilities in European countries: ILO (2013)

* Amount indicator applies exclusively to the education sector (public and private schools).
** Indicator height and entity size considered are determined by authorities of the autonomous areas.
*** Indicator height depends on the sector of the economy.
### Table 4: Services in the field of career counselling in selected European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>There are all kinds of services, except for services related to performing for the good of the beneficiary. Counselling and services of information and advice provision are commonly provided as well as easily available. The most effective elements of the system include skills assessment, case management, pre-professional trainings and psychological support. Very effective elements of the system are specialist professional training and professional rehabilitation. However, none of these services are generally provided or widely available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>All kinds of services are available with the exception of case management. They are commonly provided apart from services associated with performing for the good of the beneficiary and psychological support. With regards to directing people to the open labor market, appropriate job selection, employment support, evaluation of professional skills, specialist professional/education trainings and care in the workplace are considered to be very effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>All kinds of services are present in the system. Top services are: evaluation of professional skills, consulting, and assistance in obtaining grants, information and advice provision, specialist professional training, pre-professional trainings and psychological support. Services matching the right job, performing for the good of the beneficiary, case management and care in the workplace are only sometimes provided. However, access to services, such as: the evaluation of professional skills, appropriate work selection, case management and care in the workplace is not easy. All other services are regarded to be effective in the management of persons with disabilities in the open labor market with the exception of pre-professional trainings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Four types of services are not available: selection of the appropriate work, performing for the good of the beneficiary, case management and care in the workplace. The universality of the provision of many services is not highly appreciated and consulting and assistance in obtaining grants, information and advice provisions as well as psychological support are considered to be relatively inaccessible. Most services are not easily accessible. When it comes to directing persons with disabilities to the opened labor market the most effective are: evaluation of professional skills, consulting, education and professional training, professional rehabilitation and pre-professional trainings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>All discussed elements are present. Provision of all elements received relatively high evaluation; majority of them are commonly provided. The most popular services include: selection of the appropriate work, consulting as well as information and advice provision. Most of the elements of the system elements are considered to be effective, with the exception of assistance in obtaining grants and case management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Most of the elements of the system a present in Malta (with the exception of evaluation of professional skills, professional rehabilitation and pre-professional trainings). However, the universality of provision of these services was evaluated as relatively low. The most easily to access services include: selection of the appropriate work, consulting, information and advice provision, performing for the good of the beneficiary and case management. Majority of the elements – apart from assistance in obtaining grants, performing for the good of the beneficiary and pre-professional trainings – were assessed as very effective or effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Services Provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>All elements are present. However, only the case management is commonly provided, although it is not easily to access. Service rarely provided include: selection of appropriate work, consulting, performing for the good of the beneficiary, professional specialist/education training, professional rehabilitation and pre-professional trainings. The appropriate work selection is regarded to be the most effective. Other highly ranked services include: evaluation of professional skills, assistance in obtaining grants, professional specialist/education training, professional rehabilitation and pre-professional trainings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>All kinds of services are present. Most commonly provided ones include: assistance in obtaining grants, performing for the good of the beneficiary and care in the workplace. Professional skills, consulting, information and advice provision, case management, pre-professional trainings and psychological support were assessed as effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>All kinds of services are available except for: assistance in obtaining grants, performing for the good of the beneficiary and case management. The universality of the provision is assessed as relatively low; only evaluation of professional skills, specialist professional education/trainings, professional rehabilitation, pre-professional trainings and psychological support are sometimes provided and accessible. The elements of the system were not assessed as effective, except for: case management (however, this service is not widely provided).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Most of the elements are available, apart from professional skills evaluation and case management. Existing elements are said to be provided occasionally, and only information and advice provision was assessed as easily available. Only performing for the good of the beneficiary and professional specialist/education trainings were assessed as effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>All the elements are present, except for the psychological support. The most commonly provided services include: selection of the appropriate work, performing for the good of the beneficiary and professional specialist/education trainings. The least common ones are: evaluation of professional skills, professional rehabilitation, pre-professional trainings, psychological support and care in the workplace. Selection of the appropriate work, professional specialist/education trainings and psychological support are assessed as effective. However, the most effective are: evaluation of professional skills, performing for the good of the beneficiary, information and advice provision as well as case management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>All the elements are present. The least common services are: case management, psychological support and performing for the good of the beneficiary. All other services are commonly provided and easily accessible. Information and advice provision was recognized as the most effective one. Other effective services include: evaluation of professional skills, selection of the appropriate work, consulting, assistance in obtaining grants as well as care in the workplace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>All the elements are present. Selection of the appropriate work and consulting are the only commonly provided services. Evaluation of professional skills, services associated with performing for the good of the beneficiary, information and advice provision and care in the workplace are only sometimes provided. Majority of them are available for customers. Except for assistance with obtaining grants, professional specialist/education trainings, pre-professional trainings and psychological support, all other services are assessed as effective or very effective.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universality</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Availability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Services providing information and advice**

| **Universality** | Provision frequency was assessed as high or very high in the majority of countries, with exception of France, Malta and Portugal. |
| **Availability** | Evaluated relatively high everywhere except from France, Germany, Portugal and Slovenia. |
| **Effectiveness** | These services are recognized as very effective in Malta, Slovenia and Great Britain. As relatively effective - in Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway and Italy. The highest effectiveness assessed in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Portugal and Slovakia. |

**Services related to performing for the good of the beneficiary**

| **Universality** | Commonly provided only in France and Slovenia. Quite often provided in Finland, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Italy and Slovakia. |
| **Availability** | Relatively low ease of access was assessed in the majority of countries, with exception of Finland, France, Malta and Italy. |
| **Effectiveness** | They were recognized as very effective only in Slovenia and as relatively effective in Finland, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Italy. |

**Case management**

| **Universality** | Does not appear in the legal system of four countries: Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia. As for other countries it is commonly provided only in Germany. Service provision frequency was highly evaluated in Finland, the Netherlands and Slovenia. |
| **Availability** | Services are very easily to access only in Malta and Norway. |
| **Effectiveness** | Recognized as effective or very effective everywhere, except in the Netherlands, Germany and Great Britain. |

**Psychological support**

| **Universality** | This service does not exist in Slovenia only. It is commonly provided in Finland and the Netherlands. Other legal systems in which these services are provided quite often are Austrian, Irish, Portuguese, Slovak and Norwegian. |
| **Availability** | The ease of access was evaluated as very high in none of the countries. Relatively high in Finland, Germany, Norway and Portugal. |
| **Effectiveness** | In none of the countries the psychological support was recognized as effective, although in many it was evaluated as relatively effective. |

**Evaluation of professional skills**

| **Universality** | Service does not exist in Malta and Slovakia. It was assessed to be provided quite often or commonly in most of the countries, except from Austria and Slovenia. |
| **Availability** | It was not assessed as very easily available in any country, but was regarded as easily available in Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Great Britain. |
| **Effectiveness** | Service turns out to be effective in the majority of countries, except from Ireland and Portugal. It is recognized as very effective in Slovenia. |
### Job selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universality</th>
<th>Denmark was the only country in which the ease of access was evaluated as very high. Service was assessed as relatively highly in the Netherlands, Malta, Norway, Great Britain and Italy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>Service gained an effective or very effective evaluation in 7 countries. The lowest evaluation appeared in Austria, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Care in the workplace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universality</th>
<th>Does not exist in France. Universality was evaluated very high in Denmark, the Netherlands and Great Britain, low in Finland, Ireland, Italy and Slovakia, as well as very low in Austria, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Malta.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>In none of the countries it was assessed to be very easily available. Quite available in Denmark, Norway, Great Britain and Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>This service was recognized as effective or very effective in 8 countries. The highest evaluation in Ireland, and relatively high in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Slovakia and in Great Britain. The lowest in Austria, Germany, Norway, Portugal and Slovakia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Pre-professional trainings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universality</th>
<th>Service does not exist in Malta. It is commonly provided in Denmark, Finland and Great Britain, and quite often in the remaining countries, with exception of Slovenia and Italy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>Highly evaluated in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal and Great Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Recognized as relatively effective in 6 countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Professional rehabilitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universality</th>
<th>Does not exist in Malta. These services are provided commonly everywhere, except from Slovenia and Italy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>Access to services is relatively easy in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal and Great Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Service is considered as very effective in Austria, and relatively effective in 8 remaining countries. Low assessments of effectiveness predominated in Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Great Britain.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Specialist professional/education trainings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universality</th>
<th>It is commonly provided in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Great Britain. Sometimes provided in Austria, Ireland, Germany, Slovenia and Slovakia. Quite often provided in France, Germany, Norway, Portugal and Slovakia.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>Service available in all countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Effectiveness was evaluated very highly only in Austria, and relatively high in 8 countries. Low assessments of effectiveness predominated in Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Great Britain.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assistance in obtaining grants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universality</th>
<th>This assistance does not appear in the Portuguese system. It is commonly provided in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Great Britain. Sometimes provided in Austria, Ireland, Germany, Slovakia and Slovenia.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>In none of the countries the service is readily available. Relatively available in Denmark, Finland and Great Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>In none of the countries this system element was regarded as effective. Only 4 countries determined the provided assistance in obtaining grants as relatively effective – Finland, Germany, Slovenia and Great Britain.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasserting Freedom? Response to the Prevent Agenda by the UK Coalition Government

MARK RIX
Sydney Business School, Innovation Campus,
University of Wollongong

NICK JOHNS
SOCSCI Cardiff University

ALISON GREEN
Graduate School,
Glyndwr University

Abstract

In the UK the New Labour government under Tony Blair bought into the ‘War on Terror’ declared by George Bush Junior in 2001 the consequences for the general public was a significant loss of civil liberties that was supposedly justified by the enhanced degree of risk. In opposition the Conservatives argued that this loss was unacceptable and that on a sliding scale of freedom and security, freedom should always take priority as the fundamental political principle. In power from 2010 alongside their Liberal Democrat partners, they sought to return what had been lost, and to rebalance the scales. One of the central means of achieving this has been to increase surveillance rather than employ more direct alternatives. This essay aims to evaluate in theory and practice how effective this attempt has been. Is the UK now both safer and freer?

Keywords: Freedom; Surveillance; Security; Terrorism.

Introduction

From a progressive perspective the New Labour UK government did much that was worthy of criticism. However, it is perhaps surprising that the Coalition government headed by David Cameron should find common ground with critics on the left on such an important issue as the attempts New Labour made to tackle terrorism. The Prevent agenda, along with other measures introduced by New Labour, has had quite severe implications for civil liberties and rectifying this was identified by the Coalition as a policy priority. Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister, signalled this in a speech in London at the start of 2011, where he said:

1 Postal Address: Sydney Business School, Innovation Campus, University of Wollongong, NSW, 2522 Australia. E-mail Address: mrix@uow.edu.au
If you ask people whether they are happy with the control order regime that departs very significantly from the very basic rules of British justice and has proved to be ineffective in practice as many controlees have absconded – I think everybody will say “no – clearly something is wrong. Clearly something needs to be improved” (Clegg quoted by Newman, 2011).

Hence the basis of the New Labour approach to tackling terrorism was regarded as both unjust and ineffective by the in-coming government and as such it required urgent attention.

While we would accept the dual points raised by the Coalition, averring that the measures were ill-conceived and unfit for purpose, the actions that have followed this critique have largely confirmed the distance between progressive thinking and the current UK government. On issues such as national identity and the operation of the market, the coalition is just as muddled and incoherent as the New Right governments between 1979 and 1997. Not only are they riven by neo-liberal and neo-conservative tensions but they also have to bear the weight of the ‘liberal’ conscience hidden away somewhere in the Liberal Democrat ranks. In exploring the Coalition response to the Prevent agenda we argue that it is incoherent but also in certain respects dishonest. The freedom it offers is more about perception than reality and the impact on civil liberties might be far more dangerous than even New Labour’s approach.

The Development of the Prevent Agenda

The social and political environment during the 1980s and 1990s was a key factor in shaping the counter-terror policies of the New Labour government. The riots of the 1980s and the apparent failure of multiculturalism helped to focus the threat of terror away from the traditional domestic Irish ‘problem’, towards a more global and ill-defined Islamist insurgency. There was also an important change in the language of the community agenda from social cohesion to community cohesion. The difference may be seen by some as semantics, but it is an important distinction and marks a change in policy focus. It also reflects important changes in British ‘race’ relations. The riots of 1981, and the subsequent Scarman report, highlighted the differences between diverse ethnic communities in Britain. Central to all this was the importance of faith, especially Islam, in creating difference. Muslim culture became ‘problematised’ largely by the media in response to events like 9/11 (Hussain & Bagguley, 2005; Bagguley & Hussain, 2008).

Solomos (2003) talks about the post Scarman era and the ‘enemy within’, referring to the rioters as a deviant element in society. The priority for government in the 1980s shifted from addressing ‘racial’ disadvantage to maintaining civil order and security. Even though the Scarman report clearly flagged up the need to tackle inequality between different groups it was difficult for the Thatcher government with its New Right, small government agenda to respond in an effective manner by, for example, introducing worthwhile programs to counter violent extremism. This would have required decisive intervention to tackle ‘racial’ disadvantage, running counter to the policy of reducing state interference in society, and therefore was never going to be part of a serious policy shift for Thatcher’s government. We can see clear similarities between the discourse of that period with the debates currently taking place following the riots of 2001 and more recently of August 2011.

The official account of the roots of the riots of the 1980s became firmly located in a neoliberal, authoritarian world view. ‘Race’ riots were not symptomatic of disadvantage and injustice, but were the actions of deviant outsiders – ‘the enemy within’. This set the stage for the responses to terrorist threats from Al-Qaeda and other militant Islamic groups. According to Jessop et al. (1988) this notion of a dualism in society started to emerge in the 1980s, of the law abiding national citizen versus the disenfranchised, non-productive parasite. Writers such as John Lea have illustrated the lineage of such ideas, for example, the way in which policing was refocused to control ‘the dangerous classes’ of which minority ethnic groups were a key component (Lea, 2000). We clearly see from the public responses of David Cameron to the August 2011 riots, that
this is still the abiding view in the current government. The 1990s then became characterised by the protection of British national identity and the growth of Islamaphobia, and demonization of the Muslim population. One of the key events of recent years was that of 9/11 and the destruction of the twin towers, this set in train the so called ‘War on Terror’. The effect of this ‘War on Terror’ and the subsequent rhetoric was that it cast Western powers as international law enforcers and all non-western powers/states as potential criminals. Some commentators would also argue that the ‘War on Terror’ was actually a vehicle for the neo-Conservatives to usher in the New American Century (Roy, 2004; Eagleton, 2007). This had been their objective since the 1980s and signals a return to more traditional, territorial, form of imperialism to reinforce the cultural and economic forms practised by the US in the post-war period (Janowski, 2004).

The Blair Labour Government came to power in 1997. Its much Heralded ‘Third Way’ agenda was always a nebulous idea based on an ill-defined ‘pragmatism’ and a purported rejection of ideological constraints. However, the policy process remains an inherently political one despite repeated appeals to ‘evidence-based’ policy-making (Pawson, 2006). Policy thus became whatever the Government wanted it to be at any one time, freeing it from the ties of ‘Old Labour’. This enabled them to pick and mix policies across the spectrum of political discourse, from tough neo-conservatism embodied in the counter terror legislation through to neo-liberal ideas on private sector involvement in public welfare (Clarke, 2004). The whole ‘citizenship’ agenda had compliance and control at its heart, and the demonization of anyone who, through choice or lack of choice to do otherwise, did not participate in paid work.

The Labour government continued the focus on community cohesion and national values under its ‘citizenship’ agenda. The idea that social cohesion and harmony were dependent on limiting the numbers of immigrants of certain groups, persisted as a fundamental political and popular belief (Schuster & Solomos, 2004), a belief Labour historically placed at the centre of ‘race relations’, balancing such policies against their anti-discriminatory legislation (Layton-Henry, 1992). Thus social policy around citizenship and immigration policy has subsequently become interwoven with counter terrorist policy. This is demonstrated in the way that policy responses to terrorism influence other areas of policy having nothing to do with terrorism or violent extremism (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; also see on this point ICJ, 2009). An example of how measures designed to tackle serious terrorist threats become part and parcel of ‘normal’ policing can be seen in the way ‘stop and search’ became a feature of policing more broadly under New Labour, and more recently the responses of the police to student protests and the ‘Occupy’ demonstrations.

During its time in office, New Labour introduced five major pieces of counter-terror legislation: the Terrorism Act 2000 (HM Government, 2000a); the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 (HM Government, 2001); the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005 (HM Government, 2005); the Terrorism Act, 2006 (HM Government, 2006); and the Counter-Terrorism Act, 2008 (HM Government, 2008). It also passed some more wide-ranging legislation, such as the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act, 1998 (HM Government, 1998) as well as legislation that, while not aimed explicitly at countering terrorism, nevertheless had a significant impact on the powers available to the police and security services, such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 (HM Government, 2000b). This as a whole resulted in critics accusing the Government of increasingly eroding civil liberties. The legislation covers a wide range of powers, much of which were introduced as reactive, rather than proactive, measures to external events.

The Terrorism Act, (2000) (HM Government, 2000a), widened the definition of terrorism to apply to domestic terrorism and included, “any political, religious or ideological” cause that uses or threatens violence against people or property; creates new offences of inciting terrorism; enhances police powers, including stop and search and pre-charge detention for 7 days; outlaws terrorist groups (including Al-Qaeda). The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, (2001) (HM Government, 2001), initially enabled the Home Secretary to indefinitely detain foreign nationals without charge, if they were suspected of terrorism – a system subsequently replaced with control orders after a House of Lords ruling. It also gave government the power to freeze the bank accounts and assets of suspected terrorists. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, (2005) (HM Government, 2005), introduced control orders,
which allowed the government to restrict the activities of individuals it suspected of “involvement in terrorist related activity”, but for whom there was not sufficient evidence to charge. The Terrorism Act, (2006) (HM Government, 2006), extended the pre-charge detention period from 14 to 28 days and introduced a prohibition on the “glorification” of terrorism. Finally, the Counter-Terrorism Act (HM Government, 2008), enabled post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects; it allowed the taking of fingerprints and DNA samples from individuals subject to control orders; and amended the definition of terrorism by inserting a ‘racial’ clause.

**Big Society, Nationalism and Assimilation**

In the run up to the 2010 election the Conservative Party was keen to promote the idea of a ‘Big Society’ as a way of promoting social cohesion and replacing State control with community empowerment. This rhetoric has been central to the way the Coalition Government has countered critics to the cuts in State intervention and welfare funding. During most of the New Labour period in office the Conservatives had been a particularly ineffective electoral force. Not only were they unable to regain the initiative on the centre-right of British politics, but they could not find a leader with the right ingredients to lead them out of the doldrums. Finally, with the arrival of David Cameron they sought to appeal to constituencies beyond their traditional borders, framed as a new compassionate Conservatism with an interest in diversity amongst other things. The target was what they termed ‘The Broken Society’, a society in which civic virtues had been lost and in which ‘social justice’ was largely absent. The establishment of a Centre for Social Justice under the Stewardship of Ian Duncan Smith in 2007 was part of the drive to reclaim ownership of centre-right politics. By definition this agenda was far more domestic in emphasis than New Labour’s approach under Tony Blair.

Many of the ideas of the ‘Big Society’ were clearly not unique, with echoes of Blair’s responsible citizenship agenda. However, there are important differences. Blair’s agenda was very much about duty, responsibility and people contributing through paid work. In return they were awarded opportunities to succeed through access to education and employment (Williams, 1999). The old class consciousness debates of Old Labour were replaced by a new discourse which saw responsible citizenship being rewarded by equality of opportunity, based not on collective notions of ‘class’ but on group-based characteristics of gender, ‘race’, age, sexuality etc. interpreted through an individualistic lens. Levitas (2005) describes this shift as SID (social integrationist discourse). This sees cohesion and growth as being a function of paid employment, whereas unemployment typifies social exclusion. The main focus therefore, of the citizenship agenda revolved around people engaging in paid work, the implication being that the unemployed were irresponsible parasites.

For its part, the ‘Big Society’ debate is more about a retrenchment of State intervention in many aspects of welfare and community life. It is about placing responsibility and power into the hands of communities. The role of the State thus becomes diminished, not only directly by the relinquishing of functions to the private or voluntary sector, but also indirectly by the promotion of greater social cohesion and the reduction in the need for State intervention in areas like crime prevention. Thus the core of the agenda is reducing the reach and scope of central government and revivifying active citizenship through voluntarism and increasing the share of welfare provision shouldered by the third sector. According to Evans (2011), there are three main aims in the development of the ‘Big Society’. These are public service reform, the promotion of active citizens and lastly, the creation of a new accountability and transparency in government (Evans, 2011). In terms of counter terror, the first of these connects with the aim of reducing the size and scope of government and the second with the promotion of an illusory empowerment of citizens. One of the key vehicles for empowering citizens created by New Labour was the Human Rights Act 2000 which gave individuals protection against any undue encroachment on liberties and rights by the British state. In threatening to repeal this legislation the Coalition demonstrate further contradiction and inconsistency in their defence of freedom. Third and finally, the release of the Macdonald Report (2011) on the Prevent Agenda suggests at least a partial commitment by the Coalition Government to openness and transparency.
The Big Society has provoked a huge amount of debate and discussion, and the narrative around ‘Big Society’ has at times been confused and contradictory. Cynics have suggested that its principal objective is to reduce expenditure on public services, lower taxes for the privileged and redistribute the burden of caring and responsibility onto the poorest sections of society (Wyler, 2011). However, commentators from inside the Conservative party, led by Jesse Norman (2010), argue that this narrow focus on voluntarism as practical politics ignores the philosophical origins and objectives of the Big Society project. Claiming a faux legitimacy, he cites the work of Edmund Burke as a key influence and points to the importance of the reinforcing role of ‘community’ in public policy.

A major problem for the Coalition Government has been the global financial crisis and the need to reduce the size of the UK budget deficit. Reducing the size of the public sector and the ‘Big Society’ agenda have conveniently been promoted as a necessary part of the process of deficit reduction. The Coalition Government’s agenda of savagely cutting the size of the public sector combined with its apparent war on public sector wages and pensions have some poignant echoes of Thatcher’s agenda of brutally curbing the power of the Trades Unions and her war against the miners. Ken Livingstone in a recent TV interview made this point, but also made the additional point that Mrs Thatcher had more foresight, in that she predicted that the cuts and policies she was to embark on would cause public unrest. She recruited more police in anticipation of this, the Coalition Government is cutting policing. Sure enough August 2011 saw rioting in the streets of many UK cities, although the Government deny that political and financial factors were the primary cause, which directly contradicts the findings of research into the causes of the riots commissioned by The Guardian and the London School of Economics (The Guardian, 2011b). These studies found that the rioters in every area involved cited a deep seated antipathy towards the police as a major cause, 59% of the rioters were unemployed and half of those interviewed were black. Rioters also cited a sense of injustice as being a major motivation, articulated as either lack of jobs and opportunities or as a more intangible ‘social’ exclusion in terms of how they are regarded in society.

Since the Coalition Government was elected, the swingeing cuts and backlash to them has meant that there has in effect been a retreat from the global agenda. Indeed the war in Afghanistan looks to be rapidly fizzling into a retreat, and the temporary incursion into Middle Eastern affairs, (Libya in particular), is receiving little attention. There has instead been a reaffirmation of British national identity and ‘Britishness’ putting a greater emphasis on the importance of domestic policy. David Cameron is very keen on expressing the view that ‘we are all in it together’, that we all need to ‘pull together’ as one and that there is this notion of the responsible and acceptable citizen. Reaffirming British national identity has become a process of assimilation, the riots of August 2011 are claimed to have nothing to do with ‘race’, inequality or difference; instead they were due to deviant minority elements in society seizing opportunities to loot, steal and disrupt the lives of the respectable majority.

It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the potential or otherwise of the Big Society for improving the delivery of social welfare, what we can say with some justification is that the Big Society represents a movement away from the global and back towards domestic priorities. Part of this retreat from the global has occasioned fairly recent debates about nationalism and national identity throughout Europe (Dueland, 2011). The veto on the strengthening of the Lisbon Treaty to ensure greater fiscal discipline across the member states of the EU clearly underlines this shift towards protecting British interests and identity. Despite the importance attributed to diversity in opposition, Cameron (2011) used a speech in Europe to question the validity of ‘multiculturalism’. The tone of this speech harked back to the assimilationism of the 1970s, whereby black and minority ethnic groups were expected to eschew their cultural and lingual origins and embrace ‘Britishness’. In some ways this did not deviate so significantly from what New Labour had done, with policy measures such as citizenship tests. However, the Conservatives have gone much further than Labour in actually challenging one of the central planks of diversity. By accident or design Cameron’s speech in Munich about the failure of multiculturalism happened to coincide with an English Defence League (EDL) rally back in Britain, which meant people inevitably made connections between Cameron’s beliefs and those of the EDL (Doward, 2011). Commentators recalled Margaret Thatcher talking about the fears of the indigenous ‘white’ population being
'swamped' by immigrants, which coincided with activities by the National Front (Layton-Henry, 1986). Some saw obvious parallels with the Cameron/EDL incident.

To summarise, the arrival of the Coalition Government spelled the end of New Labour as a governing force, and a move back towards domestic policy priorities. This can be underlined by the desire to redefine nationalism as assimilationism, that where relevant black and minority ethnic communities must eschew their traditional cultural values and languages and embrace a sense of ‘Britishness’. Indeed, according to Husband and Alam (2011), there has been a widespread European retreat from multiculturalism and a movement towards assimilationism and nationalism. What it means to be British, and how British culture should be defined is something that is frequently brushed over by its various advocates. More particularly though, just as the Third Way was seen to be vague, ambiguous and at times paradoxical, so too is the Big Society programme of the Conservative-led Coalition. In order to demonstrate this, we will use anti-terror policy as a case study.

Almost as soon as they were elected, the Coalition Government targeted the counter-terror measures introduced by New Labour for revision and repeal. The primary reason posited for this was the serious attack on civil liberties they represented. In many ways, those on the left and centre-left would agree with the charge that New Labour had exaggerated the terrorist threat and used this to undermine ancient rights that had taken centuries to enshrine in legislation (McLaughlin, 2005). However, the intentions and actions of the Coalition Government are worth examining in more detail, not least because we believe that anti-terror reforms show the limitations to the Big Society agenda.

There are two threads to our critique. The first relates to one of the central planks of the Big Society, the place of community. The Prevent strategy put into place by New Labour employed a multi-agency approach to community engagement, which would at first sight reflect Big Society principles. Not only did it emphasise the importance of community, but it arguably aimed to integrate BME communities more closely into wider British society (Newburn, 1998). Although this was not framed explicitly as assimilation it certainly worked along those lines. However, in cutting funding so drastically to local authorities the lifeline of Prevent has been cut off and therefore its continuation is doubtful.2

The second thread is perhaps the more important because it forms the basis of the Coalition response to New Labour’s anti-terror policy framework. A vague notion of liberty was, as stated above, the main concern of the Coalition in unpicking what their predecessors had done (Directgov, 2010). Yet the reforms, also as noted above, have perhaps been more about the perception of freedom than freedom as a reality. Although instruments like control orders have been dismissed as unacceptable impositions on freedom, the Coalition alternative is to intensify surveillance. In a sense all this does is shift the location of the civil liberties argument to an earlier stage in the counter terror process, and one which is less controversial because it is less conspicuous. However, in light of the phone hacking scandals that have beset News International and the public reaction to them, this may be an optimistic appraisal on the part of the Government (see The Leveson Inquiry, 2011).

Consequently, we would argue that the anti-terror approach adopted by the Coalition Government demonstrates not only the paradoxical nature of the Big Society agenda, but also, for the same reason, that it has natural limits. It is not a coherent, comprehensive political philosophy that provides a practical blueprint for government policy-making. Because the Coalition is constructed of a New Right with natural fault-lines around freedom and tradition and Liberal Democrat partners who lack sympathy for most Conservative inclinations, it would perhaps be more surprising if there were greater consistency and coherence.

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2 One of the authors was involved in a research grant bid to evaluate the programmes put into place by a council in one of the largest and most diverse cities in the UK, but before a decision could be reached the project was withdrawn due to a lack of resources. As a result the money invested was essentially wasted as the programme was ended with no evaluation of its impact. This means that a community-based initiative with integrationist objectives has been virtually brought to a close due to the Coalition’s determination to reduce public expenditure.
The Coalition Policy response to counter-terrorism

The Government published its response to the previous government’s Prevent strategy on 7th June 2011 (for commentary see, e.g. Staniforth, 2011). According to Hasan (2011) the final document represents a neo-conservative victory over the liberal element of the Coalition. The new Prevent strategy is based on neo-conservative, US ideas about radicalisation, that people start off disillusioned and angry, then become politicised and radicalised and then turn those radical beliefs to violence. However, evidence suggests that the route to terrorism is not consistent with this conveyor belt theory. A study in 2008 by MI5 concludes no typical pattern of how violent extremism had developed in the hundreds of terrorists they examined. In addition, Sageman (2008) analysed 500 terrorist biographies and also concluded that there was no such linear progression of extremist activity. The new Prevent agenda has ignored this, and indeed has virtually ignored evidence that foreign policy is a driver behind radicalisation. Commenting on the inquiry into the invasion of Iraq by the Chilcot committee in July 2010, Eliza Manningham-Buller (Director General of MI5), observed that the invasion had radicalised a new generation of young British Muslims. Stella Rimington (former head of MI5) further supported this view, “…if what we’re looking at is groups of disaffected young men born in this country who turn to terrorism, then I think to ignore the effect of the war in Iraq is misleading” (Hasan 2011). In a study by Mythen, Walklate & Khan (2009) of the Muslim community the important factors in the radicalisation of young people revolved around several key factors: firstly having a voice in terms of political representation, and being listened to properly; secondly, recognising the problems of British foreign and military policy in Muslim countries; thirdly, tackling ethnic inequalities; and lastly confronting the criminal injustices suffered by Muslim minority groups (Mythen, Walklate & Khan, 2009).

The language and discourse in Lord Ken Macdonald’s Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers (2011) is very interesting. The introduction to the review report sets the agenda as being to ascertain whether it would be possible to roll back counter-terror measures imposed over the past few decades. It also raises the idea that the balance of freedom versus security has moved too far in the direction of security, at the expense of personal freedom. Interestingly, Lord Macdonald also comments that the primary duty of the State is the protection of citizens; however, but did not spend much time considering the question of the need for the protection of citizens from State incursion on their freedom (although at least he raised the issue).

The report then proceeds to put forward proposals to inject greater ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ by, for example, removing curfews for suspects and removing the ability of police to detain suspects for prolonged periods without charge. Yet part of the rationale and justification for this is that these measures are ineffectual, and it is far more beneficial to allow suspects to mix with other potential terrorists, while under covert surveillance. Indeed, according to Pantazis & Pemberton (2009), some groups and individuals within the Muslim community have been specifically targeted for surveillance. One particular feature of demonstrations and riots since the Coalition Government was elected has been the use of social media and technology to communicate and coordinate activities. David Cameron has publicly said that this is something he intends to address through disruption of things like Blackberry messenger, with the help of MI5, the police and mobile phone networks. This sanctioning of ‘hacking’ into people’s private messages is ironic given the furore of over the News of the World phone hacking scandal.

Telephony, the internet and physical surveillance are all explicitly mentioned in the Coalition’s review of the Prevent strategy. Indeed The UK is already home to around five million CCTV cameras, which amounts to around 20% of the world's total. The average London commuter already has their image captured several hundred times a day as they travel to work and UK motorists can expect even greater surveillance once a new system designed to recognise number plates comes into operation. However, that is not the limit to surveillance in the UK, there is a worldwide move to enlist the assistance of telecommunications providers to monitor people's telephone calls, internet activity and emails. Modern Western nations are all undergoing a radical transformation in the use of surveillance. More and more institutions across the public and private sectors are using new technology to gather data and monitor different types of people. These institutions include retailers, local government, employers, the military etc. They use a wide variety of techniques, ranging from databases, espionage, military

...
satellites, internet monitoring, CCTV, to DNA testing. The growth of surveillance in all spheres of life has led to the conclusion that Western nations now qualify as ‘surveillance societies’, because of the centrality of surveillance to institutional practices (Murakami Wood, 2009).

The official responses to the recent rioting of August 2011, and the concern about the use of social media such as Twitter and Blackberry messenger, reinforce this message that ‘freedom’ in rolling back these measures is in fact an illusion. The Government are in effect replacing one series of visible counter-terror measures with invisible and covert measures. In the light of the phone hacking scandal involving the News of the World which has tainted the media, police and politicians alike, we can see how very real this policy has become. The irony of the development of this strand of policy though is that the Government explicitly states that the reform of the Prevent agenda is about freeing up civil liberties and freedoms. Many commentators would argue that in fact surveillance is the polar opposite of democracy and surveillance is a real threat to civil liberties (Haggerty & Samatas, 2010). Indeed some would go so far as to argue that surveillance curtails personal freedoms, inhibits democracy and ultimately leads to totalitarianism (Haggerty, 2009; Rule, 2007).

The use of State surveillance is anti-democratic for a number of reasons. If democracy is about fairness and the equitable operation of participatory decision making then it is more than just a system for making decisions. It is also the mechanism by which citizens relate to each other. A vital aspect of democracy is that the State should be accountable to their citizens and should also include open discussion between competing views and freedom of association. Therefore, accountability and transparency are of paramount importance, as is access to information (Haggerty & Samatas, 2010). This growth of a surveillance society is seen by some as a slippery slope, the argument being that many fascist governments and totalitarian states use massive state conducted surveillance as a tool of state repression. The Government would perhaps be wise at this point to look at the recent fate of the Mubarak and Gaddafi regimes in the so called ‘Arab Spring’. Furthermore Tilly (2005) argues that surveillance can corrode the interpersonal trust required for democratic governance to work effectively (Tilly, 2005).

Of course we recognise that it is necessary to have some police surveillance as the nature of policing has changed. However, the State clearly discriminates in terms of who they subject to surveillance and monitoring; this was never more apparent than in the appearance of CCTV cameras in a predominantly Muslim area in Birmingham. In this case 40 covert cameras were concealed; some believed to be hidden in trees and walls, in Sparkbrook Birmingham. The project was halted after intervention by the Guardian newspaper in June 2010, after it was revealed that this was a counter-terrorism initiative (Lewis, 2010)

One of the elements of the whole counter-terrorist agenda has been the drive to involve community groups, schools and universities in identifying potential terrorists is an integral part of the ‘surveillance society’. Community groups have been particularly critical of the expectation that they would become drawn into ’spying’ on their communities, because much of the work they do with disadvantaged and disaffected people relies upon the trust they have built up over many years. If they now start monitoring and reporting local residents, that trust will break down. In addition, one of the main problems for community groups, schools and universities has been a lack of any clear guidance as to what to look for when identifying these individuals and what exactly constitutes a potential ‘terrorist threat’. According to The Guardian (The Guardian, 2011a) the resulting review of the expansion of community surveillance (which was a component of the broader review of the Prevent strategy) has deliberately created an imprecise and unclear picture and although identification of extremist groups has been scaled down, at its heart the review amounts to an ‘illiberal intolerance of ideas that amounts to a new curtailment of freedom of speech’. Community groups are not only under threat from the potential loss of trust from their residents, the very fabric of their existence may be threatened. If funding is awarded to community groups based on their display of ‘British’ values (and ‘Bulldog’ zeal to find the enemy within) then we risk losing groups which reach out to minority ethnic and cultural groups because of their diverse nature.

Moving away from surveillance, the other strand to the review of counter-terrorism, by Lord Macdonald, expresses the intention to use deportation as a more widespread tool. This is
consistent with the nationalistic agenda of the respectable ‘Big Society’, ejecting the deviant outsiders. This rejection of multiculturalism and the move toward assimilation and integration has been a very public thread of David Cameron’s response to the recent riots.

**Conclusion**

The response of the Coalition Government to the Prevent agenda has been ideologically confused and inconsistent. They purport to be interested in engaging communities as partners in the development of social and public policies, and, in promoting policies that encourage greater integration into the British cultural mainstream. Multiculturalism has failed according to David Cameron and the time has come for greater ‘community cohesion’. However, in the savage attack that has been launched on public expenditure the elements of the Prevent Strategy that might have, at least in theory, fulfilled these related objectives have been undermined. From our point of view this is less about the reality or validity of the measures themselves and more about the inconsistency at the heart of the Big Society project.

As one might expect with a Coalition Government led by the Conservatives the strongest criticism of the Prevent agenda was directed at its implications for freedom and liberty, but they are implementing policies which will take away freedom and liberty. Indeed, we would argue that much of their response is simply *undemocratic*. The very recent debates about the future of the Human Rights Act have been very revealing in demonstrating the divide within the Coalition between the true liberals who support freedom and democracy and the neo-Conservatives who want to remove access to rights in order to control and exclude certain sections of the population. Indeed the response to the Prevent agenda is completely at odds with one of the aims of the Big Society, to give more democratic rights to voters and increase transparency and accountability of government.

**References**


Cultural Competency, Adaptation and Intelligence: Non-Governmental Organizations’ Role in this Globalization Era

DENISE KROHN RAMÓN¹
University of the Incarnate Word

Abstract

Globalization is here. It has been forth seen. Over the last few decades, international entities, such as the United Nations, were created. Soft laws, such as the Millennium Development Goals, were developed to form global governance to oversee interactions amongst nation-states. Partnerships and qualms have manifested from different perspectives, especially when processing the work towards mutual goals. Presented is a literature review that explores ways to build cultural intelligence and cultural adaptation in order to increase intercultural competency and cross-cultural exchanges through non-governmental agencies, such as Women’s Global Connection. This particular research introduces each component and delves into literature that scrutinizes related issues.

Keywords: Globalization; Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS); Cultural Adaptation; Cultural Intelligence; Intercultural Competency

Cultural Competency, Adaptation, and Intelligence: Non-Governmental Organizations’ Role in this Globalization Era

By now, in this period of history of Mother Earth, people have traveled throughout the entire planet, having walked on all continents, dipped in every accessible water spot, and have touched the sky beyond Earth’s atmosphere. The United States Census Bureau’s (2013, August 7) declare that the world has over seven billion people. Globalization, world-wide, and international are words that are popping up more often in local news, public debates, and in everyday conversations. Researchers, the media, explorers, and others of interest, have probed into the vast majority, if not every, type of culture that exists on this planet, providing at least a bird’s eye view into the multitude of communities. Since the 20th century and the start of the 21st century, one of the main developments of the world has been “the rapid growth of global social relations” (Scholte, 2010, p. 459). Given the abundant variety of livelihoods, what could bring people together as one holistic society? Why would coming together as one global junction even be desired or sought after?

All life forms have basic needs. Humans, by nature, are social beings and have an inborn tendency to form relationships. When there is more than one person around, usually, there is a sense of protection and aid. History, as well as, current day practices demonstrates that communities establish norms and common laws to abide by, to keep order. Many times, a society will institute some sort of governance. The definition of governance runs a broad spectrum and denotes numerous significances depending on the viewed philosophy, theory, or

¹ Postal Address: University of the Incarnate Word, 4301 Broadway, San Antonio, Texas 78209, U.S.A. E-mail Address: dkramon@student.uiwtx.edu

There are a vast range of international structures, mechanisms, and components of global governance that includes public and private sectors that participate in formal and informal frameworks (Karnes & Mingst, 2010). Major stakeholders, also considered actors, include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and nation-states (Karnes & Mingst, 2010). The United Nations (UN), charities and non-profit organizations, and individual countries are examples of global governance stakeholders. Other global governance actors who play a role are large groups with vested interests, such as ad hoc groups (i.e. The Group of Seven, G-7), multinational corporations, and international terrorists and regimes (Karnes & Mingst, 2010). Global governance, additionally, incorporates international rules and laws, called soft laws, which are used as guides, such as Agenda 21 or The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Soft laws are intended for multilateral agreements, customary practices, judicial decisions, regulatory standards, and cooperative problem-solving arrangements (Karnes & Mingst, 2010; Fukuda-Parr, 2004; OECD, n.d.).

If globalization and global governance is going to play such a major role in the world, what aspects should culture take part in? How do the macro and micro societies interact? Nations, will have to deal with the intertwined issues. Citizens, will have to learn about others who are different from themselves. Individuals will have to consider adapting their ways. Actors, therefore, especially non-governmental organizations, such as Women’s Global Connection, enable the promotion of intercultural competency as a tool in cross-cultural interactions to bridge gaps that may hinder relationships in modern society. Cultural adaptation and cultural intelligence (CQ) is the ensemble composed to obtain intercultural competency and cross-cultural exchange in this era of globalization and world governance.

**Defining Cultural Competency**

During the 1980’s, U.S. national mandates and subordinate levels of government accentuated the induction of cultural competence objectives as subsidy requirement for service programs due to the social trends instigated by the civil rights movements (Gallegos, Tindall & Gallegos, 2008). Gallegos, Tindall & Gallegos (2008) state, consequently, many disciplines of study and industry have included cultural competency themes and ideals. In 1989, a foundational definition was laid for cultural competency, but over subsequent years, the meaning has been altered to fit varying perspectives, interests, institutions, settings, and needs (Georgetown University, n.d.). This has left multiple descriptions. Presently, organizations and social work programs generally embrace cultural competence in their mission statements (Gallegos, Tindall & Gallegos, 2008).

Some researchers separate “culture” and “competence”. Culture is patterned human behavior created by the factors and occurrences encountered, perceived, and experienced by an individual or a group (Georgetown University, n.d.; Rice, 2007). Some shaping dynamics include: customs, beliefs, values, physical facts (i.e. gender), socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, geographic location, nationality, age, and historic events (Georgetown University, n.d.; Rice, 2007). The U.S. Human Health Service Department (2001) is quoted by Rice (2007, p. 624), and states that “Competence is ‘having the knowledge, skills, and abilities to be effective in a particular area’ or having attained a level of mastery”. Vasquez (2009), director of The Leading Institute and the Professional Development Institute, Rutgers University, and Georgetown University (n.d.) says that cultural competency is a complex phenomena clustered in awareness, knowledge, dexterity, behaviors, values, viewpoints, attitudes, and policies that systematically converge to enable the efficient engagement of entities in culturally diverse environments.

competency is “the range of awareness, beliefs, knowledge, skills, behaviors, and professional practice that will assist in planning in, for, and with ‘multiple publics’”. Studying cultural competency focuses on differences in cultures and comparisons of their “complex, dynamic, and embodied set of realities in which people (re)create identities, meanings, and values”. To become culturally competent, with the aim to become proficient, means to seek equality, flexibility, and understanding of the difference between cultural groups and their needs (Agyemen & Erickson, 2012).

In order to narrow the cultural competency definition, a synthesized explanation has been adopted from the presented information. It is within these explanations that this research addresses cultural competency. Culture and competency are seen as two entities working together to form a cluster. Joined, cultural competency is the ability to be aware of and understand the differences of the factors that shape an individual’s or a group’s identity. Cultural competency leads to intercultural competency. This is when an individual or a group is able to deal and maneuver through the differences to enable working relationships.

Defining Cultural Adaptation
Tomasello (1999; 2000) and Boyd, Richerson & Henrich (2011) look at cultural adaptation from an anthropological lens, linking it to the human evolutionary process. Culture is passed on through generations because humans have a cognitive ability to learn from others socially, are able to imitate observed behaviors, can make inferences, and are able to enable improvements based from previous knowledge (Tomasello 1999, 2000; Boyd, Richerson & Henrich, 2011). Adaptation takes place cumulatively and over time (Tomasello 1999, 2000; Boyd, Richerson & Henrich, 2011).

Crisp & Turner (2011) and Sugiyama, Tooby & Cosmides (2002) support the same claim of cultural adaptation, but add a cognitive dimension to it. Crisp & Turner (2011) do this by challenging stereotypical expectations. They argue that social and cultural diversity grows “under the right conditions” (Crisp & Turner, 2011, p. 242). In Cognitive Adaptation to the Experience of Social and Cultural Diversity, Crisp & Turner (2011) conclude that facing stereotypes and confronting its obstacles generate benefits that promote social change and cultural diversity. This in turn, will build greater tolerance towards differences in individuals and groups, effects on egalitarianism in social attitudes and behavior, and provide varied aspects of psychological functioning. Sugiyama, Tooby & Cosmides (2002) report a quantitative study proving the ability for people to experience cross-cultural cognitive adaptation for social exchange.

This composition will define cultural adaptation as a change in an individual’s or group’s way of thinking and interaction with others, especially those considered as “outsiders”. It is seen as a process that is done through various social experiences that may challenge present knowledge and feelings towards a particular culture. With a collection of new erudition, in due course, acclimatization takes place. Cultural adaptation transpires, leaving a path open for communal transformations and cultural diversity to be cultivated in a viable manner.

Defining Cultural Intelligence (CQ)
For the context of this piece, the foundational definition for cultural intelligence (CQ) will come from the works of Earley & Mosakowski (2004) and Ward, Wilson & Fisher (2011). In Cultural Intelligence, Earley & Mosakowski (2004) refer to CQ as a continuum of emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence looks at the commonalities in humans and the aspects that make each individual different. CQ is that sense of when a person can innately interpret another person’s “unfamiliar and ambiguous gestures” as if coming from the same background (Earley & Mosakowski, 2004, p. 139). It is able to be developed. Ward, Wilson & Fisher (2011) quote Earley & Ang’s (2003) definition for cultural intelligence (CQ). CQ means to have the ability to “adapt effectively” to novel contexts, including cultural circumstances, settings, frameworks, and situations (Ward, Wilson & Fisher, 2011). With CQ, a person is capable of differentiating behaviors as universal norms for all people from those behaviors that are specific for a particular individual or group (Earley & Mosakowski, 2004).
Four core components are comprised within cultural intelligence (CQ) (Ward, Wilson & Fischer, 2011, p. 138). The first one is Behavioral CQ, which is one’s “flexibility in demonstrating appropriate actions in encounters with people from different cultural backgrounds”. Next, Motivational CQ is “a person’s drive to learn more about and function effectively in culturally varied situations”. Thirdly, “an individual’s knowledge of specific norms, practices and conventions in new cultural settings” is Cognitive CQ. Last, Meta-cognitive CQ is someone’s “cultural awareness during interactions with people from different cultural backgrounds”.

Significance
The League of Nations formed in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles. Its purpose was “to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security” (United Nations, n.d.C, para. 4). On account of World War II, The League of Nations was disassembled. The United Nations (UN) formed after World War II in 1945, having 51 countries devoted to keeping “international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights” (United Nations, n.d.A, para. 1). Since its establishment, the UN has been the core and driving source for international governance. It has developed and overseen international soft laws, such as The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which aim to defeat global issues, such as the lack of human rights and poverty. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are on the forefront since its evaluation date is nearing, 2015. In September 2000, these goals were established by “all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development institutions” as a global action plan, outlining “efforts to meet the needs of the world’s poorest” (United Nations, n.d.B, para. 1). The eight MDGs are to:
- eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;
- achieve universal primary education;
- promote gender equality and empower women;
- reduce child mortality;
- improve maternal health;
- combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;
- ensure environmental sustainability; and
- develop a global partnership for development

MDGs strengths are that they prioritize human development; give a measureable, concrete scaffold for accountability; and include all governments regardless of their economic levels (Fukuda-Parr, 2004).

Outcomes have bountifully flourished with the implementation of the objectives set in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), yet endangerments lurk to keep goals from fully being manifested, especially by 2015 (Ahern, 2007; Khan, 2010; United Nations, 2011; 2012; United Nations, DESA, 2012; Waage, et al., 2010). It will be quite challenging to meet these goals with the existing condition of the state affairs on inequity, poverty, aggressive hostilities, environmental problems, and pandemics, (Ahern, 2007; QLD nurse takes international honour, 2011). The UN’s MDGs Report 2012 (p. 5) states, “Achievements were unequally distributed across and within regions and countries. Moreover, progress has slowed for some MDGs after the multiple crises of 2008-2009.”

There are five inequalities, listed in the MDGs’ 2012 Report, that divert gains towards the goals and are slowing advances in significant areas. The first one is that “vulnerable employment” was at 67% in 2011 and has decreased only slightly, having little overall change when comparing the difference over the last 20 years (p. 7). Women and youth are the most vulnerable to be subjugated to land wavering and scantily compensated positions when matched to other employed populations. Secondly, despite the reduction in the maternal mortality rates, this goal is far from its anticipated 2015 marker. Thirdly, there is a discrepancy in improved water sources in rural areas. It is estimated that over 19% of the rural population “used unimproved sources of water in 2010” in contrast to over 4% in urbanized areas. In addition, “2.5 billion—still lacks access to improved sanitation facilities” (p. 7). The report already predicts that this goal will not be reached. Fourthly, 15.5% of the world population is
under nourished and living in hunger. This still is a major global challenge in spite of efforts to change this reality. Lastly, in 1990, about 650 million people lived in slum conditions, and currently an estimated 863 million people are living under these poor circumstances. Slum living is a growing dilemma.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a direct, objective, data-driven blueprint with a solution-orientation action plan. Predominant leaders and experts have been involved for a multitude of years with this comprehensive project. The recipe for success should be inevitable. Conversely, detrimental global issues endure. There must be a missing, intangible component. Facts are being reported and discussed in the attempted progression to meet the MDGs. As far as this text goes, literature and information found disconnects the MDGs with cultural aspects. It does not appear that culture and its features have truly been analyzed when creating the MDGs, and other international soft laws. Neither indicators nor benchmarks for cultural aspects are apparent and do not seemed to be measured. One work found, Göran Hydén’s 2007 published article, Poverty and Hunger Special Feature: Governance and Poverty Reduction in Africa, also referred to these concerns. Even though the work is narrowed to Africa, it illustrates the international development policy community’s principal hypothesis, which is that enhanced governance is a primary instrument to diminish poverty. He alludes that there is a heavy emphasis on economics components and convention policy models, and little consideration for cultural aspects, in the political science and social science arenas.

“The MDGs can be achieved by 2015, with accelerated development policy implementation and intensified investment in targeted areas by all development actors” (OECD, Achieving the MDGs: The OECD's Role, Supporting Strategic Areas of Progress, n.d., para. 1). “[Global issues]… do not recognize national frontiers and cannot be tackled by nation-states in isolation” (Ahern, 2007, p. 4). To prevail worldly trials and to increase justice and peace, Ahern (2007, p. 4) suggests more exchanges between governments and “the Community of Nations,” while emphasizing the importance of NGOs and the values on “Catholic Social Teaching (CST)” on justice, solidarity, peace and the integrity of creation” (Ahern, 2007, p. 4).

The purpose of this literature review is to explore non-governmental organizations as agents to build intercultural competency through cultural adaptation and cultural intelligence. Furthermore, this work renders the significance of culture’s role in globalization and the cross-cultural exchanges to attain international goals. Inquiries for this exploration point to the ties between cultural intelligence, adaptation, competencies, non-government organizations (NGOs), and the attainment of international goals. Three particular derived questions in are: (1) Can cultural adaptation and cultural intelligence increase intercultural competency?, (2) Can a rise in intercultural competency support measures that achieve goals towards international sustainability development in a global society?, and (3) What role do NGOs play in supporting the development of intercultural competency? This research has pro-Western bias, influence, and assumptions, and comes from an educational perspective. Individuals who are concerned with culture and are associated with global issues, social science, policymaking, economics, education, and NGOs may find this writing of interest. Bennett’s Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS) is used as a conceptual framework.

**Conceptual Framework to Increase Intercultural Competency**

Milton Bennett desired to clarify the process of how some individuals could communicate “across cultural boundaries” readily so that cross-cultural training and education could better prepare people for cross-cultural dealings (Bennett, 2004, p. 62). Consequently, the Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS) originated from a grounded theory approach. Cognitive constructivism is the foundational theory for DMIS because of its ties with the formation of experience and the idea “that we do not perceive events directly” (Bennett, 2004, p. 73). Our background knowledge, abilities, and history, are like shaped templates that place categories into our schema, which affects our view and slant on phenomena. “…More cognitively complex people can make finer discriminations among phenomena in a particular domain” (Bennett, 2004, p. 73).
The Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS) framework is a continuum of stages in which people respond to cultural differences. There are six intercultural competency levels, denial of difference, defense against difference, minimization of difference, acceptance of difference, adaptation to difference, and integration of difference. As noted by Dong, Day & Collaço (2008), who reference Greenholtz (2000), the model also shows that when a person’s cultural experiences vary, one’s competence in intercultural situations increases, as well. As one befalls intercultural competency, there is a key transformation in their experiential quality, altering from a state of ethnocentric to ethnorelative.

The Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS) splits in the middle into two sections. The first half is the DMIS are the ethnocentric stages. Along this side of the spectrum are the stages of denial of difference, defense against difference, minimization of difference. The ethnocentric stages yield that an individual perceives one’s identifiable culture as “central to reality” (Bennett, 2004, p. 63). This translates experiences as “just the way things are,” and there are no queries regarding primary beliefs, behaviors, social patterns, and community (Bennett, 2004, p. 63). It is a singular, insular point-of-view. An increase in ethnocentric orientations manifests in shunning divergent cultures. The other half of the DMIS is the ethnorelative stages. Acceptance of difference, adaptation to difference, and integration of difference make up the later part of the spectrum, the ethnorelative stages. Coming from a broader lens, the ethnorelative stages open “the experience of one’s own beliefs and behaviors as just one organization of reality among many viable possibilities” (Bennett, 2004, p. 62). Single cultures, including personal culture, are seen as part of a bigger picture.

Since the DMIS indicates the acumen of intercultural sensitivity, it can be seen as a measurement tool that tracks progress towards intercultural competency (Hofner Saphiere, Schaetti & Robinson, 2011). At the heart of progressing to the ethnorelative stages are having opportunities or need to experience differentiations in cultures, and the capability of adapting (Bennett, 2004). People who are exposed to a monoculture will typically have a limited worldview and attain low intercultural skills (Bennett, 2004). There is an understanding of personal culture being above others (Communicaid Group, 2010). On the other hand, exposure to different cultures develops intercultural sensitivity, the power to adapt to alternate experiences, and a broader worldview (Bennett, 2004). One’s culture is seen as leveled in value and complexity with other cultures (Communicaid Group, 2010). Thus, as one becomes more ethnorelative, a person becomes increasingly effective when dealing with cross-cultural matters (Bennett, 2004). Succeeding towards intercultural competency may summon time, but it is an asset for those involved with globalization (Communicaid Group, 2010).

Review of Related Literature

Globalization and NGOs
De Soysa & Vadlamannati (2011) inquire about the effects of economic, social, and political globalization on human rights conditions, especially since this is a chief distress among scholars, global business, policymakers, and the community at large. Two arguments come from the liberal perspective, which believes in the emergent interdependence among countries in a positive light, and those who are cynical towards globalization, including a large portion of the NGO community. Liberals say that globalization brings forth economic, social, and political benefits, which brings forth human rights. The skeptics view globalization as a catalyst for abuse and manipulation by those with power on those who are feeble, retaining the opportunity for economical profiting, social harmony, and political privileges. In analyzing the two sides, earlier studies were reviewed in order to look at the issue of single indicators of globalization, and then, findings are compared to the authors’ suggested measurement tool, which is multifaceted. Results from the study support the advantages of globalization.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are influential actors in globalization. Yet, some of the criticism received by NGOs comes from the perception that NGOs lack accountability towards stakeholders, as noted by Szporluk (2009). NGOs, and calling attention to international ones (INGOs), provide various services, advocacy, relief efforts, and practices of development.
Even so, INGOs need to be liable and hold responsibility towards their stakeholders. At the same time, other entities, such as donor governments and intergovernmental, involved with INGOs, it is eminent that they be held accountable, as well. Some efforts have been made to form accountability measures for INGOs, but improvement is still needed. Overall, the works INGOs conduct is invaluable and must maintain working alongside with others are involved with improving the quality of life. This in turn, will support good global governance and the betterment of people.

Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have a history of having a rocky relationship at the international level (Krautheim & Verdier, 2012; Porter & Kramer, 2006; Williams, 2012). It appears that clashes lie in the motives to work with and develop struggling people and areas. Yet, in recent years, MNCs and NGOs have been mending their rapport as analyzed in two case studies in a May 2012 thesis from Williams, A Positive Future for Partnerships Between Multi-National Corporations and Non-Governmental Organizations. One of the major references used in William’s paper is Porter & Kramer’s (2006) article, which is based on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), its current emphasis in society, and the divergences between “cosmetic” and “strategic” CSR. Industry and social programming is a potential combined powerhouse, having the ability to positively aid and service impoverished and needy communities; however, tactical partnerships focusing on similarities are essential. Baur & Schmitz (2012) report corporate and nonprofit exchanges are expanding because of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In this stage of development, there is a call for accountability on both parts so more compromise and co-optation is fostered. Rather than competing or blaming one another, it is recommended that corporations actively support NGO independence and critical capacity.

NGOs and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
Non-governmental agencies (NGOs) have played a major role in successfully reaching the MDGs. The Haiti Innovation website, written by an anonymous author (2008), reports on Charles MacCormack’s, President and CEO of Save the Children, speech on the potentials and limitations of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at the Johns Hopkins University International Development Series. The speech questioned as to what extent NGOs play in the attainment of the MDGs in a country, using Haiti as an example, and if the MDGs truly addresses poverty. According to the report, the MDGs have become convoluted. Since the MDGs are not from a “comprehensive, systematic, interdependent” standpoint, they may not be very effective. This leaves donor agencies and NGOs as contributors to the mess, especially since they are involved in fundraising. NGOs competitively collect 43% ($70 billion) of the world’s total aid from private sources, in addition to public donations. In spite of that, NGOs’ roles are dwindling, and they are becoming marginal entities in the occurrences of world assistance. Government is recognizing the proportion of NGOs’ influences, and is trying to better connect in order to effectively plan for the potential MDGs accomplishments. In order to address poverty issues, in a globalized context, Bakibinga Ibembe (2007) takes a look at the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and a working relationship between government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Uganda. Bakibinga Ibembe (2007) bases the study on obtainable literature and talks with a few policy stakeholders. It is argued that neither government nor NGOs can overcome global challenges, poverty in particular, as solo actors. Positive outcomes have stemmed from the partnership in conjunction with international efforts. The MDGs, specifically, have provided a holistic approach to implement Universal Primary Education (UPE) as a human resource development strategy for nation-states. UPE is a soft law stating that it is an eminent right for people to have educational access. By addressing UPE, countries have brought forth triumphant socio-economic and political situations in specific countries. In Uganda’s case, NGOs’ role is highlighted as an influential body for policymaking and implementation process and direction of initiatives, such as UPE. It is recommended that government elucidate the role of NGOs and to dig deeper into partnership with them to ensure the achievement of mutual goals, especially when evaluating policy.
South East Asia has also experienced successful models on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with the help of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Jung (2010) describes NGO projects and their models as benchmarks for others to ensue, especially with the focus of reaching the eight MDGs. The recommended best practice models detailed are: partnering; collaboration with government; women’s participation; using media; making profit for project sustainability; using a holistic approach; and proper targeting. Out of these models women’s participation and partnering are found to be the most prevalent. Using online communication is a vital lifeline in order to promote reciprocal branching relationships. Despite effective models and actions, the MDGs are vast and too massive to be dealt with by local NGOs alone. Government support and sufficient funding is also needed.

Khan (2010) reviews the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a method to explore a multidimensional concept for human development. Khan’s (2010) view is that the MDGs are inefficient because the objectivity and quantitative methodology is too uniformed to deal with human development. Globally, the details of human conditions for such a vast space are broadly dissimilar. Currently MDGs are flat. It is recommended that reconsiderations be made in regards to the generalizations, standardization, target sets in rates, proportions, and percentages of the set goals. Major issues in relation to the reconsiderations are the aggregated approach and the deficits in entitlements, distributional inequities, and interpersonal diversities. It is argued that global policy frameworks, such as the MDGs, need to operate in a wide, agile, multidimensional informational space that can address different situations and components of human-oriented goals. Capabilities Approach (CA) is highlighted as a way to better meet the needs of the MDGs. Using CA creates a framework for assessment, evaluation, and effectiveness and provides an outline for human development proxy plans.

The initial concept of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was an innovative, unparalleled concept of its time. It was a radical move to measure and reduce poverty within a framework of what was thought to be feasible, deliberately targeted goals. As 2015, nears, MDGs will have to be benchmarked. The 2010 article, The Millennium Development Goals: A Cross-Sectoral Analysis and Principles for Goal Setting After 2015, does not evaluate the current MDGs themselves, but rather gives an analysis of the assessment of the goals from an interdisciplinary, holistic standpoint. The focus is on MDGs implementation obstacles. This, in effect, will improve the next set of international goals. More than simple donor funding is needed. It is recommended that global cooperation is present alongside assorted means to achieve goals. Sustainable, communal endorsement practices are necessary in the areas of “national ownership and ongoing investment in human, social, and physical capital” (Waage et al., 2010, p. 1021).

Cultural Adaptation: Emphasis on Social Learning and Cognition

A large part of globalization and international humanitarian aid is socially bound. Kim, Sherman & Taylor’s (2008) stance is that social support is one of the most valuable ways by which people can cope with stressful events, such as living in impoverished conditions. The authors declare that little research has examined the role of cultural distinctions in how the populace operates their social support connections. This study specifically looks at Asian and Asian Americans, the implication on mental health services, and how the groups go about seeking assistance. Even though the study is limited to a particular cultural group, the overarching conclusion can be generalized to further studies on intercultural themes. When social support aligns with norms for cultural relationship expectations, goals are better met. Cultural specificity, cultural and psychological diversity, and knowing how people relate and intermingle in social relationships are important to continue researching so that more effective ways of structuring social support can be developed and misunderstanding avoided.

Dean et al.’s (2008) article speaks to the phenomenon of human aptitude to nurture social support and cumulative cultural learning. As a platform, the article details a comparative study of sequential problem solving involving capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees, children, a puzzle box, and a reward system. Results found that children were able to reach higher-level solutions in association with socio-cognitive processes. The children exhibited behaviors involving verbal instruction teaching, imitation learning, and benevolence. When children received some
sort of social support, they were able to complete problem solving tasks. On the flip-side, children performed unsuccessfully on the problem solving tasks with the absence of meaningful social support.

Boyd, Richardson & Henrich (2011) explain why social learning is vital for human adaptation, describing the occurrence as a cultural niche. Despite the fact that humans are biologically set up to have higher-level thinking abilities, no one person is as intelligent enough to attain and manage all essential information to survive in a single territory. People have expanded societies across the globe because they have the cognitive ability to adapt to environments largely through the mean of social learning. Societies progressively gather information over time, passing on information to the subsequent generation. Knowledge passed down is molded to fit current situations, but nonetheless, all information, past and present is accumulated.

Tomasello (2000) states that Piaget had grand influence on the human cognitive development theory, but left a void in which two main groups of researchers, those emphasizing biology and the others who are focusing on cultural influences, are filling in. In *Culture and Cognitive Development*, Tomasello (2000, p. 37) argues that “an evolutionary approach to the human capacity for culture and an ontogenetic approach to human cognitive development in the context of culture” are needed. The article describes studies of chimpanzees, children, emulation learning, and imitative learning. Emulation learning is social learning performed through observation and analysis of the effects of an action or object on its environment. Imitative learning, on the other hand, is cultural learning achieved by direct replication of an observation towards a certain goal. He goes on to emphasize how imitative learning affects infants’ cultural learning development and language. The conclusion of the article ties the biological component of human evolution with cultural learning, linking it as a processional adaption that effected human social cognition and cultural transmission. Since imitative learning, other cultural learning has sprung, such as instructed learning and collaborative learning, along with the ratchet effect.

**Cultural Intelligence**

Herrmann et al. (2007) use the cultural intelligence hypothesis, in a qualitative study, to contend the notion that human have higher overall cognitive abilities when compared to primates, the next of kin to humans from the evolutionary perspective. After conducting a series of cognitive tests to chimpanzees, orangutans, and human children pre-literacy formation and formal schooling, aged two and a half, results showed that the three groups have like cognitive skills physical world tasks, but children had advanced cognitive skills in matters dealing with the social world. Socio-cognitive skills are conceived in early human development and in the exchange of knowledge in cultural groups with communication, learning from others, and an understanding of mental status.

Earley & Mosakowski (2004) define and elaborate on the meaning of cultural intelligence (CQ). The article opens with the idea that people perceive information differently and the importance of knowing how that information is received from various perspectives. One learns cultural norms from their surroundings and use of the five senses. If exposed to only one culture, one may become superior in that particular cultural knowledge, but incapable of to make sense or understand other cultures. This endangers the display of stereotyping. Interestingly, it is commented that if one is somewhat detached from their own culture, they may more readily be able to understand and adapt outside cultures because of the constant dealing of trying to fit in and taking more of an observational role than an active one. A person can be categorized to fit into a CQ profile, provincial, analyst, natural, ambassador, mimic, and chameleon, but often people overlap in the categories. A determinant of one’s profile is dependent on the three areas of CQ, physical, cognitive, and emotional / motivational. Discerning how to manage CQ can be developed. A diagnosing tool is given to measure one’s CQ, indicating a personal level in each of the three components and whether it is an area of improvement or CQ strength. A recommended step-by-step process is given on how to foster CQ. There is a business slant to this particular work since it focuses on company managers. Still, inhibiting CQ is pertinent because of the trend of internationalism.
Ward, Wilson & Fischer (2011) inspect four modules of cultural intelligence (CQ), behavioral, motivational, cognitive, and meta-cognitive. With a gap in empirical research in this field, a longitudinal quantitative study of international students in New Zealand was performed and based on cultural learning theory. It was hypothesized that the four modules of CQ can forecast cross-cultural adaptation dilemmas. This research was narrowed to test motivational CQ as a predictor of better psychological and socio-cultural outcomes over time. Outcomes show that higher motivational CQ and meta-cognitive CQ led to less psychological symptoms and socio-cultural adaptation problems during cross-cultural transition. There was not a direct relationship of motivational CQ as an independent predictive variable for cross-cultural adaptation problems. It is recommended that proceeding research investigate “CQ in relation to both positive and negative indicators of psychological and socio-cultural adaptation and the changes in the patterns of adaptation over time” (Ward, Wilson & Fischer, 2011, p. 141). By doing so, more contributions can be made to the acculturation field and current motivation-based theories in psychology, change of cultural behavior, and cultural adaptation.

Cultural Competency
As with much of the literature presented, Ang et al. (2007) speak to the importance of navigating culture and being able to adapt to novel situations due to the interconnection with globalization. Since much research is on the conceptual theories of cultural intelligence (CQ), the authors conducted an empirical study to measurement the effects of CQ on cultural judgment and decision making, cultural adaptation and task performance. The study analyzes the four CQ scopes, meta-cognitive, cognitive, motivational and behavioral, and three intercultural effects, cultural judgment and decision making, cultural adaptation, and task performance in culturally diverse settings. The multidimensional cultural intelligence scale (CQS) was used and the USA and Singapore were the two sample countries. Outcomes from the study elude that predictors for cultural judgment and decision making were connected with meta-cognitive CQ and cognitive CQ. In addition, motivational CQ and behavioral CQ forecasted cultural adaptation. Finally, meta-cognitive CQ and behavioral CQ predicted task performance. It is important to continue to study CQ from a multidimensional lens and its role in intercultural training.

Agyeman & Erickson (2012) perform three overall tasks in their work. First, the authors outline and detail the meaning of culture and multiculturalism. They use the concept of differences and equity for the definitions. Then, they reason the need for cultural competency skills, especially in education, in the development of intercultural communities, while lastly, providing a framework for merging cultural competency themes in school curriculum. It is argued that cultural competency is a necessary interdisciplinary skill that bleeds into many professions. It also provides equity throughout communities.

The development of cultural competency is a course that takes time to fully unfold and requires joint efforts from a range of people from all aspects of an organization and outsiders of the group. Purnell et al. (2011) view cultural competency from a healthcare point-of-view, but offer handbook-like suggestions to incorporate and grow cultural competency in organizations, in general. Four major areas of consideration when analyzing cultural competence in an organization are: administration and governance, orientation and education, language, and staff competencies. This guide incorporates steps to take, content areas, activities, departmental responsibilities, and advice on the use of consultative serves especially geared towards cultural competence. In conclusion, cultural competence is a now a popular phrase and is incorporated in many environments. It is important to understand to what extent cultural competency truly exists in an environment.

Discussion
Six major themes emerged from this exploration: globalization, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), global governance soft laws and goals, cultural intelligence, cultural adaptation, and cultural competence. It is important to see each of these themes separately, but
interrelated. These terms should not be confused with other terminology. Namely, there is a difference between the *cross-cultural and intercultural*. Cross-cultural “means a comparison and contrast between two cultural groups,” while intercultural submits to what happens when people from different groups gather (González, 2011). Intercultural is based on interaction between two cultures.

Ultimately, the impetus for this research is to understand intercultural effects. As far as what this research looked at, little to no literature was found on globalization and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that included an emphasis on cultural aspects. Most of the literature presented, focused more on the partnerships needed, but not on the process of how this can happen. The role of cross-cultural competency will continue to come into view as the world becomes a more globalized, holistic culture in itself. It is believed that NGOs, along with other global leaders, such as multi-national corporations, can be key elements in supporting and developing intercultural skills needed for communities to work through cross-cultural exchanges more effectively.

**Exemplar NGO Model Promoting Intercultural Competency: Women’s Global Connection**

In order to further education and research within this growing global community, Sister Dorothy Ettling and Sister Neomi Hayes, established Women’s Global Connection (WGC) in 2001 (Women’s Global Connection, n.d.a). Grounded in the principles of human interconnectedness, personal and social transformation, diversity, spirituality, and feminine expression, WGC is a non-profit organization that is “fostering innovative partnerships that support catalytic projects linking women and girls to education, technology, and business opportunities” (Women’s Global Connection, n.d.b). WGC’s mission “is to promote the learning and leadership capacity of women locally and globally” in order “to strengthen families and communities and work for transformative change” (Women’s Global Connection, n.d.b). The organization is based in San Antonio, Texas, in the United States, but reaches its efforts into Zambia and Tanzania, Africa, and most recently into Peru. Projects and online discussions are comprised of a system of links straddling cultures and borders, and include initiatives such as the aid and support of women’s economic development through income generating activities, online academic exchanges, providing resources and training, collaborations, and immersion trips.

The guide to join forces with women across cultures used by Women’s Global Connection (WGC) includes the acknowledgment of the possibility to learn collaboratively, construction of supportive networks and relationships, enduring communal commitment with the parties involved, and mutual planning and implementation of efforts (Women’s Global Connection, n.d.a). WGC initial efforts and relationships took place with African women and organizations. Since then, many grassroots, women-founded ventures have been able to gain initial funds to for the first time and have the capacity to commence commercial ventures, increase schooling for children, and build stronger communities. In addition, WGC is heading research that has created a model for sustainable development.

**Connecting Cultural Competency, Adaptation, and Intelligence with NGOs**

This literature review, in essence, searched for best practices for the development of cultural competencies in an interconnected society. Women’s Global Connection (WGC) exemplifies successful intercultural development and implementation and Milton Bennett’s *Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity* (DMIS) theoretical framework. Africa has been an area that has had trouble implementing flourishing opportunities for women and practical initiatives for their communities. WGC has been able to provide sustainable relief that is also sensitive to cultural aspects of the community. Women in Africa who are working with WGC have been able to move from their own culture and learn new skills that have made them more viable for their community’s improvement. Other organizations may consider WGC as a model to work
from the bottom up and to implement culture from the community they serve into the helping endeavors.

Some of today’s imposing international and interconnected challenges include climate change, environmental degradation, food security, natural disasters, pandemics, international crime organizations, international terrorists’ organizations, sex trafficking, child soldiers, and the lack of education. Global social justice would be denied to many people if these troubles are ignored. A major lies dilemma is seeking ways to govern the world to address intercontinental obstacles without a world government (Leen, 2004). International efforts are going to vary from region to region because of the beliefs, needs, and amenities for each particular group and these cultural and societal differences need to be considered. Global governance in conjunction with the actors will thrive if people own it, shape it, connect with it, and see the feasibility in it. Regulations are needed to prevent chaos and misuses, aid in social relations, to provide social justice, and to promote sustainability. Earth is a shared planet, belonging to no one particular group or individual. Everyone needs to learn how to get along.

**Conclusion**

Based on all the information presented in this review, it is without a doubt that globalization and culture go hand-in-hand. Like a domino effect, increased cultural intelligence (CQ) in one’s self increases cultural adaptation. In turn, the more flexible one is to adapt culturally, leads to cross-cultural competence, and ultimately intercultural competence. In reference to the Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS), this means people can reach the highest level of ethnorelative, integration. Being able to integrate personal culture to other cultures unlocks more opportunities for rapport, economic development, and, perhaps, the accomplishment of the MGD’s.

Like all studies, this work inherently had limitations. This is a cursory review that focuses on literature speaking to various related themes, but not on the direct topic of intercultural competency’s role in the influencing function of NGOs’ roles or the reaching of overarching international goals. It is recommended that research continue, in an interrelated fashion, to coincide with globalization, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), global governance soft laws, and cultural topics. Consequently, this could lead to elevated understandings and quality of intercultural competency training through non-governmental agencies. Hopefully, ideas brought forth can be taken into consideration in future international policy making, industrial development, and educational planning. In doing so, international goals may have a stronger chance to being met and a stronger global community will form.

**References**


Validity of the Push and Pull Hypothesis for the Explanation of Romanian Migration Flows

CIPRIAN PÂNZARU
West University of Timisoara, Romania

ROBERT D. REISZ
West University of Timisoara, Romania

Abstract

The article focuses on the migration phenomenon from Romania to the European Union and considers the key motivations which may have shaped the decision to migrate. The research was based on statistical data provided by Eurostat. The period which has been reviewed was from 1990 to 2010, and key indicators such as gross national product, average wage and unemployment levels were analyzed. We have tried to show the possible correlations between the migration flow and these various indicators, and for these reasons, the theoretical support we have used as a starting point for the analysis was the push and pull theory. The results are presented in an attempt to demonstrate the patterns that have arisen when studying the overall migration flow from Romania to the European Union. At the same time, we have analyzed separate migration flows; from Romania to three main countries - Italy, Spain and Germany. We have demonstrated that the push-pull model is not applicable for the general migration flow from Romania into other European countries, and that the numbers of migrants cannot be explained simply by national economic indicators, whether these indicators refer to the origin country of the migrant, or the destination country of the migration. On the other hand, the push and pull model seems to be partially applicable when analyzing the migration flow into separate, individual countries. The studied cases of Italy and Spain could be seen as successfully given examples in this respect.

Keywords: Migration; Push and Pull Theory; Time Series; Gross National Product; Average Wage; Unemployment.

Introduction

The statistical data compiled indicated that in the year 2010, there were as many as 2,769,400 Romanian migrants living and working in countries other than Romania within the European Union. This figure represented approximately 13.1 percent of the total population of Romania living outside their country of origin. Unofficial sources however regularly state that the real figures of Romanian immigrants living in the EU could actually exceed 3 million. This makes Romania the EU country with the most immigrants, followed by Poland with 1.6 million, Italy with 1.3 million and Portugal with 1.5 million.

The case of Romania is symptomatic for the European Union as it is today, adding a “new” mobile Europe to the “old” continent. After the last two enlargements of the EU, 2004 and 2007, labor migration became an important subject not only to politics, but also to the mass-media. Romania has evolved into one of the countries with a very large number of immigrants. In the present paper we study migration flows originating from Romania, as an example of

1 Postal Address: Department of Sociology, West University of Timisoara, Blvd. V. Pârvan no. 4, Timisoara 300223, Romania. E-mail Address: cpanzaru@socio.uvt.ro
intra-European migrations. We will follow and analyze the differences in pre-enlargement and post-enlargement migration flows. Using Romania as a case study has a number of advantages. First of all, for Romania there is as good as no historical precedent to the migration flows that started in 1990. Another advantage in analyzing the Romanian case is the large number of migrants that migrated to a small number of destination countries. Having very large numbers of migrants from Romania to Italy and Spain will allow for mathematical models that would not have the same relevance if migration patterns would have been less concentrated. Finally, for the test of push and pull models with economic variables we needed to eliminate competitive reasons to migrate having a political character. Thus a country of origin had to be chosen that has an open, democratic political system and no major human right violations.

The current situation where we see such a huge number of Romanians immigrating to other EU countries and further afield is exceptional in Romanian history, as traditionally, Romania has never been a country which has a strong leaning towards international migration. Until the 1990s, the levels of Romanian migration have been insignificant, to say the least, and this relatively high level of migration was only reached with the onset of the 1990s and over the past twenty or so years. Prior to 1989, migration existed at the very lowest levels. Of course, there existed a degree of political and ethnic migration, and on a smaller scale there also existed temporary migration for the purposes of studying or working abroad. This latter kind of migration was based only on inter-governmental agreements between Romania and the governments of other countries, but in both situations the actual number of migrants remained very low.

The only truly significant levels of migration flow from Romania before 1990 were in the XIX century, when migration levels were peaking due to the high amount of emigration from the Transylvania area (former province of Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918) to North America. This sort of migration was part of the migration phenomenon which saw about 4.5 million people from the Austro-Hungarian Empire immigrate to North America (USA and Canada) from 1875 to 1914. Akos Egyed (1970) says in that period, about 250,000 people left Transylvania for the new world (It must keep in mind that the total population of the province was about 4.8 million people).

It goes without saying that the situation for Romanians in general has shifted significantly since 1990. This can be partly explained due to the geopolitical and social context created by the fall of the Berlin Wall, which significantly shaped migration figures and practices by opening the possibility of movement of people mainly from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. The phenomenon, somewhat timid at first due to quite restrictive legislative conditions, was accelerated by the enlargement of the European Union, and by the advent of labour market liberalization for its citizens. Due to the new realities of everyday life and socio-political shifts, Romania transformed from a country which, for a long time, had not been a significant source of migration, into an important provider of immigrants in Europe. Gradually, the Romanian’s level of migration has increased, and in time this has developed into something which has become an important social phenomenon. The main motivations of migration have transformed from ethnic and political ones, which was mostly the case at the beginning of the 1990s (Diminescu, 2004), to migration due to economic reasons. During the beginning stages of the swelling of migration levels, it was more common for migration to come about for family reunification, and ethnic migration (Hungarians migrating to Hungary, Germans migrating to Germany, etc.) was typical, but meanwhile, as research made by Open Society Foundation shows, the migration for work (employment) quickly became the main driving factor for migration (Sandu, 2006).

According to Eurostat, between the years 1990 and 2010, the migration flows from Romania to the European Union’s other countries were ranging from 30,092 in 1997 (the lowest level) to 555,797 in 2007 (the highest level). These trends are shown in the chart below:
As we can see, the levels of migration were considerably more consistent in the early ‘90s, (when the reasons for migration were most commonly ethnic and politic ones) and afterwards, we encounter a slump in migration levels in the period from 1993 to 1997. It then returns to a steady incline, and, after 2003, the phenomenon becomes more widespread, with levels in 2007 (the moment when Romania joined to EU) beginning to register a peak of more than 500,000 (Eurostat, 2011) emigrants to EU countries due to the widespread aspirations associated with employment migration.

Because in the past two decades it has been steadily providing this high number of migrants, Romania has become an important provider of immigrant workers for European Union; As such it is perhaps not surprising to learn that Romanian people make up the majority of economic migrants in countries such as Italy or Spain.

It is important to emphasize that, until now, Europe had no important internal migration flows. Europe has been either a source of migration, or a destination of migration mainly for migrants coming from outside the continent. Nevertheless, when we begin studying and regarding the intra-European migration flows, we must consider a few exceptions to this trend, such as the migration during the cold war from the socialist side (Eastern Europe) to Western Europe. It must be stated, however, that those migration flows were of a level which could be said to be relatively insignificant, and the small peak in migration figures were rather the result of departures with the approval of the state, mainly for dissidents, opposites of the political regime, or due to illegal departures: people fleeing over the borders.

Therefore, at the moment, the continuous trends we see within the intra-European migration flows demonstrate an important phenomenon of current social realities.

**Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

In regards to migration theories, the common approaches are generally primarily focused on the causes of this phenomenon, or on its effects, be they economic, social, or demographic shifts. These approaches often consider both the country or area of origin, and the destination area as key factors to be studied.

One of the first explanations for migration was provided by Ravenstein (1885) in his work *Laws of Migration*. Ravenstein compiled data from British censuses dating from 1871 and
1881, and, based on them, he computed the volume of migration and thus provided 10 assumptions which he considered to explain the generalities and trends of migration phenomenon.

Another explanatory model of migration is known as the gravitational type (Zipf, 1946; Anderson, 1955; Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2009). According to this theory, migration flows are generated by the distance and the volume of the population from the destination area and in turn from the origin area. In other words, the gravitational model takes into account the link between the volume of population in the two areas and the distance between them.

The most influential approach which attempts to explain migration phenomena is the neoclassical economic theory. Lewis (1954), one of the developers of this theory, hypothesizes that the wage differences between the two economies - one characterized by a surplus of labor force (unemployment) and the other characterized by a surplus of capital - have an important hand in shaping the migration phenomenon. Migration is a phenomenon characterized by a fundamental imbalance between the demands of the labor force, and the available supply for the labor force (Todaro, 1980, p. 362). The migrant is pulled by the attractive 'bright lights' - the force of a new destination which arises when the expected income is bigger than the actual income (Massey et al., 1998, p. 174). The majority of migrants, as one might expect, originate from countries with a low capital and a low level of employment, along with a high number of unemployed people who would otherwise make up the labor force.

As a critical response to neoclassical migration theory, in the ‘80s, was developed the new economics of labor migration theory (Stark & Bloom, 1985). According to this theory, it is often the whole family which makes the decision to migrate. Such a group decision ultimately lowers the economic migration risks, since the whole family can come together to cover migration costs, and thus support each other until they become established and settled at their destination (Stark & Bloom, 1985, p. 175).

Yet another theory which invokes economic causes in explaining migration phenomena is the dual labor market theory. Doeringer & Piore (1971) are the key promoters behind this theory. According to them, in economically developed societies, we often see a segmentation of the labor market. The labor market segmentation is part of migratory process (Castle & Miller, 2009, p. 253). On one hand, we have a segment of the labor market which provides stable and well paid jobs for those who have a high level of qualifications, or who have valued and well developed skills applicable to a particular role. On the other, we see a segment which calls for unskilled or unqualified workers, and this segment is generally shunned by the local or native population (Piore, 1979).

Despite the variety of theories which try to explain migration phenomena, it is acknowledged that each of them ultimately suffers from a great deal of limitations. It is very obvious, regardless of the kind of theories which are used to explain the migration phenomenon, that there are two important types of factors that have been considered in a series of theories on migration: push factors and pull factors. Everett S Lee (1966) has drawn such a model which considers the following factors regarding migration: factors associated with the origin area, factors associated with the destination area, difficulties between the origin area and destination area (intervening factors) and the specificities of the group with the risks of migration (personal factors).

Therefore, the factors invoked by the neoclassical economic theory, the factors invoked by the dual labor market theory, even the factors invoked by the gravitational theory, are, finally, what we can call push and pull factors. Moreover, even Ravenstein in Laws of Migration (despite being criticized by Castles & Miller (2009, p. 22) because his model is “too individualist and ahistorical”) shows that the “migratory currents” are generated by a lot of push and pull factors (the terms used by Ravenstain was migratory currents, instead of the migration flows more commonly used today).

However, regardless of which theory we use to explain migration phenomena, at least two conditions are necessary and must be considered: firstly, as Martin (2003, p. 10) says, on the one hand we need the ‘pull’ factors - that is, we need to know the demand and the availability of destination area to receive migrants. On the other hand, we need the ‘push’ factors. Between them are network factors which link origin and destination.
In other words, pull factors are the reasons which determine a person or a group to choose a certain destination, and the push factors are the reasons which determine or encourage a person or a group to make the decision to migrate in the first place.

We will use this model to attempt to evaluate the impact of economic push and pull factors regarding the migration phenomenon from Romania to the European Union between 1990 and 2010.

The factors that we have analyzed included the following: gross domestic product per capita, unemployment and average gross earnings. We have tried to identify how each of these factors work as push factors (in Romania) and pull factors (in destination countries). In our opinion, a low level of gross domestic product per capita and average gross earnings, combined with a high level of unemployment could be reasons which encourage people to leave Romania (in other words, push factors), and a high level of gross domestic product per capita and average gross earnings combined with a low level of unemployment could be reasons for choosing a certain destination area (pull factors).

**Data and methods**

In our intention to analyze the validity of the push-pull hypothesis regarding Romanian migration into the countries of the European Union, we have used data originating from the European Agency for Statistics – Eurostat. We have studied the Eurostat web site (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes) and gathered relevant data on migration, unemployment, per capita GDP, average income and overall population of our case countries.

As dependent variable, we used the migration flow from Romania to three destination country: Germany, Italy and Spain. As independent variables we used gross domestic product per capita (GDP) as a proxy for general economic conditions, average income as a proxy for wealth of population and unemployment as a proxy for labor market conditions (at the origin as well as destination). Additionally, we considered the population as a proxy for the size of destination country and we computed a relative unemployment value (unemployment rate relative to the total population). For a more accurate analysis, we also considered in our model the difference in GDP per capita and the differences in the unemployment rate between origin country and destination country.

According to the Eurostat methodology, “Immigration” denotes the action by which a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another Member State or a third country” while “Emigration” denotes the action by which a person, having previously been usually resident in the territory of a Member State, ceases to have his or her usual residence in that Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months” (Eurostat, 2010). Eurostat data is intended to represent “flow into/out of the reporting country during the reference year” (ibidem). This is generally problematic as a large part of migration happens without involving immediate bureaucratic acts in the country of chosen residence as in the country left. Especially since the free movement of Romanian citizens after 2002, migrating to another country in the EU was often a decision taken after living for a specific period there. Data from the Eurostat sources tries to estimate the flows during the reference year by using different sources. “Depending on the methodology of the reporting country, data sources are administrative records or national statistical surveys. For some datasets statistical estimation methods are applied. Most of the countries use administrative sources for compilation of migration data (population register, register of foreigners, database on issued residence permits etc.”).

This complex methodology allows for the construction of time series, and as such, the ability to use an advanced modeling methodology that we will introduce in the following passages. In our data collection we have concentrated on the immigrant flow which originated from Romania during the period between 1990 and 2010. We could collect the data which gives us the number of migrants from Romania to each of the European countries for each of
the years of our time-span. According to the Eurostat sources, data on Romanian migrants originate from population registers. We have used these variables and set them in relation to economic variables also compiled for all our case study years and for all European countries from the same source. As such all the data of our statistical models is official Eurostat data.

The two studied decades have known different migration waves, starting with the ethnically determined migration of the German population in Romania in the early 1990s, and continuing with work force migrations to Italy and Spain in the later years. The accession of Romania to the EU in 2007 was an essential moment in shaping migration patterns and was taken into consideration in all models. Still, the effects of EU accession should not have been as radical, as accession was preceded by other steps of integration. The most important of these steps occurred in 2002 when Romanian citizens were not requested anymore to present a visa on entry in the Schengen aria. The 2002 suspension of visa requirements can be seen in the Figure 1 as a change in migration trends.

Another phenomenon which influenced the dynamic of migration flows needs to be accounted for. A few European countries have implemented regularization programs during the last years, legalizing the status of illegal aliens living in their countries. Below table indicates the moments when the assessed countries have implemented these measures.

**Table 1: Regularization programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Program Year</th>
<th>Targeted Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Asylum seekers who entered before 1990 and had more than 8 years residency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Rejected asylum seekers who entered before 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Long-term tolerated persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Unauthorized Migrants (workers and students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995–1996</td>
<td>Unauthorized migrants (workers and students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Unauthorized migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Unauthorized migrants caretakers and domestic workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Unauthorized migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Unauthorized migrants (workers and family members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Unauthorized migrants (workers and family members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Unauthorized migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Unauthorized migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Unauthorized migrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As there are quite a few such regularization programs, and data does not allow the separation of the beneficiaries according to country of origin, we did not consider these values in our models. Nevertheless, we are aware that such political decisions are essential for the overall description of the phenomenon.

We have made special models to analyze major migration flows from Romania to Germany, Italy and Spain. According to Eurostat data all these country statistics are based on population registers and are reliable to reflect official registration of foreigners in the respective countries.

**Methodology**

Using time-series often raises problems, but it also offers opportunities, the most important of these being the possibility to test causality with what is currently the most advanced form of conceptualization, Granger causality (Granger, 1969). Causality has proven a difficult issue to model and has attracted over the years a series of philosophical, sociological and economic analyses without yet reaching a methodology which is able to offer tests or models that can cover all the elements of the common understanding of the term. A simple consideration regarding the temporal asymmetry of causality can nevertheless be taken as a starting point for
further considerations. The simple truism that the cause cannot take place after the effect is the starting point of this approach. If we could prove that event A has taken place after event B, A cannot be a causal factor for B. Still, this will not bring much of any worth, as in sociological analysis we are rarely interested in singular events. Most of our research deals with time series data, and modeling the development of a process. Let us consider two such time series, representing social or even economic variables. More often than not, these variables are aggregates of individual events. Taking just a few examples, GDP is an aggregate of individual income values, stock market indexes are aggregates of individual stock values, etc. Each of these values is in fact a result of different individual events, both longitudinally as a development in time as well as transversally as an aggregate of individual decisions. If we consider that time series A is formed by events Ai and time series B by individual events Bi, where i indicate the time: the causation of B by A will mean that the probability $P(B_i|A_i-k) \neq P(B_i)$ for some value k. In other words, this means that the probability of the value of Bi is different if Ai-k has taken place. Or to use the terms of von Wright “it is not the universal coincidence of two phenomena X and Y that is the determinant factor for a causal relationship, but the fact that a change can be produced or inhibited in Y if a change takes place (or a change is inhibited) in X” (von Wright, 1974, p. 32, 72ff – cited after Thome, 1988, p. 93).

While this modeling might be simple, we usually have no information that would enable us to estimate these probabilities. Nevertheless if we consider our aggregates in their individual events we can infer further as follows. If A, the possible cause according to a model, takes place: the probability of B changes. Dividing in individual events, each event of type A changes the probability of an event of type B, thus more events of type A would lead to a greater change in the overall probability of appearance of events of the type B. Even easier formulated, if the aggregate A changes more, the aggregate B should change more. Formulated reversely, if the changes in aggregate B are independent from the changes in aggregate A, A can be assumed not to be a cause for B. This logic lies in the general concept of testing known as Granger causality (Granger, 1969; 1980; 1988).

Taken all the above mentioned into consideration, we will start our analysis with time series diagnoses tests such as unit-root tests and tests of trend-stationarity and cointegration as well as an analysis of seasonality. We will also do simple regression models to determine the overall directions and strength of the relationships. We will follow these with VAR regressions and Granger causality tests.

Our overall methodology is constructed in the following steps:

1. We will analyze the relationship between numbers of migrants and the overall economic conditions at origin and destination in order to test the push – pull hypothesis.
2. We will analyze individual migration flows separated according to destination country.

For each of these steps we will use the following outline of procedures:

1. We first construct simple correlations to analyze the strength and the direction of the relationship between variables.
2. We then construct regression models for the relationships. We use panel regressions and VAR regressions according to the results of diagnosis tests.
3. Finally we analyze the causality of the relationships using Granger tests after VAR models. These tests use a null hypothesis of non-causality. A good, i.e. close to zero, significance can be interpreted as a safe enough refutation of non-causality.

We will start with a graphical representation of migration flows from Romania to European countries. The graph below does not include all countries. We have not represented those countries to which immigration was as good as non-existent. Even so many destinations were of only marginal importance.

Figure 2 shows how only three migration flows are individually important: the one towards Germany peaking in the early 1990s and those to Italy and Spain peaking during the second half of the 2000s and especially with Romania’s EU accession in 2007. The last two years of the investigated period find an important reduction in migration even to these destinations.
Quite surprisingly, an analysis of migration flows according to the conditions at the destinations finds no significant results in a pooled model. Taking all migration flows from Romania to the countries of the European Union during the 1990 – 2010 periods, we find that the size of the flow, as well as the number of persons involved, is independent from the economic conditions at the destination. The simple correlations between the numbers of migrants, per capita GDP, average income and unemployment are all very low. Even more advanced models such as panel regressions and VAR regressions find no relationship. We have tried to model each of the relationships independently as univariate regressions as well as groups of variables as multiple regressions and have still come to no results. The immediate hypothesis is that the push-pull model does not work in this case or at least that the “pull” part has no effect. For a simple presentation of results we have decided in including a table of direct Pearson correlations.

Table 2: Correlation of the numbers of migrants from Romania with conditions at destination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Pearson’s r with number of migrants before EU accession</th>
<th>Pearson’s r with number of migrants after EU accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP</td>
<td>0.0232</td>
<td>-0.1035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income</td>
<td>-0.0020</td>
<td>-0.0594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.3604**</td>
<td>0.4937**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative unemployment</td>
<td>0.0794</td>
<td>0.1577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.3645**</td>
<td>0.5457**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p < 0.01

The only correlations that are more or less relevant before EU accession are related to the size of the destination country and have, as such, not much sociological importance. After EU accession the correlation with the unemployment level at destination is moderate, but paradoxically positive, having as such no theoretical relevance. One further step was to consider the differences between the values of economic indicators at origin and destination as motors of migration. Nevertheless, these models did also not lead to the expected results. The simple correlations between numbers of migrants and the difference in GDP is as low as 0.0106 while between numbers of migrants and the
difference in unemployment is 0.1292 for the whole time-series. More complex methods of modeling also brought no supplementary information.

**Analysis of migration according to conditions at the origin**

We took a further step in trying to analyze the conditions in the country of origin - that is, the conditions in Romania which may encourage people to migrate. While obviously many persons have taken the decision to migrate without being fully aware of the conditions at their destination (being most probably driven by social network mechanisms), the conditions to leave one country are thought to be more immediately understandable. And indeed, we find that the results are somewhat clearer here. As such and as a result of studying the relevant data, we will start by introducing some simple correlations:

**Table 3: Correlation of the numbers of migrants from Romania with conditions at origin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Pearson’s r with number of migrants before EU accession</th>
<th>Pearson’s r with number of migrants after EU accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP</td>
<td>0.8115**</td>
<td>0.3121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP minus remittances</td>
<td>0.8263**</td>
<td>0.0826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income</td>
<td>0.7973**</td>
<td>-0.3427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.5970*</td>
<td>-0.8755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative unemployment</td>
<td>-0.5725</td>
<td>-0.8766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.7301**</td>
<td>-0.9971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Note: None of the correlations for the period after EU accession are significant. This is also dependent on the small number of years taken into consideration.

The values in the upper table are, frankly, highly surprising. For the period before EU accession the number of migrants positively and highly correlates with per capita GDP and income, and is also negatively, but again, quite strongly correlated with unemployment numbers. Even if we subtract the value of remittances to Romania, we find that the overall relationship remains positive and strong in its correlation. We have found that the lower the rate of unemployment was, the more migrants left Romania. Alongside this, it is interested to note that the higher the wealth and the higher the average income, still, more migrants left Romania. As such, it is needless to say that these results completely contradict the push-pull hypothesis. While the reasons to migrate may still be economical in nature, overall national indicators seem totally unfit to explain the migration flows. In the years after EU accession the relationships change, still remaining unexplainable in the context of push-pull models. The correlations between per capita GDP values (with and without remittances) and numbers of migrants disappear and the correlations with unemployment indicators remain negative, becoming even higher. The only correlation that fits to some extent the push-pull model is the one between numbers of migrants and average income, but the value of Pearson’s r is low.

Here further modeling proved to be beneficial, as all-time series have important trends and these trends are often parallel without seeming immediately causal in their relationships. We will introduce as a final result of our modeling the values of the Granger causality tests on the effects of economic variables on migration.

**Table 4: Significance values of Granger causality tests on migration from Romania**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Granger test significance on migration before EU accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP</td>
<td>0.2057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP minus remittances</td>
<td>0.0602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income</td>
<td>0.4756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative unemployment</td>
<td>0.3406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What we find is that none of the economic indicators have a direct causal effect on migration for the period before EU accession. While the improvement in significance of the Granger test for the “per capita GDP minus remittances” as compared to the simple “per capita GDP” is important, it still does not reach the benchmark 0.05 value considered safe to refute the null hypothesis. For the years after EU accession we find a high collinearity between variables that makes the model irrelevant, which leads to the same conclusion.

The correlations from the first table were spurious and have resulted from a parallelism of trends rather than an interdependence of some form. During the analyzed years (1990 – 2006 and 2007 - 2010) the Romanian per capita GDP has grown, the average income has grown; unemployment values have fluctuated and between these, economical relationships have existed. Indeed we have found causal relationships between these variables, but there has been no testable causality that would necessarily relate the economic indicators to migration. The reasons may well be many, and we will return to these in our conclusions. There are, as such, many things to consider. It might be that the increased income variance has led to migration; it might also be that decisions for migration were taken earlier, and simply the increase in capital was in fact all that was needed to put the decisions into practice. But another hypothesis also arises: it might be that we have here an aggregation fallacy, i.e. the problem is with considering the different migration flows together and that individual flows of migration will conform more or less to the classical push – pull models and the aggregation of the flows is the one that hides the effects.

In order to test this alternate hypothesis we have followed by computing the models for three individual migration flows: (1) from Romania to Germany, (2) from Romania to Italy and (3) from Romania to Spain. Here are the results of these computations.

**Migration from Romania to Germany**

The first important migration flow from Romania after 1990 led to Germany. Motivated at least to some respect by ethnic particularity, this flow was labeled as a “return” of German migrants that had settled in Transylvania as early as the 13th century, and to the Banat during the 18th century. In fact, the migration flow was not limited to ethnic Germans and might have also had many economic reasons. It can generally be considered that the decisions to emigrate from Romania to Germany were mostly taken during the last years of Communism, but many of these could only be put into realistic practice after 1990, as the conditions and possibilities for international migration became more liberal and feasible. Migration to Germany continued also after the first wave, but the numbers of migrants were somewhat lower. In the years after Romania’s EU membership the numbers have increased by some extent, but have not yet again reached the same peaks of the early 1990s.

**Table 5: Correlation of the numbers of migrants from Romania to Germany with conditions at destination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Pearson’s r with number of migrants before EU accession</th>
<th>Pearson’s r with number of migrants after EU accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP</td>
<td>0.8543**</td>
<td>-0.4761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income</td>
<td>0.7134**</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.5953**</td>
<td>-0.5649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative unemployment</td>
<td>-0.6114**</td>
<td>-0.5440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP difference</td>
<td>0.5566**</td>
<td>0.1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment difference</td>
<td>0.3688</td>
<td>-0.9995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < 0.01**

Note: None of the correlations for the period after EU accession are significant. This is also dependent on the small number of years taken into consideration.

---

2 We could not compute the “per capita GDP minus remittances” as we the statistical data do not separate remittances according to country of origin.
Germany is currently still under a restrictive policy towards Romanian immigrants who desire to work. Romanian citizens continue to be required a work permit with validity limited to one year. The free access of Romanian citizens on the German labor market will be possible starting with January, 1st 2014. The German regularization programs did not target potential immigrants or illegal workers, but addressed mostly the asylum seekers. The results before EU accession conform very much to expectations of the push-pull model. Correlations are quite high and have the expected direction. The higher the per capita GDP and the average income in Germany, and the lower unemployment levels are there, the higher the numbers of those who have migrated from Romania to Germany. Even the correlation with the difference in per capita GDP and the difference in unemployment rates are according to model expectations. After EU accession, the correlations have generally lower values and the overall image is less coherent.

Nevertheless, as we have already seen that spurious regressions with the conditions at the origin of migration were present, we will have to continue our calculations in order of getting more reliable results. Indeed computing VAR models and Granger causality tests we find that the relationships of the correlations above have no causal character with only one exception: that of the relative unemployment in Germany. Even if other correlations have higher values, especially those with the per capita GDP which raises to almost 0.9 in the pre-accession period, they are motivated by parallel trends that can be considered independent from each other. Only relative unemployment in Germany has indeed had an effect that can be considered causal. A separation of the two waves of migration to Germany, while only exploratory, leads to the result that this causal effect is limited to the second decade of our investigation period (we have computed separate models for 1990 – 2000 and 2001 – 2010).

 Migration from Romania to Italy

Italy was one of the few countries to partially open the labor market for Romanian immigrants immediately after Romania joined the EU in 2007. Thus, this particular country presented itself as a preferred country to immigrate to, both due to the cultural compatibility and the higher number of fields of activity which were opened to Romanian migrants to work in. These included agriculture, tourism and the complementary services, housekeeping and cleaning services, constructions, engineering, management and white-collar professions, as well as seasonal work. Furthermore, Italy implemented significant regularization programs between 1990 and 2010 as shown in Table 1. Nevertheless, the general labor restrictions for the Romanian immigrants have been suspended only in January 2012.

As our Figure 2 also shows, migration from Romania to Italy started in 1998 and has risen in consecutive waves to reach a peak in 2007. This was the most important wave of migration from Romania to any of the European countries and has had no other reasons beyond the economical ones (besides the preference given to Latin countries by ethnic Romanians). As such, we have expected to find here the clearest example of a push-pull explanation.

| Table 6: Correlation of the numbers of migrants from Romania to Italy with conditions at destination |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Variable                        | Pearson’s r with number of migrants before EU accession | Pearson’s r with number of migrants after EU accession |
| Per capita GDP                  | 0.6965*                                         | 0.6890                                         |
| Unemployment                    | -0.6654                                         | -0.9814                                         |
| Relative unemployment           | -0.6655                                         | -0.9797                                         |
| Per capita GDP difference       | 0.7578*                                         | 0.9104                                         |
| Unemployment difference         | 0.7357*                                         | 0.7525                                         |

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Note: None of the correlations for the period after EU accession are significant. This is also dependent on the small number of years taken into consideration.
And indeed, the results are as expected. The higher the per capita GDP was in Italy and the lower unemployment was there, the more people migrated from Romania. The effect of the difference in per capita GDP was also the expected one. The higher the differences in per capita GDP and unemployment were, the higher was the number of migrants.\(^3\) Our more advanced causality models also find that Italian GDP growth during the 2000 decade can be considered causal for migration from Romania, even if the unemployment numbers do not have this direct causal effect.

Migration from Romania to Spain

The migration flow from Romania to Spain started a few years later than the one of that to Italy, but did not have the same wave-like development.

From a legal point of view, Spain had a permissive policy towards Romanian immigrants. Thus, immediately after EU accession in 2007, any Romanian immigrant who wished to work in Spain was allowed to do so, without needing a work permit. There were, however, other transitional measures implemented, such as work authorization issued by the Spanish authorities. All these restrictions have been suspended in 2009. The number of migrants traveling from Romania to Spain has increased constantly year by year until the present end of the flow. This period of growth lasted from 2001 to 2007 and can easily be seen on Figure 2.

We should also mention that Spain resumed work restrictions for the Romanian immigrants in 2011 due to the already installed crisis and the high unemployment rate. These restrictions apply to all economic sectors. Romanian immigrants who were already active on the Spanish labor market at that point were not affected, however. Similar to Italy, Spain implemented five regularization programs mainly addressed to illegal immigrants, be it workers or their families.

As in the case of migration to Italy, migration to Spain had only economic reasons and should thus conform to expected push-pull models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Pearson’s r with number of migrants before EU accession</th>
<th>Pearson’s r with number of migrants after EU accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP</td>
<td>0.9728**</td>
<td>0.2337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.3813</td>
<td>-0.8160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative unemployment</td>
<td>-0.6122</td>
<td>-0.8112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP difference</td>
<td>0.9461**</td>
<td>0.9927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment difference</td>
<td>0.6101</td>
<td>-0.9122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^* *\) p < 0.01

Note: None of the correlations for the period after EU accession are significant. This is also dependent on the small number of years taken into consideration.

As in the case of migration to Italy the migration flow from Romania to Spain seems to conform to push-pull models. The correlations show that higher per capita GDP in Spain and lower unemployment levels relate to the increased numbers of migrants coming from Romania. It should be noted that while before EU accession the difference in per capita GDP had higher values of correlation, after EU accession the unemployment number were more highly correlated to migration. What is even more convincing in this case is the fact that the differences in per capita GDP as well as the difference in unemployment before EU accession have indeed had a higher impact on the mobility flow than have the values at the destinations themselves. The only variable that does not fit in is the unemployment difference after EU accession. Indeed unemployment numbers have grown in Spain and became lower in Romania after 2007, without this having an immediate impact on the observed numbers of migrants. Advanced models of causality have, at least in the case of this migration flow, the expected results.

\(^3\) It is interesting to note that this effect can only be shown when the periods before and after accession are taken separately. In a model of the overall time-series no relationship between per capita GDP differences and unemployment differences and migration can be found.
Table 8: Significance values of Granger causality tests on migration from Romania to Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Granger test significance on migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative unemployment</td>
<td>0.0054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP difference</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment difference</td>
<td>0.3782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost all expected economic variables have a causal effect on migration from Romania to Spain, with the exception of the differences in rates of unemployment, a result which is coherent with the correlations before. As the simple correlation shows here the correlation was negative after Romania’s EU accession, the higher the difference in unemployment, the lower the numbers of migrants. This is logically coherent as the change in unemployment rates resulted from an improvement of unemployment numbers at origin, and a worsening at destination, leading as such to lower numbers of migrants. Nevertheless, as the Granger causality test shows, this difference cannot be considered causal.

Conclusions and comments

The theories of migration that we have showed above bring the economic factors to the fore as the cause of this phenomenon. These theories assume that individuals rationally evaluate the benefits of migration based on objective factors such as low salaries, high unemployment rate, poor prospects due to a low gross domestic product, and other important decision making pieces of information. Therefore, it could be said that the decision to migrate depends mainly on one or more of these economic factors.

In other words, we have to deal with a lot of push and pull factors. As such, it was expected that an increased flow of emigration would be registered in times of high unemployment (i.e. at a time when the labor market is unable to absorb the available labor force), in times of declining GDP and wages, and more modest flows would be recorded when unemployment is falling, and when GDP and income are on the rise. It was expected that the main destination for Romanian migrants would be characterized by the low unemployment trend, high GDP per capita trend and high income trend. Nevertheless, the computations show that the migration from Romania to the European Union’s countries does not follow such a simple push and pull model every time.

Therefore the economic factors such as GDP per capita, gross average wage and unemployment level as a cause for migration, or especially as a motivation concerning the choice of the country of destination is not at all enough to explain the figures that have been compiled. On the other hand, the influence of economic conditions in the destination country doesn’t seem to greatly affect the decision to migrate at all. In other words, when concerning the pull part of the theory, the validity in relation to our study is highly questionable.

However, it appears that it was often not the countries with the highest rates of personal income which were chosen by Romanian migrants. The results show that the economic factors are not the main push and pull factors for Romanian migrants. For this reason, the theoretical support used as the starting point for the analysis proved to have a number of limitations in terms of attempting explaining the migration phenomenon. As such, it also does not explain everything at all in regards to how Romanians selected a location in which to migrate to for work. Therefore, it could be said that the reasons for this phenomenon are a combination of sociological and economic motivations.

It is probable that the more relevant explanations are found in the other theories mentioned, those which take into account not only material aspects, but also historical, cultural or linguistic aspects and the myriad connections between the country of origin (Romania) and the...
countries of destination. It is most likely a combination of one or many of these aspects or factors which most strongly influences migration waves, in much the same way it strongly influences an individual’s decision to emigrate.

It goes without saying that the legal factor is one of them. If the immigration policies of destination countries are poor, difficult or dangerous, immigration into these countries is discouraged and limited. Restrictions / permissiveness of a legal nature have configured in a higher degree the dynamics of the flow of emigration. For example, the number of migrants has increased considerably with Romania’s accession to the European Union, and the opening of labor markets to Romanian workers. Italy, Portugal and Spain’s experience is also highly relevant in this respect. With the legalization of illegal immigrants held in these countries, there arose massive subsequent immigration flows, which were limited only by the labor market situation (e.g., after 2008, with the outbreak of the European financial crisis).

Following this, there is a factor concerning the social network of the migrant (Ritchey, 1976; Boyd, 1989; Faist, 1997). The migrant network is essentially a set of interpersonal ties that link migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in the country / region of destination and in the country of origin. These networks generally develop through ties of kinship, friendship or simply a common origin or ethnicity.

Cultural differences between countries have also shaped migration. Features such as language, traditions and social norms and values such as family ties have regularly influenced the destinations chosen by migrants. It suffices to note that the largest flows of Romanian migrants were registered in two Latin countries: Italy and Spain. The following are Germany, Hungary and Austria respectively, countries that, historically speaking, have had many ethnics of Romanian origin and have in the past shared much territory. As such, when the freedom to move was granted, many Romanians felt most comfortable moving to these locations.

Given that the analyzed economic indicators were not found to be determinants of migration flows from Romania to the European Union, we admit that a certain degree of subjective choice was frequently used regarding the decision to emigrate, and this especially influenced the choice regarding the country of destination.

The explanation given regarding what is essentially an individual’s choice to migrate and the destination they choose does not only subsume to the neoclassical economic theory on migration, but demonstrates that the phenomenon is caused and molded by a complex combination of factors. Obviously, the analyzed economic indicators - gross domestic product per capita, gross average wage and unemployment – have their indisputable place, but among them are also found a number of other factors such as socio-cultural and legislative ones.

As such, there is an immediate and simple conclusion. Overall push-pull models seem not to work to a satisfying degree when it comes to attempting to explain the migration flows from Romania to other European countries. The numbers of migrants cannot simply be explained by national economic indicators, whether these are considered at the origin or the destination of migration. However, if we take a closer look and separate migration flows we may find a different narrative emerging from the data itself. While some flows cannot be explained by simple indicators of a national level, others can. While a migration flow as that from Romania to Germany at the beginning of the 1990s still had its political and ethnic reasons and motivations; the one from Romania to Spain during the 2000s was nevertheless a clear example of a push-pull mechanism.

References


Students with Small Children in Higher Education

AGNES ENGLER

Institute of Educational Studies
University of Debrecen

Abstract

The aim of the present study is to describe the concept of lifelong learning in the case of a special group, that of student mothers. We examined female students bringing up small children, we did research on their motivation, their difficulty and success in learning path in a longitudinal research project. A central question of the research was whether the investment in higher education during the maternity leave helps women in their return to work. We have also examined the strategies women follow when they choose a course in higher education.

Keywords: Higher Education; Adult Students; Women; Small Children; Investment in Human Resources

Introduction

The survey described in this study focuses on a not very thoroughly researched subject, that is the progress in studying in higher education of female students who have small children. We surveyed their experience in higher education in the framework of a longitudinal research project. Hungarian laws enable women to stay at home with their small children for a period of three years, during which their employment is not terminated and they receive a certain percentage of their original wage, depending on the type of the maternity care they choose. The period they may spend at home is longer than the European average and affords immeasurable advantages in bringing up a child, but during the time they are away from the labour market their original knowledge, skills and expertise may erode.

Permanent self-education during the inactive period may compensate for the disadvantages caused by staying away from work and help the mother to re-integrate into the labour market. Studies pursued during the maternity leave, however, require considerable material and immaterial investments. It is necessary for the mother to carefully calculate whether the investment will produce the desirable results.

The Model of Interpreting the Investment in Studying and the Return of the Investment of Non-Traditional Students

Theories of cultural reproduction, rational decision making, and capital investment related to studies partly served as a framework of the research project. We created a model of investment and return based upon the concept of Becker (1964) on the investment of human capital, combined with Bourdieu (1986) and Schultz’s (1961) ideas and theories of capital. The model is capable of describing investment into higher education and the potential return of the investment at individual and collective levels. Students who have small children, similarly to other students, invest in their...
own human capital when they opt to pursue studies in higher education. The concept of investing into human capital was described by Schultz (1961), who identified the objective of the investment as the acquisition of various skills and expertise that are necessary for satisfying future needs and for increasing future income. Schultz, in his calculations, summarizes the items of expenditure from the aspect of the state; the specific amounts spent on the education of an individual, the maintenance of the institutional infrastructure, the costs of labour in higher education and the loss of income of the students during their study period. On the other side of the equation, the return is the increase of the national revenue. We consider the state as a collective investor in the education of students with small children as the state offers them lowered tuition fees, thus undertaking some of the costs of education for them.

The details of the students’ investments are summarized in Table 1. The costs of the individuals are analysed, among others, by Rosen (1991). The expenses include tuition fee, the direct costs of studies, the value of the time spent studying, the delayed entry in the labour market, and the income loss suffered during the studies. In addition to those, in the case of students with small children there are other costs, too: the loss caused by their drop-out of household chores, the care and supervision of the child(ren) while the mother is doing her studies. Apart from purely material investments, there are other changes in the narrow community of investors, that is the family (they will tend to spend less time together, roles within the family may temporarily change, free-time activities are given up etc.) and these changes all appear on the investment side of the equation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs of Studies of Students on Maternity Leave</th>
<th>Indirect, non-financial investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct expenses</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indirect, non-financial investment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct expenses of studying (travelling, accommodation, meals, books, photocopying)</td>
<td>Time spent with the family reduces (the role as mother and wife may change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs generated by the individual’s partial drop-out of household work (Paying somebody for household work, child care and supervision)</td>
<td>Utilizing social capital outside the family (help from friends, colleagues, organization under the individual’s new circumstances)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving up a certain part of the person’s regular income (various types of maternity allowance and/or other revenue)</td>
<td>Study efforts (regular and effective learning, attending consultation sessions, exam stress, managing one’s time, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal expenses (clothing and beauty care etc.)</td>
<td>Different use of free time (partially abandoned cultural and community programmes, hobbies, holidays etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other costs in connection with studies (e. g. private tutor, foreign language courses, costs of Internet use)</td>
<td>Relations with relatives and friends loosened up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: self construction based on Rosen, 1991

The need of obtaining a college or university degree is usually associated with the labour market. (Engler, Tőzsér & Szilágyi, 2012) During the expansion of the higher education in Hungary in the early nineties, one of the most important elements of motivation of young people to enter a college or university was the fear of unemployment (Polónyi & Tímár, 2001). Changing social expectations induced a change in the composition of college and university students (Kozma, 2004) and, as large numbers of people graduated from the institutions of higher education, a social stigma was attached to the lack of a degree (Nagy, 2003). In the case of students who have a small child, however, it is assumed that there are other elements of motivation and other envisaged return of the investment, in addition to the need of meeting social expectations. In Figure 1 we outlined the fields into which we arranged the expected return and yield of investments made into higher education. The fields are labelled “Intellectual progress”, “Integration into the labour market” and “Social embeddedness”. The peaks of the triangle link together the fields of return and indicate the types of capital where return is expected as a result of the studies, specifically human capital, cultural and social capital.
In the model illustrating the yield of investment made into education the elements of various theories were amalgamated, as the answer sought to our question is built up from building blocks that originally belong to different concepts. We extracted the elements from their original context, and added them into our own model. For instance, the cultural capital accumulated as a result of intellectual progress is originally close to Bourdieu’s definition of incorporated cultural capital, and as a secondary meaning it may also indicate the accumulation of institutionalized cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). In our model we attributed special significance to the fact that cultural capital as “the most heavily disguised inheritance” is transferred with the smallest loss of time and with the greatest efficiency in families that themselves already possess a large amount of cultural capital. It is important for us because female students with small children enrich their own existing cultural capital, and their increased capital shall in turn contribute to the cultural capital of their children. Even though they share a number of common features, Schultz’s human capital and Bourdieu’s cultural capital are treated separately in our model, as we emphasize only one major feature of each of those concepts. Under the term of “human capital” we examine the usability of the educational investment in the labour market, the value of the degree, in case of new qualification, the increase of human capital as a result of education, results in an easily found job, a higher income, and a more advantageous position. Whereas investment into human capital is usually measurable in financial terms – expenses and returns – the increase in Bourdieu’s cultural capital is a more complex phenomenon. As it has been mentioned earlier, for our research, incorporated cultural capital is of primary importance. That kind of capital, similarly to human capital, is unalienable from the individual, takes time to acquire, and the individual acquires it in a largely unconscious way. The acquisition of that capital largely depends upon the cultural capital of the family in which the individual lives (Bourdieu, 1986). That basic cultural capital of the family is further enriched through the education of the individual. What the student invests into his or her own education is, first and foremost, time and also a “socially determined libido” that involves sacrifices and failures as well (Ibid.) Here we refer to the characteristic feature of that kind of capital that learning becomes a part of the personality, that education will be connected to the individual in a number of ways.

The next segment of the triangle, symbolizing intellectual progress and connecting human- and cultural capitals, shows that we expect a return of the investment in higher education in terms of the students’ attitude to learning. Similarly to incorporated cultural capital, this is difficult to precisely define. The attitude of the students is different from the material return, which is easily detected in the labour market. At the same time, the effects of this barely tangible immaterial return are much further reaching in the individual’s professional career than the direct effects experienced in the labour market. The purpose of utilitarian learning is the hopefully fast and palpable return, but knowledge as
a value is the foundation of incorporated cultural capital. We intend to illustrate this assumption by Pléh’s contrast pairs, in which he places pragmatic approach in opposition to the Humboldtian ideas. In the latter, education and knowledge are a source of pleasure. Quoting Mill’s (1962) theory, Pléh argues that “knowledge in itself, independently of, and regardless to its use and profitability, enriches the personality” (Pléh, 2004, p. 205). We believe that this idealistic approach to education will be detectable to a certain extent among women studying in higher education. There will be female students who look upon education as a value. We shall term their activity as value-rational work, as opposed to the previous attitude that may be categorized as purpose-rational activity (cf. Weber, 1968).

We also expect a return of the investment made into higher education in the field of social embeddedness, which is the third field of return, with peaks in social and cultural capital. Women on maternity leave do not only drop out of the labour market temporarily, but they also suspend their participation in social communities that used to be part of their daily life previously, especially their work colleagues. But right after childbirth, commitments with the baby keep the mother away from gatherings of the family and friends, educational and entertainment opportunities as well. As students of a university or college they become a member of a different community. Prins, Toso & Schaft (1996) demonstrated the positive effects of a community of students among marginalized social groups. Zrinszky (1996) found solitude and lack of communication as a motivation among elderly people.

At this point we arrive at the third pole, that is, increase in social capital. We agree with Coleman that social capital is a positive relationship among people that motivates positive action of the individual. We ascribe special importance to social capital within the family (Coleman, 1988), as the transfer of capital within the family is only ensured when parents spend sufficient time with their children (cf. Pusztai, 2009). We believe that social capital outside the family shall increase in new forms of relationships that emerge between students, and between students and teachers.

A Description of the Research

We examined the investment made by students with small children into higher education and the return of that investment in the course of a longitudinal research programme, following students in higher education from their decision to start studying all the way to using their newly acquired degree in the labour market. Samples were taken from the students bringing up small children at two major regional institutions of higher education, the University of Debrecen and the University College of Nyíregyháza. A regional approach was used, as the return of the investment into education was to be examined in similar education-ecological environments. Ten faculties of the University of Debrecen, and four of the University College of Nyíregyháza were involved in the research.

Because of their particular situation and problems, female students receiving a maternity benefit usually choose corresponding courses, so students attending these part-time courses were found to be most suitable to be approached first. The difficulties in finding a number of individuals in a similar situation, and the data protection rules binding the administrative units of the universities, a random systematic sampling appeared to be the most suitable method for the purposes of the research.

The first phase of the research took place in 2006, when female students receiving a maternity benefit and studying at the two institutions of higher education were contacted (N=226). Students selected for the sample received the questionnaires designed for self-respondents by mail. During phase two, that of the cohort examination, in 2009, we met graduates of the two institutions they obtained the degrees from during their maternity leave and had been working for at least one year (N=121). In this phase we were not able to rely on any kind of data base or register, so we did not continue the research with a probability selection method. The employees chosen through a snowball method completed the questionnaires with the assistance of interrogators.

Our preliminary assumption regarding investments into higher education, based upon cultural reproduction and rational decision making theories and capital theories was that social background determined the entire educational career of the students. We therefore paid special attention to the existing basic qualification of the students when we examined their decision making strategies at adult age. We carried out the analysis through a comparison of the group of those who had a GCSE before starting their studies in higher education and the group of those who had a diploma – that is who started a postgraduate course. Hereunder we briefly summarize the results of our research into
the investment made by female students with small children into higher education and the return of that investment.

**Investment of Students into Higher Education**

When examining the decision making mechanism regarding the start of studies in higher education, we identified four major factors of motivation. Environmental effects included the incentives received from the closer family, friends and acquaintances of the students. We examined the investment strategies in the micro-environment in the two groups of students, and found that women without a degree received more encouragement from their parents, partners and friends alike than the women with a college or university degree. In the hope of the envisaged benefit (earning a diploma), the members of the micro-environment of women without a degree estimated the costs of studies for women with a small child less effectively.

When the student began studying, members of the investing micro-environment fully or partially abandoned her with the expenses and did not help with the extra burden in the struggle for a degree. The gap between the benefit expected in the future and the costs emerging in the present caused tensions and made several undergraduate female students reconsider their attitude towards studying, sometimes even their role in the family. The problem also caused considerable conflicts in their micro-environment as well (see Table 2). On the other hand, those students with a degree, whose families had a higher cultural capital, did not need any encouragement or any illustration of the expected benefit; their inner motivation, rooted in their social milieu, directed them towards starting their studies in higher education. During the process, the community investing in the studies of the individual undertook some of the extra costs of the person’s learning, so they found the extra costs of education for a degree less depressing.

**Table 2: Difficulties Arising during Studies, in a Breakdown According to Preliminary Qualifications, in percent (N=226)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difficulty</th>
<th>Undergraduate</th>
<th>Graduate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of family support**</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems with child care and supervision*</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising funds for the studies***</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exam stress***</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** sign. = 0.000 ** sign. = 0.004 *sign. = 0.05-0.01

The motivation arising from a woman being on maternity leave is constituted by free education and the fact that as a new mother she stays at home. During the time when the survey was made, all mothers on a maternity leave were exempted from paying tuition fee in Hungary. Students who had already had a diploma made efforts to get advantage of the situation. According to the answers they gave to the inventory, for 80% of them free education was a major reason when they decided to start studying. It was also a powerful motivation for undergraduates, as 70% of them identified free learning as an important incentive. A surprisingly high percentage (more than 60%) of the students who have started their studies said that they would certainly stop studying if a tuition fee were introduced. It illustrates how important a motivation free education really is, when prospective students make a decision about investing in higher education. We found it necessary to examine whether those who said that they were going to continue their studies anyway were not closer to the end of their study course, thus facing relatively smaller financial burden than those who still had several semesters to go and pay a lot of tuition fee. No correlation, however, has been found between the intention of the respondents to go on with their studies and their remaining semesters.

There were major differences between the two sample groups in terms of decision-making strategies related to higher education and also in the accomplishment of the study courses. Highly qualified students, usually working as professionals, who were also financially in a better position, had a more elaborate decision-making strategy for a longer period of time, showing signs of a homogeneous family atmosphere. By contrast, undergraduate students with a lower financial status tended to calculate the potential benefit of obtaining a higher education degree, the risks and the advantages, on short term only.
It explains why the families of the students with secondary education suffered mostly from the mother’s efforts invested into studying, as they were able to coordinate their educational and family commitments with difficulties, they lacked the necessary flexibility in organizing their tasks, and their efforts invested into studying caused regular conflicts in their lives. We also assumed that learning attitudes, efficiency and motivation of the two groups were different as well.

There is a strong correlation between the social background and the achievement of the students. The students with improved socio-economic background are more successful in their studies, which shows that the cultural reproduction is working also in the adult education. The demographic background is significantly different in the two groups. Those who have a college or university diploma are coming usually from large towns, have highly educated parents, and their husbands own one or more degrees. Women who do not yet have a degree are living usually in small towns or villages, grow up in larger families, usually with lower level educated parents, and secondary level educated partners. According to the cultural reproduction theory the examined groups have distinct learning paths. Undergraduates study preferably in college, while students who already have a degree rather continue their studies in a traditional university. Less than half of the first groups speak foreign languages, by contrast, almost 90% of the students of the latter. In the last semester the undergraduates had medium-high average, while students with a degree have completed at much higher levels.

According to our inventory, *intrinsic motivation* as personal investment in studying included individual ambition, professional interest and love for studying. In our sample, intrinsic motivation for the participants of the survey to start studies in higher education appear to be powerfully relevant: personal ambition is on the top of the list of priorities, reaching 90 on a 100-grade scale of value preferences. Professional interest and love for studying follow, with 83% and 80%, respectively (See Table 3).

| The Priority List of the Elements of Motivation for Learning: Graduates and Undergraduates Separately (N=226) |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Obtaining a degree                              | 92     | 78     | 85     |
| Personal ambitions                              | 90     | 90     | 90     |
| Hope of more easily finding a job               | 90     | 79     | 85     |
| Professional interest                           | 81     | 85     | 83     |
| Love of studying                                | 77     | 82     | 80     |
| Using the time of maternity leave               | 74     | 80     | 78     |
| Using the opportunity to study free of charge   | 71     | 77     | 74     |
| Hope of promotion at work                       | 65     | 72     | 69     |
| Reinforcing work position                       | 58     | 63     | 61     |
| Encouragement from spouse, partner              | 56     | 51     | 53     |
| Encouragement from parents, siblings            | 48     | 44     | 46     |
| Encouragement from friends                      | 44     | 37     | 40     |
| N                                               | 103    | 123    | 226    |

Besides the factors of external motivation, the desire to obtain a degree became a priority similarly high to primary motivation. It suggests that the desire to study and plan a career are both present in the background of the decision making before the commencement of the studies. There are differences between the two sub-patterns in terms of the primary and secondary elements of motivation. For those who already own a degree, studying is primarily a result of internal urge, they are motivated by personal ambitions, love for studying and professional interest. The desire to earn another qualification and the hope of finding a better job are in a different imaginary “second sphere” of their thinking. It is explained by the fact that the members of this group are in possession of one or more degrees that enabled them to successfully find a job, and now they expect similar advantages.

64% of the respondents in the sample had a job at the time of the survey, while close to 25% lost their jobs during the maternity leave. Less than half (48%) of the respondents who had a valid employment contract during the maternity leave were sure that they wanted to return to the same job. In the group of those who were certain that they wanted to return to their original job, the proportion of graduates was found to be higher (62%). *Position reinforcing effect* means that the person intends to reinforce his/her situation at their place of work, or to get a promotion, whereas *position-acquiring*
effect is the desire to find a job in the labour market more easily. It appears that the women who do not yet have a degree expect to improve their position in the labour market after earning a college or university qualification. Those who have a college or university diploma hope that they will be able to keep their jobs and have a promotion when they have an extra qualification.

The answers to the inventory suggest that women staying at home with small children are strongly preoccupied with the problem of returning to work. The ways and means of returning are thoughts they constantly deal with during the maternity leave; it explains how carefully they make their plans for the future. The fact that they decide to enter higher education aptly illustrates it, as during – or even before – the time they spend at home, they carefully consider their return to work. Earning a college or university degree is expected to help them in their return. The students participating in the survey mentioned the lack of foreign language skills and inappropriate qualifications as the most common factors impeding them in finding a job. The students supplying data for the research are worried about the level of their qualifications and, more than half of the respondents, found the market value of their certificates too low. The data suggest that their decision to start new studies is motivated by the wrong choice of their original career and/or by the devaluation of their original qualification.

Work, Studies and Bringing up Children

In this chapter we reach back to the past of the respondents, making an attempt to analyze the period in the life of the students when they left the labour market. Students with small children were asked about the hopes and worries that they experienced when they suspended their career in order to give birth to a child. The alternatives offered on the answer sheet referred to the characteristics of the maternity leave, their attitude to learning and the possibilities of returning to work in order to reveal the advantages and disadvantages the respondents experienced during their active and inactive periods.

Table 4: The Hopes and Worries Experienced by the Respondents when they Left the Labour Market. Figures in Percents. Graduates and Undergraduates Separately (N=226)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideas regarding their existing knowledge and qualifications</th>
<th>Hopes and worries</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>Undergraduate (n=103)</th>
<th>Graduate (n=123)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qualification competitive. No problem in returning to work</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will do self-training during stay at home*</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td><strong>80.5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worried about the erosion of skills and competences</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td><strong>44.7</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worried because child may take up all her time. No chance to learn</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worried about a break in her career</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas regarding the labour market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will be easier to find a job when she is over childbearing</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers do not like women with small children**</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td><strong>63.1</strong></td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas regarding the respondents’ direct environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family is first for her</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying at home with the child charges her with new energy</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td><strong>31.7</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing up the child exhausts all her energies</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New friendships are made during the maternity leave</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendships and relations with colleagues weaken during maternity leave</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sign. = 0.03  *sign. = 0.05

Note: Figures in bold are higher than expected in the case of a purely random distribution of the data.
The alternatives offered on the answer sheet split in three categories. The first sums up the answers in connection with the knowledge, skills and competences during the period of the suspended career. The second group of answers relates to the labour market, whereas the third category contains the answers in connection with the direct environment of the individual (See Table 4). The ideas connected to the labour market and the direct environment of the person concerned offer the conclusion that undergraduate students tend to worry more about work and family (e.g. employers do not prefer women with small children, the personal relations weaken etc.). Students who already have a degree are more positive (e.g. they think they will find a job more easily, new relations will be established). As for suspending the career, the situation is reversed: postgraduate students tend to worry more about the missed years and the weakening of skills and competences (48-33%), and they are also afraid that their career may suffer a major break (6-11%). Concerns about the latter is experienced only by several percents of the group of undergraduates, whereas ten percent of the graduate students worry that it would not be possible to compensate for the time lost during the maternity leave.

More than half of the graduate students worry about the erosion of skills and competences, and the same concern is noted at one third of the undergraduate students as well. Concerns regarding the depreciation of competences necessary for work were present in both groups when they left the labour market, but it is more characteristic of the graduate students. They decided to invest in their individual capital during maternity leave in a considerably higher proportion than persons in the other group (80-60%). In this way they hoped to avoid loss of competences caused by the drop-out of work, and they also prepared to meet new challenges in the labour market, as 80% of them were under the impression that the degree they already had is not competitive enough.

These observations offer sufficient data regarding the motivations behind the intentions of the students to obtain new positions and reinforce their old ones in the labour market. In relation with the motivations of students to start their studies we found that postgraduate students intended to go in for higher education as they had a positive attitude towards studying. When selecting a course, however, their decisions were based upon pragmatic aspects, the market value of the major subject chosen, the prestige, the status and the income that the new degree will bring along. Undergraduate students, on the other hand, were primarily motivated by the perspectives of later finding a job, in the sense that they hoped that once in possession of a college or university degree they would be able to more easily find a better job. Graduate students not only expected a financial return for their investment into higher education; they tended to look upon knowledge as an asset, whereas the undergraduates consider studying as a way heading to a desired positions.

The Return of the Investment into Studies in the Labour Market

In the second phase of the research, there was no real difference among the young mothers in terms of the level of their basic qualifications, so we used a different approach. The variables used for measuring changes in the labour market when freshly graduated students return to it have been used to identify the sub-groups within the sample. A meaningful average of the variables were made, and subcategories were set up. The variables have been used according to the respondents who returned to the original job and to those who found a new one. The sample was divided into two major categories: in one of the categories the students were more successful in the labour market than the average. They were labelled as successful investors. They used their investment in higher education successfully, and they received the return they had expected. The second sub-group has been called less successful investors, although it only reflects the situation at the moment of answering the inventory, as the time of their re-integration into the labour market was too short, therefore they cannot be considered as really unsuccessful investors (See Table 5).
Table 5: Characteristics of the Successful and Less Successful Investments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The direction of returning to work</th>
<th>Successful investors</th>
<th>Less successful investors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Among those who returned to their original job</td>
<td>Promoted</td>
<td>Continued work under the same circumstances, no change in position and conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Received pay rise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continued work under more favourable conditions</td>
<td>Released from work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among those who found a new job</td>
<td>Works in position matching the new qualification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income matching the new qualification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfactory working conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Job and family more compatible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regardless the former job</td>
<td>Upward mobility</td>
<td>Downward mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In their own subjective assessment, the degree is competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In their own subjective assessment, the degree is not competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The larger part of the sample (63%) belongs to the successful investors, 76 people experienced positive changes upon their return to work that were in connection with their new degree. In the case of other 45 respondents (37%) such positive changes has not yet taken place, but considering the original positions and the fact that downward mobility was avoided this may be seen as successful re-integration into the labour market.

We intended to show the return of investment made into education divided in three categories. As a result of investing into the human capital, several forms of return appear in the field of labour market integration. These forms of return are in obvious correlation with the advanced studies carried out during the inactive years. The answers we received to the block of questions focusing on the moment of re-integration suggest that the return of the participants to their job after several years was successful, as almost half of the women returned to their original job. 28% of them changed jobs voluntarily, 10% of them were forced to do so (their employment was terminated), another 10% had another baby, and only two participants of the survey were unable to find a job. During the later years of employment we were able to demonstrate further beneficial effects of the new qualification, including a position matching the qualification, better working conditions, higher income, better ways of matching family and career, and the participants’ successful escape from downward mobility. Those who had not had a degree previously proved to be more successful in finding a job. 43% of them were promoted from their previous positions, whereas only 32% of the postgraduate students achieved the same. No downward mobility took place in the two groups.

The group of successful investors tended to worry on the weakening of the knowledge and competences during the years away from work to a larger extent, but nearly half of the other group also shared that concern. After a few years, more than two thirds of women going out to work believed that it is important to learn in the inactive period as well, in order to survive more easily in the world of work later. This idea is shared primarily – and not surprisingly – by the successful investors, who demonstrated their ability to survive in the labour market more easily as a result of their college or university degree. However, fewer agreed that the years directly following childbirth are a good opportunity for studying, even if learning is important (60% of both sub-samples).

The answers received to the open questions in the inventory helped to better understand that attitude. The open questions focused on how the respondent and the family remembered the period of studies after a certain period of time. The answers fall into three categories, labelled problem-free, tolerable and difficult. Those who are in the problem-free category, did not suffer from any noteworthy family disadvantage when they were at home with a baby and studied at College at the same time. Some of them even reported positive experience, e.g.: “it was not very exhausting” or “I overcame the difficulties with ease” or “it was good for everyone, the baby spent a day with granny,” or “I was away from the ratrace” or “my husband helped me a lot in the family” or “it was basically positive, the family shared the burden.”
The women who described the period of their studies as *tolerable*, mentioned some difficulties, but they were able to solve the problems: “it was difficult, but the whole family and all relatives were very helpful” or “my husband helped me a lot, but we still had some difficulties” or “we did have difficulties, but there are difficulties in our daily life anyway” or “it was difficult, but we made the decisions together, I studied during the night and my family was helpful” or “it required a lot of organization, patience and it was tiresome, but it was worthwhile”. Those who found the period *difficult*, have largely negative memories: “everything else was ignored, husband, child, and she often thought of giving up her studies”, or “it was very difficult spending the night studying, I was tired, stressed and nervous” or “I moved to my mother during my studies, and travelling was very tiresome for the baby, too” or “there were constant quarrels about who would take care of the baby, she was remorseful for ignoring the baby” or “the children suffered from my stressful situation during the exam periods, I ignored my household, and my husband did not like it” or “I soon gave up breast feeding, and the baby first called my mother-in-law, ‘mother’…”

**The Return of the Investment into Studies in the Attitude of Students to Learning and in Learning Communities**

The field of return in intellectual progress was full even during the period of studies. Further elements were added in the time following the return of the young mothers to work. The desire of the participants to learn increased, they began to pay more attention to self-education, and they proved to be very successful in their return to work. It is an interesting development, that women who harvested less return in the labour market developed more inclination and desire to learn.

The overwhelming majority of women investing in advanced studies during the maternity leave (in excess of 70%) found later that the effects of learning were very powerful when they returned to work. They found studying particularly useful in terms of professional skills and competences, but they also experienced positive effects in making up for the lost time (Table 6). In terms of enrolling in and completing further training programmes organized by their employers, one third of the participants found useful their previous studies. A similar proportion of the respondents found previous advanced studies beneficial in personal issues like finding their own place in their respective community and the re-organization of their private life. The only considerable difference between the two groups was detected in (re)starting the highly professional part of their work. The successful investors were more efficient in this respect, probably because they were able to use what they had learnt during their inactive period more effectively. That is another element of the return of the work invested.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Various Fields of Re-Integration into Work</th>
<th>Successful investors</th>
<th>Less successful investors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joining professional work **</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making up for lost time</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending further training programmes</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration. Finding their own place</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing career and family into harmony</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sign. = 0.01**

Figures in **bold** are higher than expected in the case of a purely random distribution of the data.
able to use their parents’ accumulated cultural capital if the parents invest in their children’s human capital (Coleman, 1988).

The first signs of return in the field of social embeddedness were observed in joining the community of learners. They were able to break out of the isolation of their homes. This new form of social capital assisted the individuals in re-establishing their relationships with their colleagues. The yield of higher education in the sphere of the family helped the individual in bringing career and private life into harmony. Cultural consumption of these families also changed as they started to consume goods and services typically used by intellectuals and professionals.

Another important effect of advanced studies is that they encourage the environment of the adult learner in life-long learning. It has been noted that women received relatively little encouragement and support from their families to start their studies, but once they have started, their parents and partners were very helpful. The majority of our respondents seemed to have been satisfied with the period of learning in their adulthood because, regardless the sub-group they belonged to, during and after their studies they encouraged their environment to follow suit. 85% of them encouraged somebody in their environment to study. This encouragement was addressed to their direct environment, with half of the women attempting to persuade their husbands, one third encouraged their colleagues, 24% of them wanted to send some of their relatives to college, 15% wanted to see their siblings studying. The lowest proportion, 6%, attempted to persuade their parents. The low figure here is probably explained by the age of the parents.

Conclusions

An examination of the studies of students with small children and their return to work shows that the capital invested during the years study apparently yields a return in a short run. The investment, and its return, has been examined at individual and collective levels. For constraints of space, the latter has not been discussed in this essay. It is to be emphasized, however, that supporting women with small children in their studies and return to work may have considerable benefit in the long run. Such a benefit may be an improvement of the demographic situation, because if women find it safe to temporarily leave their work, they will find it safer to have children. The employment will increase and the unemployment will decrease. The example of a learning parent will positively shape the attitude of the children to studying and will improve the cultural capital of the family.

For the experts dealing with higher education and andragogy, an important result of the research on studying during the period of bringing up a child or more children is the fact that young women living an inactive period and being exposed to a low level of intellectual challenge are characterized by a high degree of primary motivation. The primary elements of motivation to start learning (love of studying, professional interest etc.) may serve as a good foundation for further studies, and for creating the demand and need of the individual for permanent studying.

The re-integration of women into the labour market after a maternity leave during which they have accomplished a successful training course is an important result for the decision-makers of the business world as it positively influences the economic activity of the population through increasing employment, reducing the number of unemployed people, also reduces hidden unemployment, as it is not necessary to maintain the status of forced inactivity. As a result of the successfully completed training courses, labour market will receive professionally competent employees. The highest proportion of the respondents found that the most positive effects of learning were the better chances of re-entering the labour market and the proper maintenance of knowledge and skills. It is necessary to launch new research programmes in order to examine the research questions. One of the possible directions of further research is following the career of women who have graduated during the maternity leave. The objective of such a monitoring project might reveal further returns of the educational investment. An even longer term research is required to monitor the generational transfer in the families concerned.


Aids-Orphanhood and Human Capital Development in Nigeria

RASAKI STEPHEN DAUDA
Department of Economics and Business Studies, Redeemer’s University, Nigeria

Abstract

This study employs the descriptive method of analysis and growth rate to determine the effect of high number of AIDS Orphans on human capital development in Nigeria. The available facts reviewed and the result of the analysis revealed that the growth rate of the number of orphans, occasioned by the pandemic, has continued to be positive since 1990 till date. AIDS Orphans as a percentage of children within the 0 and 14 has been on the increase, from 0.03%, in 1990, to 2.1%, in 2000, and has extended further to 3.78%, in 2009. Enrolment figures, as well as the rates of school dropouts among the orphans and vulnerable children, clearly indicate that the negative impact of increase in AIDS Orphans on human capital would be substantial if this trend remains unchecked. Therefore, it is imperative for governments at all levels to set better policy measures to support these orphans. Such measures could focus on free and compulsory education, shelter, clothing, medical services and food. Communities, which provide safety nets for the children should be empowered and encouraged with proper financial assistance. In addition, there’s a clear need for specific legislation against the growing trend of all forms of exploitations and child-abuse, particularly on girls.

Keywords: AIDS Orphans; Human Capital; HIV/AIDS; Orphans and Vulnerable Children; School Enrolment; Nigeria.

Introduction

The menace of the dreaded HIV/AIDS disease continues to assume different dimensions in the economies of African countries. Aside from the high prevalence of deaths and the great number of persons living with the disease caused by the pandemic, another negative aspect has emerged. The disease leads to an ever-increasing the number of orphans in Africa. According to Skyward Journey (2011), there are about 143 million to 210 million orphans globally and an estimated no. of 5,760 children become orphans every day, which translates into 2,102,400 orphans annually. The agency further confirms that in Africa every 15 seconds a child becomes an AIDS orphan and about 14 million AIDS Orphans exist in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) alone. It is noted that the number of AIDS Orphans was supposed to reach 18 million by 2010. Furthermore, it points out that 8 out of every 10 children orphaned by AIDS live in SSA while approximately 250,000 children are adopted annually.

Foster & Williamson (2000) observe that out of the total no. of children orphaned by AIDS globally, 95% of them live in Africa where a continuing increase is expected, reaching 40 million by 2010. These observations have remained true and today’s statistics are witnesses to their validity. While in its 2010 report on the global AIDS epidemic UNAIDS reported that the spread of the disease has been halted and also begun to rescind, available statistics from the...
agency on the status of the pandemic have shown that out of the 33.3 million people living with the disease in 2010, about 22.5 million were from the SSA. This figure comprised 12.1 million women and 2.3 million children (an increase from the 2001 figure of 1.8 million children). Prevalence among adults between 15 and 49 years ranged around 5% while the number of AIDS deaths stood at 1.3 million. Orphans due to the pandemic in the region were estimated at 14.8 million out of the global figure of 16.6 million orphans. In fact, the UNAIDS (2011) report on the global status of the disease and the information provided by the US Global Health Policy (2011) stated that at the end of 2010, an estimated number of 34 million people were still living with the disease worldwide, which translates in an increase of about 17% compared to the 2001 figure. Although the report states that the annual new infection rate of the pandemic fell by 21% between 1997 and 2010, the statistics of persons living with the virus are still on the high side. This means that many new infections continue to occur, influencing directly the number of orphans connected to the disease in the nearest future, with the SSA countries being at the highest risk.

Until recently, Nigeria has been trailing many countries whereas the HIV/AIDS prevalence was concerned, but currently it has overtaken most of them. In fact, the country globally occupies the second position after South Africa (see UNGASS, 2010) in terms of the number of persons living with the virus. UNAIDS (2010) reports that in 2009, Nigeria alone accounted for about 3.3 million of persons living with HIV/AIDS, which were further subdivided into 1.7 million women, 1.24 men, and 360,000 children. The number of AIDS deaths in the country in 2009 was estimated at 220,000 while the average national prevalence rate was 4.6%. It is very difficult and worrisome to note that Nigeria leads globally in terms of HIV/AIDS induced orphans, at 2.5 million in 2009. This puts an additional burden to the increasing menace of other communicable diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis with their attendant and concomitant implications for human capital development, both at household level and national level. This is a serious problem that called for considerate urgent attention.

This work sets out to analyze the impact of AIDS induced orphans on human capital formation in Nigeria. The rest of the work is organized as follows: section two brings some detailed facts about Nigeria and the HIV/AIDS situation in the country, section three reviews the literature, section four provides a brief methodology, section five dwells on analysis and results, while section six focuses on summary, conclusion and policy recommendations.

Background

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. While the 2006 national population census reported that a total of 140 million people lived in the country, the National Agency for the Control of AIDS (NACA) in 2008 gave an estimate of about 152.6 million people. The Nigeria’s 2010 National Literacy Survey reported that the nation’s population stood at 154.77 million. According to the CIA’s World Facts (2012) estimate, the country’s population would have reached a record of 170,123,740 by July 2012. The variations in the figures notwithstanding, the nation’s population is currently well above 150 million persons with its growth rate given by the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette (2007) as 3.2%. Nigeria has about 250 ethnic groups, with two major religions of Christianity in the South and Islam in the North. Currently, it comprises 36 states with the Federal Capital Territory located in Abuja.

Nigeria is well endowed with natural and human resources. According to Momoh (2010), the nation is the 6th largest producer of petroleum in the world and the 8th largest exporter with the 10th largest proven reserves. In spite of all these, the country remains overburdened with high rates of poverty, crime, disease prevalence, and so on, as indicated by available health, macroeconomic, development and others indicators in the economy. The literacy rate in the country as at 2010 was 57%. However, the rate differs among the different states and the six geopolitical zones (North-Central, North-East, North-West, South-East, South-South, and South-West) the country is divided into. The table below provides information on adult literacy rates by the six geopolitical zones in the country.
Table 1: Adult Literacy Rate in English by Geo-Political Zone, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geopolitical Zone</th>
<th>LITERACY IN ENGLISH</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Both Sexes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td></td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td></td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the table shows, literacy rate in the country is higher among males as compared to the rate among females. Of the six zones, the rate is highest in the South-South zone, given as 81.1% for male, 66.7% for females and 74.0% for both sexes. This is followed by the South East zone with 80.7% for male, 67.5% for females and 73.8% for the two sexes. The zone with the least literacy rate is the North-West recording 31.7% for both sexes. Generally, the northern part of the country is less educated (Western Education implied here) and therefore communication in English is very difficult among the illiterates. This is understandable since most of the people living in that part of the country are Muslims with more preference for Islamic education than Western education.

Evolution and Fact of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria

The first HIV/AIDS case in Nigeria was reported in 1986 and since then, the country has continued to experience a surge of the prevalence rate and of both the number of persons living with the disease and of related-deaths as well as an increasing number of orphans resulting from the pandemic. In an estimate provided by the UNAIDS (2010), about 590,000 Nigerians were living with the disease in 1990. By 2001, it had increased to 2,700,000, while the figure estimated for 2009 was 3.3 million and that of 2010 stood at 3.1 million people. Table 2 provides information on the projected HIV population in each state of the six geo-political zones in the country, including the federal capital territory, from 2002 to 2008, while Table 3 gives the prevalence of the disease in the same geo-political zones, in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2008.

Table 2: Projected HIV Population by Selected States in Nigeria in Thousands, 2002-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>207.8</td>
<td>177.3</td>
<td>187.5</td>
<td>197.8</td>
<td>155.3</td>
<td>135.5</td>
<td>265.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/River</td>
<td>182.3</td>
<td>228.7</td>
<td>175.8</td>
<td>120.7</td>
<td>180.8</td>
<td>189.1</td>
<td>121.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebonyi</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>136.7</td>
<td>129.6</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>104.1</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>105.7</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>112.7</td>
<td>110.8</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>114.5</td>
<td>227.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT</td>
<td>169.6</td>
<td>160.1</td>
<td>142.8</td>
<td>124.6</td>
<td>128.0</td>
<td>119.1</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the Author from the 2009 Social Statistics Bulletin of the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria.

From consulting Table 2, we can notice that the State of Benue, which is in the North Central, had the highest number of persons living with the disease in 2008, given as 265,634, followed by the State of Kaduna State, a North West Zone. Both states have witnessed persistent increase in the number of persons living with the pandemic since 2002 till date, as it can be seen from the table. The least is in the South East, put at 55,457 persons in the State of Ebonyi. The figures in the federal capital territory have been on a decline.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/River</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebonyi</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the Author from the 2009 Social Statistics Bulletin of the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria.

From consulting the table above, it is obvious that the prevalence of HIV/AIDS disease in various states in the country is quite high. In fact, they have reached a generalized epidemic of 1% and above. The State of Benue still leads in terms of prevalence, which has remained double digits since 2005. In 2001, this state had the highest prevalence. It recorded 13.5% prevalence in 2001, while the 2008 figure remained at 10.6%. Cross River took over Benue State in 2003, when it recorded a 12% prevalence. In 2008, Benue regained its leadership with a prevalence of 10.6% followed by the federal capital territory with approximately 10% of prevalence. It is worthy to note that while the States of Ebonyi and Gombe have been experiencing a steady decline in terms of prevalence of the disease from 2001 till date, other states continue to record high prevalence data. Cross River State, for instance, which had 8% prevalence in 2001, suddenly recorded a 12% rate in 2003, then a decrease to 6.1% in 2005, and finally went back to an increase up to an 8% rate in 2008.

The Concept of Orphans and AIDS Orphanhood

The literature is filled with different definitions of the word “orphan”. According to UNICEF (2009), an “orphan” is that child who has lost one or both parents. While some literature, organizations and countries define children as persons under age 15, others define them as persons within the age bracket 0 to 17 years. Article 1 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child states that the word child refers to every human being below 18. Based strictly on this definition, it can be said that conceptually, any person under age 18, who has lost either or both parents, is an orphan. This is in line with the definition given by the NPC and ICF Macro (2009) in the Nigeria’s 2008 Demographic and Health Survey, that an orphan is a child under age 18 with one or both parents deceased. On the basis of these and other definitions of the “child”, an “orphan” could be referred to as a child below age 15 or 18 as the case may be, who has lost either or both parents. In addition, some authors consider as being an orphan the child who has lost not only his/her parents but also his care givers. Table 4 presents definitions of the word “orphan”, by country.

Table 4: *Orphan Definitions by Countries*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>A child under 18 years of age who has lost one (single parents) or two (married couple) biological or adoptive parents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>A child under 18 years of age who has lost both parents, regardless of how they died.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>A child under the age of 18 who has lost either a mother, a father, or both parents – or a primary caregiver – due to death, or a child who is in need of care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>A child who has lost one or both parents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>A child under the age of 18 years who has lost one or both parents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This study adopts the definition of the orphan given by the UNICEF, UNAIDS and USAID as any child of age 0 to 17 whose mother (maternal orphans) or father (paternal orphans) or both (double orphans) are dead. In view of this, any child who falls within this age bracket and has lost either mother or father or both to AIDS disease is an AIDS orphan or child orphaned by AIDS. As noted
earlier, there is a new trend emerging from the menace of HIV/AIDS, which is the increase in the number of orphans caused by the disease. The trend is on the increase particularly in the SSA of which Nigeria belongs. This has a lot of implications not only for the child, but also for the economy. The figure below gives an estimated number of children under 18 orphaned by AIDS in SSA from 1990 to 2007.

Figure 1: Estimated Number of Children under 18 Orphaned by AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa (1990–2007).

Figure 1 above reveals that since 1990 till 2007, the number of orphans due to the AIDS pandemic reaching a record of more than 11 million in 2007. In fact, the UNAIDS (2010) report indicated that the number of orphans caused by AIDS in 2009 was 14.8 million. This further confirms that this problem is actually that of the SSA countries.

Children Orphaned by AIDS in Nigeria

The Abiye Orphanage (2011) reports that about 13% of people infected with HIV/AIDS in Africa alone are Nigerians with 72% of all infections found among adults below age 40. Momoh (2010) has reiterated that Nigeria alone accounts for the largest burden of orphans globally, amid weak social protection systems. This is further aggravated by the scourge of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As a matter of fact, the number of orphans resulting from AIDS in Nigeria has continued to increase over the years. Available statistics provided by the Encyclopedia of Nations (2011) revealed that, in 1990, Nigeria occupied the 9th position in terms of the number of children orphaned by AIDS, put at 12,000, after countries such as Burkina Faso, Kenya, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Uganda. Uganda topped the table in 1990. By 1995, Nigeria had moved to the 4th position and since 2000 till date, the country has taken over from all other countries to become the nation with the highest number of children orphaned by AIDS. UNAIDS (2010), Index Mundi (2011), Avert (2012) and Encyclopedia of nations (2011) put the 2009 figure for the country at 2.5 million orphans. The 2009 M&E2 plan for OVC3 response in Nigeria reported that as at 2008, about 17.5 million (24.5%) of the Nigerian children are orphans and vulnerable. This is an alarming situation that calls for urgent policy attention. Table 5 below gives the figures of AIDS induced orphans in Nigeria from 1990 to 2009.

From Table 5, it is obvious that the number of AIDS induced orphans in Nigeria has continued to witness very substantial increases since 1990 till 2009. About 12,000 orphans were caused by the dreaded disease due to the death of either or both parents in 1990. By 1995, the figure had increased by 100 % and by 2009, it had reached an alarming figure of 2.5 million orphans from the disease.

---

2 Monitoring and Evaluation
3 Orphans and Vulnerable Children
Table 5: *Children Orphaned by AIDS in Nigeria in Thousands (1990-2009)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>AIDS INDUCED ORPHANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Response Programmes to AIDS Orphan Problems in Nigeria

Response activities to the problems of AIDS Orphans in Nigeria are undertaken at community and national levels, thus including agencies and civil society groups. According to the FMWASD (2007), the communities provide the initial safety net to the OVCs outside of their immediate families. But as pointed out by the ministry, the responses have been inadequate because they have been limited in scope and size, and largely driven by NGOs, with gaps in the quality and consistency of care. The nation’s 2009 M&E Plan for OVC Response stated clearly that an appreciable number of bodies are now involved in response programs addressing the OVC phenomenon in Nigeria. Such stakeholders and players include: Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA); Civil Society Organizations (CSO); Faith Based Organizations (FBO); Private Sector and Development Partners with the FMWASD as the coordinating agency. There is a table below showing notable actions taken so far to address issues relating to OVC in Nigeria.

Table 6: *Some Notable National Level OVC Responses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Action Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 2004</td>
<td>National OVC Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June – August 2004</td>
<td>Rapid Assessment, Analysis and Action Planning Process, and Development of draft action plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>Establishment of the OVC Unit in the Federal Ministry of Women Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>Inauguration of the National Steering Committee on OVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>Inauguration of the National OVC Stakeholders Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>Inauguration of the National OVC Plan of Action Task Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October – November 2005</td>
<td>Zonal Consultation workshops to develop the National OVC Plan of Action (2006 - 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>Development of the National M&amp;E Framework for the National OVC Plan of Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to the ones mentioned above, a National Plan of Action (NPA) on OVC was developed for the period 2006 to 2010 to provide a single framework for OVC response. According to the 2009 M&E Plan for OVC Response in Nigeria, the NPA for OVC is a five-year plan that focuses on areas such as survival, protection, participation, development, care, and support needs of OVCs in the country. The plan has the following as thematic areas: protection, psycho-social support, education, health, household care and economic strengthening, advocacy and social mobilization, legal and environment policy (Federal Ministry of Women Affairs, Nigeria, 2009).

Review of Related Literature

AIDS Orphans and the Household: What Impact?
The scourge of the dreaded HIV/AIDS disease has continued to have a lot of consequences at the household front, particularly in African countries. The statement made by Mermin et al. (2005) cited

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4 Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development
by PEPFAR\textsuperscript{5} (2006) implies that the death of a parent as a result of the AIDS disease would make the child three times more likely to die, even when the child is HIV negative is not an understatement. This is because “when HIV/AIDS enters a household by infecting one or both parents, the very fabric of a child’s life falls apart” (UNICEF, 2004, p. 67). Starting from the period when the parent is sick, most of the burden would start to fall on the child even when the parent is still alive. The child becomes the one to take care of the parent either directly or indirectly. As a matter of fact, as soon as the parents develop HIV related symptoms, children begin to shoulder new responsibilities such as cooking, cleaning, fetching water, “laundry, care giving activities such as feeding, bathing, toileting, giving medication, and accompanying relatives for treatment, agricultural or income generating activities and childcare duties” (Foster & Williamson, 2000, p. S278). These extra and weighty activities further compound the problem of the child. In addition, the scourge of the pandemic has also created children care givers whereby nine-year-old children are now acting as parents for younger siblings, “grandmothers caring for the children of their children, children and youth living on the street – all with limited resources and no hope for a better tomorrow” (MacDonald & Moore, 2006, p. 331). This is very pathetic.

The implication of this is that such a child may become inconsistent in school in terms of attendance or he or she may withdraw or even begin to look for either a part-time or full time job in order to take care not only of the sick parent but also to make provisions for the family, since most infected people in developing countries are poor. As a matter of fact, the child begins to suffer as soon as the parent(s) gets infected in terms of the provision of food, caring, education and even psychologically. PEPFAR (2006) has maintained that HIV/AIDS caused orphans to face high risk of death, stigmatization, rejection, and a lack of love and care, emotional distress, malnutrition, lack of health care, and poor or no access to education. In addition, the agency reiterates that such orphans are faced with high risk of labour exploitation, sex trafficking, homelessness, and exposure to HIV. These are some of the problems most orphans face in developing countries, with Nigeria inclusive. To corroborate these, it has been reported that orphans are confronted with a number of vulnerabilities such as “stigmatization, discrimination, malnutrition, sexual violence, child labor, dropping out of school, lack of access to parent’s properties, trafficking and even death” (Momoh, 2010, p. 1). Momoh further observed that with little or no social protection systems in place, it has been very difficult for the children to cope with these risks.

In the SSA countries such as Nigeria, where the prevalence of HIV/AIDS disease is high, most households live in abject poverty. In actual fact, the effect of the pandemic on children and families is further compounded because many families live in most communities, “which are already disadvantaged by poverty, poor infrastructure, and limited access to basic services” (Foster & Williamson, 2000, p. S278). This has grave consequences on children orphaned by AIDS because a good number of them find it difficult to continue in school; even food becomes a problem. As a matter of fact, some of them become household heads and street beggars; others engage in criminal activities while some of the girls could turn to prostitution for subsistence.

In a study carried out by McGaw & Wameyo (2005) for the African Office of the World Vision International on violence against children affected by HIV/AIDS in Uganda, it was discovered among other things that children who are affected by the disease, either infected or orphans, face a lot of violence, in form of stigma, discrimination, psychological abuse, neglect, child labor, and sexual abuse. For instance, out of the 16 orphans that were interviewed, 14 agreed that they faced all forms of stigmatization and discrimination, with examples to support their claims while in another group of 32, 29 attested to the fact that discriminations against them were some of the problems they faced. The study further reported that about 98% of guardians discriminate against orphans in their care. In addition, resource limitation in the communities where orphans were cared for also reduced such care and most of these orphans appeared uncared for “with poor clothing (often without a school uniform) and poor health and hygiene shown by the presence of lice, jiggers (flea larvae) or symptoms of AIDS” (McGaw & Wameyo, 2005, p. 8). In fact, most AIDS Orphans appeared not to be treated as well as other children. Some of them would be abused, beaten up, called insulting names, belittled, and compared negatively to other children. The study reported that discrimination

\textsuperscript{5} President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
could be noticed in the words used, tone of voice, non-verbal gestures, failure to provide sufficient food, clothing, bedding, educational opportunities, health care, protection from harm, undertake of excessive and age-inappropriate household tasks, sexual abuse, primarily of girl orphans, and so on. Atwine, Cantor-Graae & Bajunirwe (2005) analyzed the psychological distress among AIDS Orphans in rural Uganda, using 123 children aged 11-15 years who became orphans as a result of AIDS pandemic and 110 children of similar age bracket and gender who were living with their parents in the same neighborhood. The findings revealed that orphans had greater risk than non-orphans for higher levels of anxiety, depression and anger. In addition, it was found that orphans had significantly higher risk to develop vegetative symptoms, feelings of hopelessness, and suicidal ideation.

In the same vein, Mishra & Assche (2008) in their study on OVC in High HIV Prevalence Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa discovered that OVC are disadvantaged in schooling compared to non-OVC, while orphans are disadvantaged in the area of mosquito nets, which made them more vulnerable than non-orphans in terms of the morbidity and mortality associated with malaria. In addition, they reported based on their findings that only few primary caregivers of children make arrangements for succession plan and most OVC and their families are not receiving the necessary care and support. When the HIV/AIDS pandemic hits any household particularly in Africa, the household income tends to decrease, since there is always the tendency to be absent at work either both for the infected person and by whoever needs to stay by him or her while expenditures tend to increase in the household, which all together could bring about a reallocation of the money meant for school expenses to be expended on basic necessities and health requirements.

Orphans also tend to be engaged in demeaning activities, while others are forced to undergo child labor activities such as the under-aged engaged in street trading and so on. Unfortunately, in the African context some still believe that some of these activities rather than destroy the child could assist to make him/her and also prepare him/her to be fit in the society and become independent. Others also see it as a way of augmenting the income of the household as most farmers see children as blessings as long as they can assist them on farming works and daily chores. Even without HIV/AIDS problem, most poor households in Africa still engage their children in various activities such as street trading, farming, helping as shop attendants in family business, apprenticeship and so on, while they are schooling. Most would do that after closing hours or on Saturdays and Sundays. These activities are always rampant among fostered children, orphans, and the rest.

**Impact of AIDS Orphanhood on Education and Health**

It has been established by literature that education, health and training are very germane for human capital development in any society. Dauda (2011, p. 211) has noted that “the human capital components in man are the skills, knowledge, capabilities, attitudes, and the experiences, which are developed through education, health, on-the job training, and other means”. The roles of education, health and training in human capital development cannot be overemphasized, considering the quantum of leaps they have contributed to the growth and development of advanced countries in our contemporary days. Therefore any factor that tends to impact negatively on this process must be squarely addressed. The increase in the number of orphans as a result of the AIDS pandemic seems to be a major blow to human capital development mostly in African countries, which are already suffocated under a thick cloud of problems such as poverty, high crime rate, critical rates of communicable diseases, and so on. HIV/AIDS menace has a lot of adverse implications for the child’s education. When a member of the household gets infected, the immediate impact is felt on the household income even before the death of the person. This is as a result of increased medical expenses, which also leads to a re-allocation of financial resources from other household commitments such as schooling, clothing and other health care provision. The inability of parents to meet the child’s schooling could result to absenteeism as well as a complete drop out of school. In actual fact, the child’s performance in school could begin to dwindle as psychological trauma of the happenings at home tends to weigh him down and eventually, the demise of the infected person could further aggravate the problem.
Table 7: School Attendance among Ages 10 to 14 Years Old in Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Non-Orphans (Children Living with at Least one Parent) Attending School</th>
<th>% Double Orphans Attending School</th>
<th>Double Orphan/Non-Orphan School Attendance Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEST AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.64*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.74*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CENTRAL AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.96*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Democratic Rep. of the</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EAST AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.59*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTHERN AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the Author from UNICEF (2006).

* signifies that the proportion of double orphans attending school was based on less than 50 children.
UNICEF (2003, p. 27) observed that “orphans are less likely to be in school and more likely to fall behind or drop out”, which compromise their abilities and prospects. It further reported that in Tanzania while school attendance rate for non-orphans was 71%, the rate for double orphans was only 52%. In fact, the burden exacted on household incomes as a result of HIV/AIDS could affect school fees and procurement of school uniforms and other related expenses may pose barriers to school attendance if orphans’ caregivers struggle to afford these costs, which could make AIDS orphaned children to miss out on school enrolment, have their schooling interrupted or poorly perform poorly in school as a result of their situation (Avert, 2012), which portend danger for human capital development, not only on the part of the children but for the economy as a whole.

Citing Bicego et al. (2003), Pullum & Greenwell (2009, p. 2) reported based on findings from five SSA countries that orphans were less likely to be in the expected grade level, especially at younger ages, compared to non-orphans and that although “the loss of both parents was most detrimental to educational attainment, the loss of the mother had a stronger negative effect than the loss of the father.” They further cited Ainsworth et al. (2005) who carried out a household survey in Tanzania and discovered that school enrollment was delayed for maternal orphans in Tanzania, and for girls already attending school, the number of hours in school diminished sharply immediately after losing a parent.

Mishra et al. (2007) examined how school attendance and nutritional status differ between orphans and fostered children, and between children of HIV-infected parents and non-HIV-infected parents in Kenya focusing on 2.756 children age 0-4 years and 4.172 children age 6-14 years. They discovered that orphans and fostered children (age 6-14 years) were significantly less likely to be attending school than non-orphans and non-fostered children of HIV-negative parents. Furthermore, it was reported that “children of HIV-infected parents were significantly less likely to be attending school, more likely to be underweight and wasted, and less likely to receive treatment for ARI and diarrhea than children of non-HIV-infected parents” (Mishra et al., 2007, p. 383).

Table 7, above, shows school attendance among children ages 10 to 14 years old in SSA. A cursory look at the information contained in the table, reveals clearly that a very wide margin exists between school attendance of orphans and non-orphans in the SSA. With the exception of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau where orphans’ school attendance was slightly higher than non-orphans living with their parents, all other countries witnessed lower school attendance among orphans than non-orphans. All the information contained in the table point to the fact that human capital development will be jeopardized in these countries if efforts are not put in place not only to reduce and eradicate HIV/AIDS disease, but also to provide adequate education for the high number of orphans the disease has added to the already bloated number of orphans in the SSA countries.

Human capital development is not limited to school attendance alone. As a matter of fact, health and nutrition are other vital components of human capital formation, without which it will be impossible to develop the teeming human resource based of the economy. The increase in number of orphans caused by the AIDS menace in most SSA countries, which are already groaning under the heavy weight of poverty, coupled with the fact that the disease is rampant among the low income earners, have continued to be a major concern. A higher percentage of the household incomes in this part of the world have been diverted to treating HIV/AIDS related problems, living little or almost nothing for proper feeding and good nutrition. Most of these orphans have difficulties to properly feed themselves because of the income limitation. The fact that most household heads are poor with some being too old or even under aged children further aggravates the problem. UNICEF (2003) has noted that households affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which lack community support, would have their food consumption reduced by more than 40 per cent. The agency cited a research conducted in the United Republic of Tanzania, which indicated that the loss of either parent and the death of other adults in the household would worsen the child’s height for age and increase stunting. Furthermore, it reported the findings of a study conducted in Western Kenya indicating that orphans appear to be disadvantaged compared to non-orphans when the weight-for-height measure was used. In addition, the 2003 nutritional survey for Zimbabwe, which weighed and measured nearly 42.000 children, including 1,760 orphans, reported a higher percentage of
orphans being malnourished than non-orphans. Accordingly, it might be impossible for these children to develop to their full physical and intellectual capacity. Besides, the agency reiterated that the increasingly weakened state of health-care services occasioned by the HIV/AIDS menace in most SSA countries might act to worsen and deteriorate the nutritional, health and survival prospects of orphans.

Although the study conducted by Mishra et al. (2007) cited earlier found no clear pattern of relationship between orphanhood and nutritional status of children, it however revealed that fostered children were more likely to be stunted, underweight, and wasted, than children of HIV-negative parents. In the same vein, they noted that children whose parents were HIV/AIDS positive were significantly more likely to be underweight and wasted.

Foster & Williamson (2000, p. S281) argued that it is probable that the health of the orphans whom are taken care of by elderly and adolescents could worsen compared to that of other children, as substitute care givers might be “uninformed about good nutrition, oral rehydration treatment for diarrhea, and the recognition of serious illness”. Reporting the findings of some studies in Zambia and Kenya, Foster & Williamson (2000) assumed that younger orphans in rural Zambia were more likely to have frequent illnesses than non-orphans while orphans were significantly more malnourished than non-orphans in an urban slum in Nairobi, Kenya.

AIDS Orphanhood and Human Capital Development: The Case of Nigeria

The surge in the number of orphans caused by the HIV/AIDS epidemic seems to be reversing the clock of human capital in Nigeria. This is evident from the school enrolment difference between the non-orphans and orphans in the country. Data enclosed in Table 7 above revealed that in 2005, the percentage of non-orphans attending school in Nigeria stood at 77%, whereas the rate shown for orphans was 55%.

From table 8, it is clear that the adverse impact of HIV/AIDS on children's schooling is more marked in the North Central, North East, and South East than other regions of Nigeria. While about 13% of respondents in the North Central zone agreed that children in the community could not attend school as a result of parent’s or guardian’s sickness or death due to HIV/AIDS, 10.2% and 12.6% agreed to this fact in the North East and South East zones respectively. The lowest is recorded for the South West region, which had just 1.1 percentage point.

Information provided in the Nigeria’s 2008 Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) published by the NPC & ICF Macro (2009) revealed that orphans and vulnerable children could drop out of school as a result of inability to pay school fees or for the purpose of helping with household labor or even in order to be able to assist sick parents or younger siblings. The result of the survey doesn’t confirm this totality as it was discovered generally that orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) were more likely to be attending school than non-OVC children. In fact, the figure revealed that about 80% of OVC were attending school compared to the 73% rate of non-OVC children with double orphans having 84% school attendance compared to 72% of children with both parents alive. These results aren’t shocking in reality for the following reasons. Firstly, the survey focused on “only orphans and vulnerable children living in households; children who are living in institutions or other non-household settings, including children living on the street, are not included in the 2008 NDHS OVC results” (National Population Commission, 2009, p. 285). Secondly, the number of sampled OVC was by far lower than that of non-OVC. While the OVC number and double orphans sampled stood at 2,593; the number of non-OVC stood at 15,459. Furthermore, there’s the possibility that these group of OVC and double orphans benefit from better attention and assistance because of the available care services compared to the non-OVCs who were living with their parents, and since most households in this part of the world are living below the poverty line, it is possible that many don’t have the financial possibility to send all their children to school.

6 National Population Commission
The 2009 M&E plan for OVC response in Nigeria indicated that most Nigerian OVCs actually live in deplorable conditions and are also exposed to neglect, exploitation, and abuse and are deprived of basic human rights. The plan also revealed that in Nigeria about 29% of all children between 6 to 17 years are engaged in child labor, 20.3% are not attending school regularly, 15% lack access to health facilities; more than 20% have no birth certificates while

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**Table 8: Effects of HIV/AIDS on children’s schooling**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background Characteristics</th>
<th>Children in the Community Do Not Attend School Because Parent or Guardian Died or is Sick Because of HIV/AIDS</th>
<th>Children in the Family Do Not Attend School Because Parent or Guardian Died or is Sick Because of HIV/AIDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Distribution of Parents/Guardians By Whether Children in the Community and Children in the Household Do Not Attend School Because Their Parents / Legal Guardians Are Sick or Died of HIV/AIDS, By Background Characteristics, Nigeria Education Data Survey (NEDS), 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background Characteristics</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know/ Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know/ Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Number of Parents/ Guardians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<td>87.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<td>Urban</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>18,185</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<td>85.2</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
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<td>81.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>97.2</td>
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<td>98.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5,614</td>
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<td>Second</td>
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<td>88.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>75,376</td>
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<td>Middle</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>96.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>Fourth</td>
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<td>87.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
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<td>89.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>97.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>26,634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: NPC\(^7\), FMOE\(^8\), USAID\(^9\) and ESSPIN\(^10\) (2011)

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\(^7\) National Population Commission
\(^8\) Federal Ministry of Education
\(^9\) United States Agency for International Development
\(^10\) Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria
17.8% are victims of sexual abuse. It further noted that the situation of OVC in the country is deplorable, which is in turn compounded by HIV and AIDS epidemic.

Furthermore, in the area of basic material needs, such as shoes, clothes, and blankets, the survey found out that these needs were met for every 7 out of 10 children aged 5 - 17. It was further discovered that in the case of OVC’s, only 66% were likely to have these basic needs fulfilled compared to the 69% of the non-OVC. The situation is worst in the rural areas, where the survey discovered that only 61% of the OVCs were likely to have all three of the basic material needs met as compared to 77% of non-OVC. In addition, differences also exist among the six geo-political zones in the country. While 55% of the OVC in the North East have their basic needs fulfilled, the South West zone recorded about 94%, the highest figure in the country. This could be due to the high level of Western education as well as a relatively better economic status of the zone. Whereas nutritional status is concerned, while 28% of the OVC under age five were underweight, 27% was observed among the non-OVC, with the South East zone having the lowest proportion of underweight OVC, precisely 11% and the North East having the highest rate of 40%. All the above issues have severe consequences on the human capital development and will surely affect the individuals and the whole economy unless nothing is done to ameliorate the situation.

**Methodology**

This work is merely descriptive. It additionally employs growth formula to analyze the rate at which AIDS Orphans increases in Nigeria. The growth rate of HIV/AIDS induced Orphans is given as

\[
H_n = \left(\frac{H_t - H_{t-1}}{H_{t-1}}\right) \cdot 100
\]

Where: 
- \(H_n\) = Growth rate of HIV/AIDS induced orphans
- \(H_t\) = Number of HIV/AIDS induced orphans in current year
- \(H_{t-1}\) = Number of HIV/AIDS induced orphans in previous year

**Data Sources**

This study employs data from the UNAIDS\textsuperscript{11}, UNDATA (2011), Index Mundi and Encyclopedia of Nations.

**Brief Results and Discussions**

The growth rates of the number of AIDS Orphans in Nigeria analyzed in table 10 above revealed a continuous and positive growth from 1990 to 2009. Between 1990 and 1991, in just one year, the figure shows a 100% rise. By 1992, the growth rate declined slightly to 91.67%. Although the rates over the years have been positive, one promising thing is that the rate has been on a decline as could be seen from the table. In 1995, a 60% increase was registered, but by 2000, the rate fell to 25% and in 2005, it further reduced to 10.53%. The 2009 rate stood at 4.17% indicating that the number of orphans determined by AIDS pandemic has continued to decrease. This is very encouraging. Figure 2 below shows a graphical representation of the growth rates of AIDS Orphans in Nigeria from 1990 to 2009 allowing for a better visual appreciation. From the figure, it is easily observable that the rate continued to decline sharply and consistently from 1990 to 2009. This is closely connected to the increase in awareness of the deadliness of the disease, which has contributed to the decrease the number of deaths caused by the pandemic.

\textsuperscript{11} Joint United Nations Program for HIV/AIDS
Contrary to the above, the percentage of AIDS Orphans aged between 0 to 14 shows an increasing trend. A rapid look at the figure reveals a consistent increase since 1990 till date. While 0.03% of children aged 0-14 were orphan in 1990, the rate rose to 0.5% in 1995, and it has increased to 2.1% by 2000. This trend continued until reaching a record of 3.5% in 2005 and by 2009, it has extended to 3.78%. Figure 3 below provides a better graphical analysis of this fact. From the graph, it can be easily seen that the trend is rising, which is not at all good for the country considering the ugly plight of most orphans in this part of the world, where the
majority of them live in deplorable conditions, neglected, exploited, abused, and deprived of basic human rights as revealed by the 2009 M&E plan for OVC response in Nigeria.

![Figure 3: AIDS Orphans as a percentage of Children Aged 0-14 (%). Source: Generated by the Author](image)

**Summary, Conclusion and Policy Recommendations**

This study considers and analyzes how the increasing numbers of AIDS Orphans in Nigeria would affect the households, the lives of the orphans themselves as well as the economy over the years, in terms of welfare, educational attainment as well as health and nutrition status, which will jointly have impact on the level of human capital at micro and macro levels. The review of a number of related literature and the states of Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Nigeria as well as the policy response programs revealed that there is still much to be done.

The results of the few analysis which have been carried out revealed that the growth rate of the number of orphans occasioned by the dreaded disease has continued to be positive since 1990. Furthermore, AIDS Orphans as a percentage of children in the age bracket 0 to 14 has been increasing on national level. In fact, the increase of this figure is quite alarming, shifting from 0.03% in 1990 to 2.1% in 2000 and further to 3.78% in 2009. Enrolment figures as well rates of school dropout among the OVCs are clear indicators that the impact on human capital of the increasing number of AIDS Orphans will be substantial.

The above findings suggest that there should be better policy programs spearheaded by the various governments in Nigeria focusing on the welfare of these children who are orphans as a result of the AIDS pandemic. This study recommends that at least fundamental education should be free and compulsory for these children. Medical services should also be freely provided to them until they graduate from university and have better employment opportunities. Government should also provide them shelter, clothing, and food. Those who currently live as street traders or the ones sleeping under the bridges should be provided accommodation. Communities providing safety nets for these children should be empowered and encouraged with proper financial assistance. In addition, funds meant for the upkeep of these orphans should be judiciously used solely for this purpose and must not be diverted for private usage. Proper legislation against all forms of exploitation and abuse, especially of the girls, should be provided. Finally, religious organizations should be encouraged and empowered to cater for these children since their leaders are usually highly respected by the society.
References


Pathways to Education in Hungary with Public Care Background

ANDREA RÁCZ
Department of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Debrecen, Hungary

Abstract:

Hungarian child-protection system cares for 21,000 children and young adults. In the case of the children who were removed from their own family it is obvious that the professional bodies and the communities take the parental responsibilities, which means that all the governmental and the official agencies in the institutional child-care and the workers of the foster-care network must work on improving the lives of the children in state care. In Hungary it is not known exactly how the needs of the recipient determine the types of service they can receive. We do not have any information relating what principles prevail in the planning and provision of care and services, and additionally what are the effects of the structural transformation of the system starting 2013. In this study, we present the Hungarian child protection system and briefly also the education system, then we show the opinions of the decision-makers, the child protection professionals and the social workers in the public care system who were interviewed for Young People: Pathways to Education in Europe (YIPPEE) international research project – funded from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Program. We deal with the young adults’ educational career and with their aspirations for the future. We investigate those factors that can possibly determine the further and higher education career of young people with public care background and we have tried to identify possible supporting and inhibiting factors.

Keywords: Child Protection; Educational Carrier after Compulsory School; Supporting and Inhibitory Factors.

Introduction

Hungarian child-protection system cares for 21,000 children and young adults. In case of the children who were removed from their own family it is evident that the professional bodies and communities (educators, child welfare supervisors, foster parents) take the parental responsibilities (corporate parenting), which means that all the governmental and official agencies in the institutional child protection care and the workers of the foster care network must work on improving the lives of the children in care state (Jackson, 2007). There are two central trends which influence the way we view children and young people in care and schooling. The first is the compensatory thinking, which means an educational approach addressing the “problems” and troubled backgrounds of the children and youngsters in care. The second is the comprehensive thinking, referring to a unification of the social education and special educational provisions. The comprehensive thinking means that we focus on the children and young adults from troubled backgrounds instead of focusing on the resources which play a major role in the children and young adults’ future (Bryderup, 2008). In Hungary it is not known exactly how the needs of the recipient determine the types of service they can receive. At the present moment we do not have any information regarding what principles prevail in the planning and provision of care and services, additionally, which are the effects of the structural transformation of the system from 2013 onwards. It is essential that the children’s individual needs define what kind of services and support are needed and how these services and helping mechanism can give adequate answers to children’s problems (Trocmé, 1999; UNICEF, 1997; Rácz, 2012). The regional way of operating is predictably overtaken by the

1 Postal Address: Egyetem tér 1, 4032 Debrecen, Hungary. E-mail Address: racz.andrea2@chello.hu
less established professional principles; the planning, the provision of the services and the support of the educational carrier have an *ad hoc* nature; in the child protection system there is no conscious planning and the quasi-professionalism is typical (Rácz, 2012).

This article presents the major Hungarian experiences in the qualitative research phase of international YIPPEE research, based on the published national reports (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010; Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011). 'Young People from a Public Care Background: Pathways to Education in Europe' international research was realized by the 7th Research Project of the EU – ‘Young People and Social Discrimination’ – give an overall picture of the possible helping and hindering factors that can influence the choice of a higher education career of young people with child care background between the ages of 19 and 21. The research was carried out in Denmark, Hungary, Spain, Sweden and Great Britain in 2007-2010 and it was divided into several parts. First of all, we carried out a literature review and analyzed the published statistical data in this field. Secondly, we interviewed the decision makers and the child care professionals. Then, we made a questionnaire survey with young people between the ages of 19 and 21 who spent at least a year in child care and who were still in care at the age of 16. On the basis of these results, we carried out series of interviews with 35 young people and with a key figure in each student’s life. Young people who participated in the Hungarian survey were all in after-care support, and came from 4 counties of Hungary (Regional Child-protection Agencies).

In this article, we start by briefly presenting the Hungarian child-protection system and education system, then we show the opinions of decision-makers, child-protection professionals and social workers who were interviewed for YIPPEE international research. In the end, we deal with the interviewed young adults’ educational career and with the aspirations they have for their future. We wish to investigate those factors that can possibly determine the further and higher education career of young people with a public care background and we have tried to identify possible supporting and inhibitory factors. We will conclude this paper with commentaries and conclusions regarding the theme that was studied.

**A Short Guide to the Child Protection and Education System**

During the transition years, after 1989, practically all policies related to education, protection and support of children and young people have been changed and modernized. *The Act 31 of 1997 on the protection of children and guardianship* (Child Protection Act) was accepted by the Hungarian Parliament in April 1997. This Act is based on the Hungarian Constitution, which gives the general framework for the protection of children, youth and families. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was accepted in New York on 20th of November 1989, specifies the wider framework of our Constitution. It is setting out the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of children (Rácz, Hodosán & Korintus, 2009).

The Child Protection Act owes its existence essentially to the social and historical event of the end of the former regime. Its legal historical significance is that it is the first complete and independent legal regulation of the Hungarian child-protection system. Its significance in terms of child-protection history is that it enriches, transforms and structures the protection of children by adding new institutions (Domszky, 1999).

Children’s rights and interests are priorities; therefore the aim is to bring up children in their own families, as much as possible. The Act is the relevant piece of legislation for all services for children, such as childcare, respite care, residential care, and foster care. The two main objectives in relation to children in public care are 1) to help children to get back to their own families as soon as possible and 2) if this is not possible, support their integration into society, and assist them achieve an independent life (Rácz, Hodosán & Korintus, 2009).

The Hungarian child-protection system includes *child welfare services* (child welfare, childcare and respite care) and *long term care* for children and adolescents in children’s homes and foster families. TEGYESZ, the Regional Child Protection Agencies coordinate child protection actions, support people working within the system and provide the caretakers for children. Before the termination of the short- or long-term care, *after-care support*
(consultation and personal advice in everyday matters) is granted to children or young people for minimum of one year, provided that they request it. Upon the request of the young adult, after-care provision (in residential home or in foster care plus consultation) is granted if s/he cannot support herself (himself), or is in full-time education, or is waiting for admittance to a social welfare institution. Since 2010 January 1st, young people can apply for after-care provision up to the age of 21 if they work or are seeking work, or up to the age of 24 if they study, and until the age of 25 if they take part in full-time post-secondary education. Financial support is available towards buying a home when they leave the system. Since Hungarian young people, in general, leave their families to start an independent life at 25 and a half, the age of becoming independent is roughly the same for the two groups (Rácz, Hodosán & Korintus, 2009).

In Hungary, the educational system is not part of the child-protection system. The primary rules on the obligation to study are laid down in the Act No. LXXIX of 1993 on Public Education. The Act No. CXC of 2011 on National Public Education entered into force on the 1st of September, but most of the measures are delayed and will be introduced gradually. From September 2012, the compulsory school age is of 16 years, instead of 18 years. The legislature justified this change by saying that it was not necessary to keep those students in school who did not wish to study in the framework of educational institutions. Lowering the compulsory school age greatly increases the social exclusion risk of young people who are disadvantaged or have been raised in the child-protection system.

The number of looked after children and young adults reaches in the last years to around 21 thousand. 17 thousand children under 18 years and 4 thousand older than 18 lived in long term care. 9% of the looked after children was 0-3 years old. 26% was 4-10 years old. 46% was 11-17 years old and 19% is older than 18 years old. The low level of education of people raised in the child-protection system predicts their social exclusion. In 2009, a total of 9,674 children living in specialized care attended primary school, primary school for mentally disabled children and primary school for workers. The majority (3,584) of children placed in foster families attending primary school were in the normal age range of their group, while the corresponding figure for those living in children’s homes was reversed, the majority being over-age (2,546) (Child protection statistics Guide, 2009).

We have very few information about the educational pathways of young people in care and their participation in the higher education – this is a field that should be improved in the future since, given the present circumstances, we do not have any insight into the further studies of students within the child-protection system, at higher educational levels. The biggest obstacle proved to be the national educational statistics, which contain very few data about students in the child-protection system and that statistical data collection concerning child protection is not detailed enough, in the case of school career (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010).

In the scholastic year 2008-2009, the majority attended vocational schools (2,745), and a far smaller number went to secondary school (832). The lowest number was of those attending vocational education courses outside school (78) (Child protection statistics Guide, 2009). In the scholastical year in question, 164 children went to high school, 327 went to vocational secondary school, 1,662 attended a vocational school, and 45 attended an NTR course. Children placed in foster care are more likely to continue their studies in schools which offer better educational and labor market opportunities, than their counterparts living in children's homes. However, the number of students in vocational schools was also relatively high (1,083 during the scholastical year 2008-2009), but they valued more vocational secondary school that offered a diploma and a profession than high schools focusing on general knowledge and a leaving diploma. This typically arises from the fact that higher education is hardly a perspective for foster families, as opposed to learning a profession followed by entering the labor market, and might have financial causes (Child protection statistics Guide, 2009). Comparing to the basic population, there is a larger emphasis on vocational secondary schools

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2 Until the new regulations come into force, the relative provisions of the Act No. LXXIX of 1993 on Public Education apply, their repeal is carried out gradually. The rule on the compulsory school age [§ 45 Article (3)] is in effect from 1 September 2012, with the transitional provisions that lower the compulsory school age first for those who are in eighth or lower grade during the 2011-2012 school year [§ 97 Article (1)].
and proportionally half of those who choose to study in vocational training school grow up without a family (Educational Statistical Guide 2008/2009).

Based on “Ifjúság 2008” data, we can establish that acquisition of a secondary school leaving-certificate does not provide protection against unemployment. In the young age group of the general population (15-29 years), the majority of the unemployed are graduates of primary school (35% unemployed), while 29% of vocational school graduates and 28% of secondary school graduates are unemployed. Unemployment among university graduates is 8%. (Szabó & Bauer, 2009, pp. 27)

Table 1: Number and Proportion of Students in Compulsory Education in Hungary (School year 2008/2009³)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>In Hungary altogether</th>
<th>Those who are in the public child-care</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school (Általános iskola)</td>
<td>790722</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school (Gimnázium)</td>
<td>247777</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational secondary school (Szakközépiskola)</td>
<td>271351</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training school (Szakiskola)</td>
<td>128848</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1438698</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Students with a public-care background are characterized by lower qualifications and poorer performance at school than the general population of their age groups. There is evidence showing that only a small number of those in public-care who engage in further studies had good results at secondary school or vocational secondary school that could pave the way to higher education. Children in public care who are under 18 of age are more likely to study in vocational schools than their counterparts living in their families, and three times more likely to have multiple disadvantages in life, according to the National Competence Study. Some of these might be due to years of living in unsettled, deprived families not recognizing the values of education. Thus, many children in public-care have already accumulated shortcomings during primary school (Gyarmati, Csák & Rácz, 2009). A typical problem is the lack of motivation of children in public-care. It has been stated, many times, that those living in foster-care are more motivated, since personalized education and attention is more effective, and since foster parents also provide a stronger role model. It has also been pointed out that many children prefer work over study, in order to start a self-sufficient life, become independent, and escape from the public care system as soon as possible. However, childcare agencies are not required to collect information about the educational careers of children and young people in care, so more detailed information is not available. According to the estimations about 6% of those rose in public care study at higher education, whereas the same figure is 21% for the general population (Rácz, Hodosán & Korintus, 2009).
Educational career support and inhibiting factors in educational career after compulsory schooling

Research design and methodology
The overall aim of the YIPPEE project is to investigate educational pathways after the end of the compulsory schooling among young men and women who have been in public-care in European countries as children, and to consider how their opportunities to access further and higher education might be improved.

Specific objectives are to:
- Map current knowledge about educational participation among this group,
- Track and evaluate the educational plans and pathways of a sample of young people aged 19-21,
- Identify the conditions within care and education systems that facilitate or act as obstacles to continuing in post-compulsory education,
- Explore young people’s constructions of educational identity and their trajectories in terms of social class, gender, ethnicity and care responsibilities, both young men and women, and also explore those of the careers and staff offering services designed to support them.

In Hungary we hardly have any information about those young people who live in child protection system. Overall, there have been only a limited number of researches related to children and young adults in public-care or leaving the public-care since 1990. Research focusing on their education after the age of 18, motivation to study or participation in higher education was basically non-existent.

The research done since the transition years, mostly deals with the working and the structural transformation of the child protection system. It would be high time now to analyze the situations, the problems, and the possibilities of those children and young adults coming from the public care system to begin autonomous lives, focusing especially on the continued education, and labor market- and social integration. The importance of studying and further education is acknowledged by the existence of after-care homes, where young people can stay between the ages of 18 and 25, if they study or work. The YIPPEE research is the first endeavor to study the motivations, opportunities and educational pathways of this group.

The aim of the research was to identify and track the progress of 19-21 years old with a public care background who were still in care at the age of 16 and gave some evidence of ‘educational promise’ by either having passed the secondary school final exams (the certificate being the criteria for entering higher education) or taking one of the alternative pathways through the education system to pursue studies, and showed the motivation to continue in further or higher education (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010; Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011).

Under the YIPPEE international project in Hungary, we used several qualitative methods to value the further education opportunities existing for young people raised within the child-protection system, which paths do they take within the educational system and which are their characteristics in this field.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of Regional Child-Protection Agencies (TEGYESZ) in the four selected counties. The selection of the four TEGYESZ agencies was based upon the country's territorial and developmental characteristics, and the number of young people being raised within the child-protection system. In the sample were included one county from the western region (Vas County), one from the country's northern region (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén), one from the eastern region (Hajdú-Bihar), with the capital also included in the sample as the fourth area. In terms of economic development, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County is located in a disadvantaged part of the country; Vas County comprises more affluent areas, while Budapest is considered to be a region with the best attributes in all aspects. The number of those raised within the child-protection system is the highest in the capital, while Vas County shows one of the lowest figures in the country. We asked how they see the chances of those raised in the child protection-system in further education, and what circumstances make it more difficult or easier for these young people to follow further education.

In-depth interviews were conducted with 35 young people raised within the child-protection system (they were in the system at the age of 16, and at the beginning of the research they were
between 19 and 21 years of age) who had some chance of a promising academic career. These young people were contacted one year after the in-depth interview, when a shorter interview took place. We examined how life turned out for them, and to what degree they were to implement the plans they had told us about during the first interview. The second interview with these young people (a follow-up, one year later) – was conducted by telephone, given that, in this case, a shorter and more structured conversation was necessary.

The main questions that were pursued in the in-depth interviews: How do they think about their present (education, work, family life, housing, health, hobby, obligations)? How do they evaluate their childhood and their educational carrier? How do they think about their future (three to ten years from now on)? How much does it depend on the young adult and how much is outside his/her control? After a year we asked how the plans were fulfilled. An adult of their choice was also interviewed – to gain a better insight into their lives, academic careers, and motivations. We analyzed how they think about young people’s educational carrier and life in the child-protection system.

All interviews were recorded, transcribed and analyzed using the Nvivo qualitative data analysis package.

The verbatim transcriptions of 35 in-depth interviews of young people were imported into the Nvivo software, and given codes (tree nodes) developed by the international research team. A total of 24 tree nodes were used, which consist of sub-codes for 7 larger themes (education, employment, future, health, housing, leisure time, and social relations, followed the structure of the interview guide). After trial-coding a few interviews, researchers reviewed interviews coded by others, and discussed the individual codes, so that each sub-code refers to the same theme, no matter who coded a given interview.

During the analysis, researchers divided the themes among themselves, and worked independently with the coded interviews. We worked with interviews in two phases, when writing up topics/chapters. First, snippets for a given topic code were collected, with the help of Nvivo. Reading these excerpts (which sometimes constitute hundreds of pages of material), we were able to obtain a comprehensive picture of the important elements in a topic, and of their characteristic and recurrent patterns. In the second step, we examined the topic for each interviewee, and collected all the characteristic details (which were later used when a quote was needed for illustration). Thus, in the second step, we could examine a topic in the context of the young person's life. For topics where this was relevant, the second interview was also examined, and the changes summarized (Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011).

Main results of the research
In the following part of the article we deal with the interviewed young adults' educational career and with their future perspectives. We investigate those factors that can possibly determine young adults' education career, young adults who were brought up in public care and we try to identify possible supporting and inhibitory factors based on our findings.

The perspectives of the child-care professionals
Child-care professionals and foster-parents try to support young people raised within the child-protection system in their further studies. The support system has several levels. Apart from the immediate support of studies, i.e. helping with homework, financial support, the provision of an emotional background and motivation also appear. On a critical note, however, we should say that child-care professionals do not regard higher-level qualifications as a reachable goal for this target group, so they instead tend to encourage them to obtain a secondary-school leaving-certificate and a profession. They try to protect the young people from failure, even those whose school performances show that they should, evidently, be heading towards getting a degree. In some cases, this approach entails the professionals disregarding personal achievements and merits and, thus, not providing encouragement and an emotionally-supportive background. (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010; Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011)

5 “Educational promise” was only defined as a determination to study, or a plan for further study, and we did not impose criteria on the level of studies.
Based on our research results, we can establish two groups of factors influencing further study after the youth has reached the age signifying the end of compulsory schooling: “endogenous” and “exogenous” factors. The first group of factors contains so-called endogenous factors, that can be grouped into the following 3 subgroups: 1) will, perseverance, individual commitment, a strong feeling of wanting to break out, 2) regarding knowledge as value, good school performance, balanced school career, talent, special field of interest, 3) desire to establish a secure future, taking responsibility for personal actions and decisions, assessment of the labour market position, the realization of childhood dreams and desires, future-oriented approach. The other group contains the so-called exogenous factors that can also be grouped into three subgroups, as it follows: 1) stable place of care, emotional support, motivation from child-care professionals, supportive person in the immediate environment (sibling, child-care professional, foster-parent), 2) good school-atmosphere, good relationship with fellow students, support of studies, nurturing of talent, monitoring of school career, child-care professionals’ help in career planning, 3) provision of financial support (Rácz, 2009; Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010, Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011).

Obstacles/barriers and facilitators/opportunities which may prevent young people in care from participating in further and higher education are present in five levels: 1) level of the individual, 2) level of the family, 3) level of education, 4) level of child care/welfare, and 5) level of public politics (decision-making) (Casas – Montserrat, 2009). The following table (Table 2) shows the Hungarian barriers and facilitators to study beyond compulsory schooling.

**Table 2: Barriers and facilitators in studying beyond compulsory schooling in Hungary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Different levels</th>
<th>Obstacles/barriers which may prevent young people in care from participating in further and higher education</th>
<th>Facilitators/opportunities which may help young people in care to increase the participation in further and higher education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Individual level       | • Accumulate disadvantages  
                          • Not motivated  
                          • Difficulties in choosing an occupation and in orienting themselves  
                          • Mental problems  
                          • Difficulty in formulating longer term plans  | • Realistic view of their future  
                          • High expectations |
| Family level           | • Do not value education  
                          • Income from illegal (not taxed) work more desirable  | • Paying more individual attention to children (i.e. foster families)  
                          • Inspiring environment at home  
                          • Show good personal example |
| School level           | • Cannot provide good experiences  
                          • Not prepared to deal/work with children in care  | • Following and motivating throughout school career  
                          • Dedicated person to help the child  
                          • Focusing on developing children’s basic competences and practical education  
                          • Offering psycho-social support  
                          • Positive discrimination within school |
| Child protection / welfare system level: | • Most children are not taken into care until around age 12-14 | • Offering psycho-social support  
                          • Financial support  
                          • Providing successful role models |
| Policy level           | • Two different laws and two different ministries  
                          • Need of a holistic approach  
                          • No child and youth policy  
                          • Not enough early interventions (prevention programs)  | • Clear policies for financial help and practical support  
                          • Ensuring that pathway plans exist and are acted upon |

Source: Rácz, Csák & Korintus (2010), p. 167
Young people’s experiences, future perspectives

A holistic approach was undertaken into the research questions, locating the young people’s educational experience within the overall context of their lives, in and out of care. The areas covered were young people’s lives at the time of first and second interviews, their current concerns, educational engagement and attainments, social relationships and informal learning and leisure activities. Exploration of their past experiences which means their life in the birth families and ongoing relations with relatives, childhood events, care careers and educational lives during the compulsory school years.

At the time of the first interview, all the 35 young people were studying (this is due to the selection method – see above – as we selected those who were educationally promising). One-third of the young people were attending higher-education institutions. As for the others, 12 had already obtained a secondary-school leaving-certificate but, instead of continuing their studies, were attending some kind of professional course. Six were trying to obtain a secondary-school leaving-certificate, and five were attending vocational training school. Apart from studying, many were also working, five regularly (and one holding a full-time job alongside attending a university correspondence course), although, during the interview, others also talked about taking up student jobs during the summer or on an occasional basis. (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010; Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011)

As each youngster was in the system – received after-care provision – most of them lived in some form of accommodation provided by the child protection system: continue to use after-care provision at foster-parents; utilizing after-care places provided within the institutional care; living in residential care circumstances together with other youngsters with child-protection system backgrounds or live in after-care homes.

Young adults primarily have external (not from the care system) relationships, and they really try keeping it that way. Relationships with those being brought up within the child welfare system are much better described as “camaraderie” rather than friendship. The most common place for friendship formation is school. Many of the interviewees recounted negative experiences from both school and the community of children; as a result of these, they developed a particular defense mechanism – hiding their pasts, their family backgrounds, and the living conditions in which they were raised. Due to their child protection system background, or their Romani ethnic origin, many of them have faced discrimination, primarily those living in institutional care (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010; Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011; Rácz, 2012).

In most cases, they faced complexes, long-term problems in the family, including ill-treatment and negligence, originating from alcoholism. Financial problems were mentioned in almost all of the narratives, but only very rarely these were the only problems a family had. It is also clear, from the interviews, that the young adults spent long years in unsettled conditions, being hurt physically and mentally, and lacking parental love and care. Typically, the biological parents were lower-educated people: many didn’t even manage to complete the 8 grades of primary-school, and they were most of the times unemployed and inactive people (living on disability pensions) among them. The interviewees specify that there is usually no contact with the natural parents, or only a very eclectic one (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010; Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011).

The majority of interviewees made positive statements about child-care professionals working within the institutional care system. Those who were raised by foster-parents tended to have a close relationship with the foster-family and said that the foster-parents did not differentiate between them and their own children and that it was easy to fit into the family. Several young people mentioned as a positive attribute that, during their time spent within the child welfare and after-care provision systems, they got to know a professional whose personality, lifestyle and general views served as a good example and to whom they could turn with their troubles. A negative characteristic is the fact that some youngsters brought up in institutional care are skeptical about trusting child protection professionals and that, as young adults, they might be treated as partners (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010; Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011; Rácz, 2012).

We saw that the child-protection professionals’ attitude towards education was considered to be supportive and, by giving priority to studies, the foster family and the children’s home confirmed the youngsters that a good academic performance is a condition for moving forward. Support provided in the child protection system can be grouped in basically three categories: 1)
assistance related to academic career (homework assistance, mentoring, tutoring), 2) covering study-related additional costs (school supplies, accommodation, travel expenses, costs of participation in school events) and 3) emotional support (counseling, motivation, career counseling and assistance). Between the two forms of child care – institutional care and foster care – support is emphasized differently; children's homes tend to have more opportunities to financially support studies, while emotional support from foster parents is much stronger (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010).

The most dominant argument in encouraging the studies is that through studying they can be better than their birth-families. They deem that further studies offer the chance to break away from their past, and ensure better, more financially-stable lives than their parents led. The strong feeling of wanting to break out and consciously separate from the past has been an important motivational force in their lives. They mostly associate positive characteristics (appreciation, respect, has a high-prestige job and a good salary) with the image of an educated person. Short-range plans related to studies are organized around three alternatives: 1) to continue studies after a year; this concerns schools that the young adults have already begun, 2) to start further studies after finishing the current studies, 3) to find a job, after finishing the current studies. In the case of those youngsters who are attending a higher-education institution, the short-range plans also include scholarship-applications to study abroad, finding a job, and the further development of language-skills. It is a general plan among young adults that they intend to use after-care provision after a year, as well. Those who continue their studies may have after-care provision until the age of 24/25. They regard this as a very important time period in the preparation for a self-sufficient life and establishing their financial situation (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010; Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011).

Conclusion

We have very few information about the educational pathways of young people in care and their participation in the higher education. Our results show that most of those raised in child-protection would like to learn some kind of profession, a major motivating factor and a priority is to be able to get, as soon as possible, an independent life; educators and foster parents predictably also consider this to be important, and often they consider a secondary certificate as realistically achievable by these young people. Young adults, as they tend to consider learning, and obtaining suitable, competitive qualifications as important, most often highlighted personal ambition, perseverance, and willpower as helping them in their studies. However, in the young adults view, a supportive background is essential. The young people highlighted their financial situations as the most inhibitor factor, many of them having to contribute to financing their studies – which strains their savings and makes starting an independent life more difficult. There is also a problem because, usually, there is no named, responsible person in the child’s life who would help him or her, and child-care institutions have no strategic plans to follow up and motivate the child in their studies. In the lives of these children, there are no appointed persons who are responsible for their school careers, from their admittance until they leave the system forever. A consequence of this is that these children have no real prospects for the future, and they experience difficulties in the course of career-planning and future orientation. TEGYESZ staff and key persons also report that if a young adult would like to obtain higher education – based on previous school performance, individual ability and motivation – the care provider and the local TEGYESZ agency try to provide every material and moral support (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010; Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011).

Continuation of studies after the age of compulsory education is largely determined by whether the children at risk receive all the necessary assistance from child-care to overcome their disadvantages and compensate for failures at school, and whether children who are taken out from their families have access, within the child-care system, to the support necessary to help them deal with the separation from their families and their familiar environment, and live down the traumas they have experienced. Professionals should support qualifications that are suited to the individual’s ideas and skills, and the foreseeable labour market demands. It might be useful to set higher expectations (e.g. vocational secondary school and secondary certificate, instead of vocational
school), because experience has shown that aiming to a higher level of education, one reaches further in the educational system. (Rácz, Csák & Korintus, 2010; Korintus, Csák & Rácz, 2011)

“Social workers and professionals tend to focus on the risks and problems in the lives of children and young people in out-of-home care. It is important to recognize the positive features, strengths and competences of these young people and their at times astonishing capacity for resilience.” (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 96).

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Book review

An approach of recent social policy issues and services in Hungary: dilemmas of a new compilation of studies

Three years after the exchange of governments and one year before the next elections in Hungary, still affected by the events of the global crisis, an almost 400 hundred page collection of novel articles raised my interest. Regarding the discipline of sociology and social policy, I often manage to find books on special issues, but not a comprehensive one which would give an overall picture of what has happened in Hungary in the last ten years in field of social affairs. Moreover, I rarely manage to find current knowledge on specific national social issues. Thus, finding one which provides an overall view of facts seems quite difficult.

According to the editors, this compilation of articles has almost two decades of antecedents, in the framework of the project called Local Organization of Social Services, with the aim to “build a bridge among different social cultures and social politics which exist in the United States, Western Europe and the so-called transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe” (Bódi, Fábián & Lawson, 2012, p. 480). With the collapsing of regimes in this part of Europe, significant changes occurred: the transition into democracy; the introduction of a market economy; privatization and the intention to make this process as smoothly and quickly as possible, without causing enormous disturbances in the operation in national society. A major change in the last years happened in politics, since the former minority party (Fidesz) gained a two-thirds majority in the last election and brought significant changes in numerous fields, such as the labor market, the taxation system, legislation, public administration or the regulations of operation of civic organizations.

During the more than twenty transition years, we may have witnessed significant successes together with significant failures. The persevering attitude to foster the process of accession to the European Union might also be experienced up to 2003, when Hungary signed the Accession Treaty. Some mention this as a new time in the history of the country. We most definitely experience signs of this in reference to the accession funds, large constructions, the transformation of the education system and we may also witness newly experienced symptoms, such as the appearance of poverty, regions lagging behind the heart of the country or the openness and exposure of the country to global market events, globalization.

This book was meant to be an element of a series of comparative research within a larger network in the Euro-Atlantic region, and further issues may be expected in the future on the status quo of other countries. Being an element of the series, it is really about what has
happened lately in diverse fields of the most important social fields and what is worth to know when we try to describe the social situation of the country itself.

This compilation includes 18 diverse professional articles on different fields of social issues in Hungary, and I would also say that it include the most necessary essences. The editors of the volume are Ferenc Bódi, PhD, senior research fellow of Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Prof. Gergely Fábián, PhD, dean of University of Debrecen Faculty of Health and Prof. Thomas R. Lawson, PhD, FUAS professor and director of International programs Kent School of Social Work, University of Louisville, meaning that this book is the result of a solid international scholar research partnership.

The editors have split up the essays of this volume into three different thematic fields: local organization of social services, the subject of inequality and regional policy-treatment of inequity.

The subject of local organization of social services primarily focuses on the historic background and a more general and external approach of the social themes and thereby forms a prequel to the next, more detailed and specific issues. We may read about primarily theoretical approaches, as a prequel, about basics of a model of the evolution of the welfare state, identifying ways and approaches to the management of the social sphere. Some articles have a historical perspective of this issue and follows events through the Hungarian history primarily based on secondary analysis. These findings also have a demographic relevance as well, guiding us through the most important events of the social stages during the socialist regime and after that. We may witness the most urging problems of the state today, the declining number of population and fears of the future generation, so many worries about the labor market policies, the imbalanced situation of the sustainability of labor market events, and the “split up of the country into liveable and less liveable areas” (Bódi & Bódi, 2012a, p. 48).

Regarding results of one of the most important issues of the book, that is, unemployment and labor market trends, “the private sector plays a rather small role in increasing the level of employment, and the crisis of 2008 still have an effect on the representatives of the private sector”. The current instruments of employment policy involving participants from the private sector are in evidence only to small degree and fall far short of both expectations and opportunities with respect to their effects at the present time” (Csoba, 2012, p. 380).

The difference of regions is a truly urging challenge of the country as well, and even owing to the European Union accession, some may refer that inequalities from the dimension of economic, chances and cultures do not seem to cease rapidly. Globalization may also have meant the increasing role of decentralization, and also raised the role of interdependence (Giddens, 2008, p. 56), but for those who live and have to live on the edge, this interdependence means the relationship of vicious events and their negative consequences (for example low education-workplace-standard of living). The disintegration, falling apart of local economies and high level of unemployment remain a basic problem for communities on the edge (Bódi & Bódi, 2012a, p. 55). Ways of development are really hard to find in those territories, when the human capacity (such as competence, creativity) does not support local economies. Hence, subsidies and promotion will also miss cities, villages, which are not prepared for that.

We may also miss the signs of local self-governing intentions; a deficit in democracy of rural societies may also be experienced. Through the years of transitions, the number of the voters seems to get lower. Basically, there is a difference by the number of inhabitants up to 2010, the ratio of voters raises with the decrease of the number of inhabitants, it seems that the smallest villages are the most active in voting behavior. It also seems to be vital, that “mass of people receiving social allowance is situated mainly in those parts of the country, where participation in the local elections was high” which raises the question of the specific civic duty (Bódi & Bódi, 2012b, p. 74). A prime survey also analyzes political issues. The rural municipalities, regarding the subject of development, became dependent on application funds (mainly EU subsidies). According to the findings (Bódi & Fekete, 2012, p. 383), “the greatest responsibility in the development of the municipality is attributed to the mayor. The population of permanently underdeveloped places can mostly count on their closed environment”.

Regarding the key question of their research – what does evaluation of local politics and public
life depend on: the development path of the municipalities or the status groups - there is no unifying, direct answer given by the authors.

Regarding poverty, social literatures often discuss its relationship with minorities, mainly the ethnic minorities, like gypsies. We may read a comparative analysis on problem sensitiveness of the roma and the non-roma, discussing most important social issues of the communities. Of the results we may declare that the most urging problem is in relationship with the unemployment status of the affected ones, and we may assume, that other effects stem from this. Public work - and its associated natures – may represent the only opportunity for the unemployed, and although they may be suitable leverages for social problems, “the long-lasting distortion of the local labour market as a result of public work programs becoming permanent” (Fónai, 2012, p. 93). The private examinations and results of Mihály Fónai are worth reading regarding this issue.

The issue of migration in a society towards modernization also needs attention, as some works in the book also hit this area. After a literary review of past events (such as immigration into the USA due to numerous reasons in history - Great Depression, Holocaust, 1956), it is also worth scrutinizing current trends, and it became obvious that we were far behind the other Eastern-European countries. This theme brings us closer to the acceptance of ethnical minorities and foreign visitors. Based on the results of primary survey among students, it became obvious – by the opinion of young respondents – that we are best friendly and tolerant with the Hungarian minorities abroad, and we are the least tolerant with our ethnical minorities, the Roma.

One of the most important issue of the book – as it is indicated on the cover - is about the complex crisis. “Crisis is the malfunctioning of the society” (Bódi, 2012, p. 129), which has numerous dimensions, and there is a strong interaction between them. A “country of the benefited”, where “households mostly depend on pensions and pension-like benefits” (Bódi, 2012, p. 137) may become more vulnerable when worst comes to worst. During the last twenty years the hierarchy of the society is constantly transforming, the population is growing old, and the related burdens of the employed seem to be growing. The crisis does not seem to be over, and beside the numerous investments, policies, no one really knows what has to be done to get it over.

The largest part of the book, the subject of inequalities reveals discrepancies and tensions inside the country’s social system, with most of the examinations based on primary research. Regions and settlements on the periphery face numerous deficiencies. An important issue besides the unemployment is the health state of the inhabitants, and the accessibility of specific health care services are hard, and the “welfare slope regarding the accessibility of basic health care has become even steeper, in rural areas it became penetrated” (Bódi & Horváth, 2012, p. 147). Besides the general approaches of the subject, we may find specialties on different fields and territories. The Eastern part of the country is characterized by the worst indicators, such as the poverty index, unemployment rate. We may read results of primary researches in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County, trying to reveal trends and events comparing the situation before and after the crisis. The social situation and life conditions of the Roma are also discussed in this part of the book, by representing results of an overall research project among two Roma communities in the city of Tiszavasvári. An important aspect of a research like this is the comparative approach of the two communities, discussing besides objective factors such characteristics as the mental status, and from the result is seems clear that a dominant ratio of them “see their future as hopeless and became indifferent and unsatisfied with anything” (Fónai & Vitál, 2012, p. 239). The question of usuary (requiring loans at a high/extreme interest rate) among the poor usually has only been subject of the media, in this book we may read the results of primary examinations by interviews recorded from inhabitants of slums. In a poor area “nearly everyone knows the institution of usuary” and for every one of ten people, usuary is the primary source of getting money, “since many people do not have many opportunities to get money from elsewhere” (Fábián, Szoboszlai & Hüse, 2010, p. 256).

This set of article also emphasizes the field of education, as well. One of the most frequently discussed subjects is the closure of schools. The researchers revealed the different characteristics of the closed schools and stated that there were “no relation between school reorganization and their physical conditions” (Balázs & Bódi, 2012, p. 313). They identified one difference between closed and non-closed schools: “in the case of the former it was more
frequent that children commuted to other neighborhoods rather than to choose the given schools” (Balázsi & Bódi, 2012, p. 313).

Trying to access to visions for the future, authors of the books also tried to highlight current attitudes of the youth of their most pressing problems, through various indicators. “Young people in different financial situations, living and consuming conditions have different views of the circle of the most serious generation problems” (Laki & Szabó, 2012, p. 349), and Youth 2008 survey (Bauer & Szabó, 2009, p. 9) tried to identify its most important features. “There is a rather worrying image of society behind where uncertain present, unplannable and unreliable future, the fear from unemployment, the chance to get into poverty are shaping the spirit, way of living and life strategies” (Laki & Szabó, 2012, p. 356). Many of the youngsters feel they are drifting without any aims and are confused. The country did not move towards the development of a modern society, “if there is among youth a shared, widespread feeling of insecurity, incalculability and that they have no real aims in life to follow” (Laki & Szabó, 2012, p. 356).

I would also divide the included essays into at least two main categories, those which fell into the category of secondary analysis and those which have primary research background. Most articles reach the period of the beginning of the crisis, and results are also valid shortly after that. By focusing the examination periods of most of the examinations, one weakness of the collection seems to be revealed: the subheading of the book refers to the fact, that most examinations, publications will be dealing with the crisis, reactions to that, and changes (necessary or already made) but as a matter of fact only few ones deal with these issues. Actually, I hardly managed to find details of the crisis, although one of my first expectations was to learn more what led us to the crisis and related crises in the field of social services, and what initiations and tries have already been launched to treat drawbacks of that. We must feel satisfied with the findings and accept that the reader should receive a lot on social issues and services, trends, events of the near past by reading the professional articles, but should not expect to learn more of crisis related issues. The subheading does not seem to be fortunate in this respect.

In conclusion, I found this compilation of articles very interesting, owing to the diversity of the fields in social policy represented and the examination of current events and trends. The composition of the authors suggests that this publication goes beyond what is usually offered in a volume of conference proceedings; this publication appears to be a thorough guide to the history of the past twenty-five years of social affairs, while also reflecting the current state of affairs, which have been exacerbated by the global economic crisis. I would recommend this research to all those interested in a country in social transition, be them scholars or students who are at their first approach to the subject of Hungarian social policy areas.

György Szabados

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